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5From the editors
Public administration is, as Woodrow Wilson writes in 1887, government in action. 
Government comes into existence, according to Aristotle’s famous phrase, for the 
sake of life – for our protection –, yet it exists for the good life. The good life is the 
reason we have governments. Can we have a science about good government actions 
– about good public administration? Public administration as a discipline of contem-
porary scholarly inquiry emerges precisely from the need to design better govern-
ment actions and from the need to know what makes government actions better, and 
why. This is the beginning of Kameralwissenschaften in 17th century continental 
Europe epitomized by the publication of Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff’s Der 
Teutsche Fürstenstaat in1656. This tradition climaxes in 19th century German 
Staatswissenschaften, which is, however, also a decidedly Estonian tradition: some 
of the most important representatives of the late 19th century German 
Staatswissenschaften (Wagner, Lexis, Stieda, Laspeyres, Bücher) worked at one 
point in their career in Estonia. Halduskultuur firmly positions itself within this tradi-
tion which, by default, means openness to other traditions, schools and also cultures 
and languages. 
Halduskultuur is a peer-reviewed multi-language interdisciplinary journal of 
administrative studies. The journal publishes contributions in the languages of the 
region: Estonian, Finnish, German, Russian, and also in English, the lingua franca of 
our times. The journal appears annually.
Halduskultuur is also an annual conference. The journal features the best papers 
from the conference. The 2008 conference concentrated on Europeanization of 
Public Administration.
The final essay is by Geert Bouckaert, Professor of Public Management at the 
University of Leuven, who on 17 September 2008 received an honorary doctorate 
from Tallinn University of Technology “in recognition of his merits in the develop-
ment of public management studies in Central and Eastern Europe, support of the field 
in Estonia and especially at TUT, and the promotion of scholarly co-operation.”
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Wolfgang Drechsler, "Lisbon Agenda and Public Administration", Halduskultuur, 2009, vol 10, pp. 6-21.
ABSTRACT
This essay analyzes the role of Public Administration (PA) within the Lisbon Agenda 
(LA), both on the EU and the Member States’ level and as concerns both the admin-
istration of the LA and general PA. It argues that overall, PA has been neglected or 
reduced to policy, finance, and a simple strife for ‘modernization’ and ‘innovation’ 
in the LA and the surrounding discourse until very recently, which is all the worse 
because without high-quality PA, the success of the LA is impossible. The essay sug-
gests that, when PA reforms are discussed, they generally follow the old-fashioned 
approach of the New Public Management, which by now has proven to be a failure. 
It is argued that, rather, a successful PA strategy for the LA has to heed the principles 
of the Neo-Weberian State, which in addition to everything else is particularly appro-
priate for any innovation-based development agenda.
Key Words
Lisbon Agenda, Public Administration, Public Management Reform, Neo-Weberian 
State, New Public Managament.
1. Public Administration and the Lisbon Agenda, 2000-2007
The life-world of the Lisbon Agenda, today’s Europe, can be described as a primar-
ily administered environment. In spite of all criticism of the public sector and its 
organization, it retains its significant, often dominating role in economy and society. 
It is therefore baffling that the original Lisbon Strategy does not address this subject 
at all, nor was this remedied in the Kok Report or any other documents until 2005. In 
that sense, public administration was the missing dimension of the Lisbon Agenda.
Only from 2006 do we see a trickle of mentions of public administration in 
Lisbon Agenda-related documents, especially as concerns its role in innovation 
(which is very different from ‘innovative practices in public administration’). The 
Implementation Report 2006 states that there is a role of the public sphere in the 
innovation process (17), and the Lahti conclusions (2006, 6-7) likewise acknowledge 
Wolfgang Drechsler
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this role. In all the documents that mention the Lisbon Agenda, including later ones, 
even if they are not factually linked, the same tendency is visible: A focus on e-gov-
ernment, public procurement, and innovation (usually very loosely understood).
2. The European Public Administration Network
At the same time, in Lisbon Agenda scholarship, too, neglect of public administra-
tion was the case; there was virtually no attention given to the subject matter. The 
main exception is the work by Seppo Määttä (2004, 2006), which is very strongly 
policy-oriented. This work was done in the context of the one institution that has 
addressed the topic fairly early on, EPAN (or EUPAN, the acronym seems to vary), 
“an informal network of Directors General responsible for Public Administrations in 
EU member States and European Commission” (http://www.eupan.org), which is in 
fact the main institution on the European level, if with no legal basis or staff and 
completely voluntary, to deal with the issues.
During the Luxembourg presidency, and chaired by it, EPAN formed an ad-hoc 
group on the Lisbon Strategy that worked for half a year in 2005; the results (EPAN 
2005) do not seem adequately reflected in the further discussion of public adminis-
tration within the Lisbon Agenda in the EU context.
The “Wassenaar Memorandum of Understanding” (November 2004) had estab-
lished the Lisbon Agenda as a main point of reference, arguing for “the importance 
of an excellent functioning public administration as a contributor to realising the 
Lisbon Strategy.” (EPAN 2005, 22) The final report of the ad-hoc group states that 
“Implementing some of the key Lisbon priorities depends on a highly competent, 
professional and competitive public administration, being characterised by effective 
governance structures, innovative and effective policy-making practices and a per-
formance oriented service delivery. In this sense the national public administrations 
are to be considered as important enablers for reaching the Lisbon targets.” (5)
What we can learn from the EPAN and Määttä is the significance of public 
administration for the Lisbon Agenda in its different aspects (to which we will later 
add public administration’s key role in innovation):
Table 1: The significance of public administration for the Lisbon Agenda
Public administration…
General
as a central part of public 
governance
as context creator for citizens 
and businesses to act
as service provider (hindering 
role as well as positive one)
In the EU
as the largest employer in the EU
as a large spender/purchaser 
(more than 15% EU GDP overall)
as the largest single industry in 
the EU (45% EU GDP overall)
For the Lisbon Agenda
as the main service provider 
especially in the key areas of 
the Lisbon Agenda (education, 
health care, social protection)
… and governments as the 
designers of the Lisbon 
Agenda
(EPAN 2004, 2-3; Määttä 2004, 4-6; 2006, 29, 58-59)
8Wolfgang Drechsler
3. Public Administration in the Lisbon Agenda today
By 2008, public administration still plays a very minor role in the Lisbon Agenda 
context, but it now does play a role, much of it a result of the Portuguese presidency’s 
initiative in this field. There have been specific meetings and policy papers (Initiatives 
2007), especially as regards the Member States and the National Lisbon Programmes; 
and public administration is an issue, if not a top priority, in the results report of the 
presidency as well. (Preparing 2007)
We can categorize public administration as it relates to the Lisbon Agenda into 
four basic categories:
Table 2: Categories of public administration in the Lisbon Agenda context
If we do so, we see that the current focus is almost exclusively on 2, with some atten-
tion to 1 and none to 3 or 4. We can further say that none of the Lisbon-related 
public administration documents address the structure and organization of public 
administration, except in very general terms; partially, this may have to do with the 
highly national quality of the civil service structure. Rather, tools and methods have 
been the main focus. A link to the current debate about the shifting character of the 
public administration paradigm, especially in Europe, seems to be almost complete-
ly missing; this short paper will attempt to supply it.
If we look from a public administration perspective at all the papers and docu-
ments mentioned, we also notice three significant aspects: public administration is 
generally viewed synonymously with public policy, and it is understood within a 
(public) finance framework, mainly aiming at its reduction and (streamlining, cus-
tomer-oriented) reform, often said to (indirectly) aid the innovation process. We also 
see that what is striven for is throughout a ‘modernization’, so as to arrive at ‘mod-
ern’ and ‘innovative’ public administration. And in general, it seems that institutions 
are seen more as barriers to growth and innovation than enablers.
3.1 Policy
Even, perhaps especially, the very best documents connecting public administration 
and Lisbon Agenda do so from a policy perspective. For instance, Maria João 
Rodrigues’ proposal (2008) for improving public administration for the Lisbon 
Agenda focused exclusively on planning and strategic management. (9-17). Even 
when taking into consideration the many problems with strategic planning, this is 
undoubtedly important, but it does not address the main issues of public administra-
tion. The same, if on a much more tool-based level, is the case with all other docu-
ments as well, best perhaps in Määttä (2004, also 2006). Obviously, then, there is a 
tacit conflagration of public administration with public policy. Yet, while the two 
overlap and always have overlapped, the clear recognition of public administration, 
Public administration
on the Member States’ level
on the EU level
of the Lisbon Agenda
1
3
in general 
2
4
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its basically implementational character, the difference between administration and 
policy (Hegel 1821, § 287 is the classic statement), is important to retain in order to 
keep one’s focus on questions of staff and organization – the ‘who’ rather than the 
‘what’, because there is no ‘what’ without the ‘who’ –, indeed of civil service struc-
ture, because administration is not policy but its exercise. A concentration on policy 
obscures the nature of and demands on administration itself, to the detriment of 
whatever the project at hand is. So, in the Lisbon Agenda context, while policy is 
important, it is necessary to look at public administration proper in order to see who 
implements it, and how.
3.2. Finance 
As regards the finance context, a particularly strong example is an ECFIN 
(Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) paper preparing a meeting 
on these issues (Initiatives 2007), where public administration reforms are seen, 
fundamentally, as a money-saving device, together with lifting a bureaucratic bur-
den. The final report of the Portuguese presidency on the Lisbon Agenda (Preparing 
2007), in turn, lists a “need for stronger action” in public administration, specifically 
“public administration modernization”, (Preparing 2007, Main Outcomes, 1) but the 
statement remains largely fiscal: “The modernisation of public administration is key 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness of public finances.” (3) Reported as a main 
result of the 2822nd Council meeting is “the reform and modernisation of public 
administration. The conclusions highlight the importance of such initiatives in 
enhancing competitiveness, delivering better services, achieving better value-for-
money and ensuring the control of government expenditure, and thus meeting the 
objectives of both the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs and the stability and 
growth pact.” (2) The following statement is typical: “The Council discussed 
Member States’ experiences of modernising public administration in the context of 
the quality of public finances.” (12) It does address “a re-organisation of public 
administrations” (12), but what this should look like, and why it should take place, 
is not specified. It even recommends having the Ministers of Finance play a key role 
in public administration reform (12), a move that historically has almost universally 
led to disaster, because ministries of finance are by their self-logic interested in cost-
cutting, neither in value-creation nor in the support of innovation. Finally, public 
administration is mentioned in the March 2008 Presidency Conclusions only in the 
context of improving the quality of public finances. (3) However, public administra-
tion can only be judged, in financial terms, by the wealth it creates, and so the ques-
tion is not how much can be saved here, but how much return one receives from 
investing. (This is of course difficult to ascertain, let alone measure, but this does not 
affect the principle.) To save by cutting public administration may be foolish if this 
leads to lower productivity, entrepreneurship, innovation, or economic development 
– and there are good reasons to think that such a connection exists.
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3.3 ‘Modern’ and ‘innovative’ public administration
Most importantly, however, what is emphasized in general and overarching as a claim 
is the need for a ‘modernization’ of public administration. Every single document that 
addresses public administration talks about ‘modernization’. However, what does 
‘modern’ really mean? Almost no document gives as much as a working definition of 
the concept, and the one that does, “Intitiatives” (2007, 4), states that “In a broad 
sense, the modernisation of public administration can be defined as reform measures 
aimed at improving the quality of governance and at raising the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of public service provision.” This is both highly reductionist and completely 
vague, because neither is merely the quality of public administration the issue, nor is 
public administration exhaustively described by service provision. 
In any meaningful sense in this context, ‘modern’ can not mean anything specific, 
but ‘in line with the times’, ‘in line with the current situation.’ ‘Modern’ in the sense 
of ‘new’ is surely not only an ambiguous, but also a highly ambivalent concept by 
now, after the experiences of the 20th century – would a totalitarian shift away from 
democracy be better because it was the new thing? What, if not ‘appropriate for the 
circumstances of the times’, could ‘modern’ mean except merely ‘fashionable’? What 
would be bad about an appropriate, well-working, traditional solution? What is appro-
priate, however, depends on the times and the situation, and the problem is that the 
vast majority of claims in documents surrounding public administration use ‘modern’ 
to denote a concept that is exactly not in line with times and situation at all.
In addition, as in so many areas of the public discourse during the last decade or 
two, what we generally see is a very loose deployment of the concept of innovation. 
Innovation, however, has to be understood quite strictly – in a basically Schumpeterian 
sense (see only Schumpeter 1928, 374-385), of course with some modifications and 
additions – if the effects, the reasons why innovation is so important and central, not 
least for the Lisbon Agenda, are going to be harvested at all. Within and concerning 
the public sector, the use of the term is just that of wielding a cliché – it means 
‘something new’, nothing more, interchangeable with ‘modern’. Yet, again, in public 
administration, it is definitely enough if some arrangement works, or works well; 
there is no reason that it has to be new, let alone genuinely innovative, if this is pos-
sible at all. Surely, the public sector has to go with the times, it is not immune to the 
demands of the “new best practice” in organization (Perez 2002, 7-8, 15-16, 114), 
but this is vastly different from being innovative in itself. Innovation is about profit, 
and the task of the state is neither to make money, nor to save it, but – as one aspect 
– to see that it can be, and is, made.
In the public administration context, this is no light matter, a fortiori as far as the 
Lisbon Agenda is concerned, with its emphasis on an innovation-based economy. 
The problem is that within public administration, the paradigm, as has already been 
mentioned, has changed in the past few years, yet the Lisbon Agenda public admin-
istration discourse does not reflect that change. Rather, it is heavily retrospective and 
basically presents a public administration that is – not in specific areas, such as 
e-Governance, but in principles and structure – designed to solve the problems of the 
1970s and 1980s, whose chance of coming back is very slight indeed.
11
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4. The New Public Management and its demise1
Within public administration, the most important reform movement of the last quar-
ter of a century has been the New Public Management (NPM), the basis of all Lisbon 
Agenda public administration initiatives, as it seems. NPM is the transfer of business 
and market principles and management techniques from the private into the public 
sector, symbiotic with and based on a neo-liberal understanding of state and econo-
my. The goal, therefore, is a slim, reduced, minimal state in which any public activ-
ity is decreased and, if at all, exercised according to business principles of efficiency. 
It is popularly denoted by concepts such as project management, flat hierarchies, 
customer orientation, abolition of career civil service, depolitization, total quality 
management, and contracting-out. Transparency, citizen involvement, and decentral-
ization are not part of the original core of NPM, both theoretically – because the 
NPM’s focus on the apolitical rule of the expert makes them more difficult and 
because they do not necessarily contradict previous forms of public administration at 
all – and empirically.
NPM comes from Anglo-America, and it was strongly pushed by most of the 
International Finance Institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. It originates 
from the 1980s with their dominance of neo-liberal governments and the perceived 
crisis of the Welfare state and its financing, but it came to full fruition in the early 
1990s. On the one hand, NPM was a fashion phenomenon within public administra-
tion scholarship and practice, which explains much of its power; on the other, it was 
a genuinely ideological concept.
As important and, though more rarely, as successful as several NPM-inspired 
reforms of the public sector might have been and still may be, what one notices first 
when looking at the public and private spheres is the difference, not the similarity. 
The state is denoted primarily by its monopoly of power, force, and coercion on one 
side and its orientation towards the public good on the other; the business world 
legitimately focuses on profit maximization. The use of business techniques within 
the public sphere thus confuses the most basic requirements of any state, particu-
larly of a Democracy, with a liability: regularity, transparency, and due process are 
simply much more important than low costs and speed.
This is why respective economic and especially management-theoretical insights 
could only establish themselves after the end of the dominance of the NPM, which 
as genuine ideology was not open even for arguments stemming from its own leading 
method. NPM reforms created, for instance, quasi-markets within administrative 
organizations in order to create market behaviour: yet, such behaviour can only 
develop in genuine and not in quasi- (i.e. pseudo-) markets. (See König 2001, 6-7) 
Another example is the problem of the concept of performance pay vis-à-vis the 
demands of multitasking and motivation through identification with the organization 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2003, esp. 9-11, 27-29); as Lawrence Lynn, Jr., has recently 
1  A substantial part of this segment has already been published in this very journal, if in a longer version 
and regionally specific, within an earlier essay of mine (Drechsler 2005a); it is retained here so as to retain 
context and argument. I have developed the same thoughts, and often the same formulations as well, in 
Drechsler 2005b and 2008a.
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pointed out (see Drechsler and Kattel in Pollitt et al. 2009), if any concept in the 
social sciences is disproved, it is that of performance pay – and yet it is politically 
pushed and implemented – also very frequently within the Lisbon Agenda context, 
at least in theory.
In advanced public administration scholarship itself, then, especially – but not 
only – in Europe, NPM is heavily on the defensive by now, if taken as a world view 
(i.e. an ideology), rather than as one of several useful perspectives for public admin-
istration reform (i.e. a tool box). What was an option ten years ago is simply not an 
option anymore today. One could say that in public administration
 around 1995, it was still possible to believe in NPM, although there were
 first strong and substantial critiques
 around 2000, the year of the Lisbon Agenda, NPM was on the defensive, as 
 empirical findings spoke clearly against it as well
 around 2005, the year of the mid-term review, NPM was not a viable con-
 cept anymore
In other words, it has become quite rare in the last five years, and is becoming rarer 
still, to see articles in the very top journals, or essays and keynote addresses by the 
very top public administration scholars – especially in Europe, but also in the United 
States –, based on, or implicitly assuming the validity, of NPM. Yet, in many areas, 
both of scholarship and of the world, and particularly in policy, NPM is very alive 
and very much kicking (i.e. the farther one is from academe, Europe, or interna-
tional and central government, the first element being the most crucial). This is also 
true on the level of the EU and many Member States, where it fits some strings of 
the dominating world view(s). Nevertheless, especially on the local and regional 
level, many communities have in recent years, and after careful deliberation, acted 
against NPM reforms, even in traditional NPM strongholds. The justification for 
stopping the NPM reforms by the city of Dübendorf, Zürich, Switzerland, sums up 
the reasons very nicely: “no improvements of efficiency, effectiveness nor quality 
could be attributed to NPM reforms.” (Noordhoek and Saner 2005, 38)
5. The Neo-Weberian State 
The counter-model to NPM, indeed its bête noire, is what is called ‘Weberian public 
administration’. This label is highly problematic, as NPM presents a caricature of it 
and thus builds up a paper tiger. Apart from the caricature, for Weber, the most effi-
cient public administration was a set of offices in which appointed civil servants 
operated under the principles of merit selection (impersonality), hierarchy, the divi-
sion of labour, exclusive employment, career advancement, the written form, and 
legality. This increase of rationality – his key term – would increase speed, scope, 
predictability, and cost-effectiveness, as needed for an advanced mass-industrial 
society. (Weber 1922, esp. 124-130)
It seems that fundamentally, with all its weaknesses, the Weberian model still 
seems to be the best around, and it is certainly superior to the NPM – it is, to borrow 
Wolfgang Drechsler
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the Churchillian phrase, the worst form of public administration except all others. 
The connection between Weberianism and economic growth seems, in any case, 
very close. (See Evans and Rauch 1999) Nevertheless, the optimal administrative 
structure of our times does not consist of a simple rehash of the organization prin-
ciples of the mass production paradigm, whose weaknesses are amply known – from 
excessive legalism via genuine bureaucratism to genuine antagonism to innovation 
and the economy. NPM also offers quite some – i.a. managerialist – elements and 
even larger principles which ‘as such’ could be judged positively, as long as they do 
not form the basis of the system, and there have to be some adaptations for the cur-
rent times and their different challenges, demands, and socio-intellectual context.
This is why the currently most discussed model for the administrative paradigm 
that follows NPM, i.e. ‘post-NPM’, is not a return to the previous one, but according 
to the concept of Pollitt and Bouckaert of 2004, the so-called Neo-Weberian State 
(NWS), a fortuous metaphor describing a model that co-opts the positive elements of 
NPM, but on a Weberian foundation, i.e. that both are asymmetrically aufgehoben. 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 96-102) One can briefly sum up the NWS as follows:
Table 3: The Neo-Weberian State (summary)
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 99-100)
Neo-
Shift from an internal orientation towards 
bureaucratic rules to an external orientation 
towards meeting citizens’ needs and wishes. 
The primary route to achieving this is not the 
employment of market mechanisms (although 
they may occasionally come in handy) but the 
creation of a professional culture of quality 
and service
Supplementation (not replacement) of the role 
of representative democracy by a range of 
devices for consultation with, and direct repre-
sentation of, citizens’ views (…)
In the management of resources within gov-
ernment, a modernization of the relevant laws 
to encourage a greater orientation on the 
achievements of results rather than merely the 
correct following of procedure. This is 
expressed partly in a shift from ex ante to ex 
post controls, but not a complete abandonment 
of the former
A professionalization of the public service, so 
that the ‘bureaucrat’ becomes not simply an 
expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere 
of activity, but also a professional manager, 
oriented to meeting the needs of his or her 
citizens / users
Weberian
[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of the state as 
the main facilitator of solutions to the new 
problems of globalization, technological 
change, shifting demographics, and environ-
mental threat
[but:] Reaffirmation of the role of representa-
tive democracy (central, regional, and local) 
as the legitimating element within the state 
apparatus
[but:] Reaffirmation of administrative law – 
suitably modernized – in preserving the basic 
principles pertaining to the citizen-state rela-
tionship, including equality before the law, 
legal security, and the availability of special-
ized legal scrutiny of state actions
[but:] Preservation of the idea of a public ser-
vice with a distinct status, culture, and terms 
and conditions
The NWS was intended as an empirical-analytical, not as a normative model, and one 
of its creators, Pollitt, is quite self-critical about several of its aspects (see Pollitt in 
Pollitt et al. 2009), but it stands so far as one explanatory model of what is going on 
in Europe, and it does not throw good managerialist – and participatory – babies out 
with the NPM bathwater. It does still form a research agenda, but in lieu of anything 
better, it significantly helps our understanding of contemporary public administra-
tion.
6. The Neo-Weberian State and innovation 
But why is the NWS so particularly appropriate for the Lisbon Agenda? This is 
because it is the perfect match for an innovation-based society, contrary to NPM. 
When dealing with innovation-based economics, the foundation, after all, of the 
Lisbon Agenda,2 what none of the papers and documents mentioned seem to see is 
the immense push-pull function of what is after all a state-based socio-economic 
development programme that asks for, draws upon, and requires a highly competent, 
long-term-oriented, dedicated and enabled civil service to implement it – “the 
Lisbon strategy does not happen by itself” (Määttä 2006, 52; see 59) – not without 
the societal actors either, but certainly not without public administration. To say that 
“Empirical research indicates that modern and efficient public administrations have 
a positive impact on productivity and growth” (Initiatives 2007, 3) is by far too little; 
it is effective public administration that has this effect, and it is more than a positive 
impact, but rather a conditio sine qua non. Innovation in the general interest, rather 
than that of an individual entrepreneur, is a question of successful innovation policy, 
and who should implement that if not the admininistration? L’innovation, une affaire 
d’état, as Claude Rochet puts it succinctly. (2007)
If we follow Carlota Perez’ great surges theory and her model of Techno-
Economic Paradigm Shifts (2002), we can also observe that, as we are in the middle 
of the ICT paradigm and heading towards a new one in the distance, at this moment, 
after the collapse and before heading towards “synergy”, state and administration are 
expected to take up their great tasks again, and the anti-state climate of the earlier 
installation period of ICT is, or should be, over. And whatever the new leading tech-
nology will be – nanotech, biotech, convergence or something completely different 
– its setup will require a particularly capable state actor and a science and technology 
policy implemented by a civil service that is denoted by long-term thinking, high 
competence and tolerance for mistakes – the opposite of NPM. (Drechsler 2008b)
Finally, it should be emphasized for the current paradigm, that of ICT, that 
e-Governance and NPM are actually not related, as is usually assumed because they 
seem to share certain features. (See Dunleavy et al. 2005) Even almost none of the 
traditional Weberian categories become obsolete through ICT (potentially, exclusive 
employment does, which may be a problem for the nucleus of civil service), some 
– such as the written principle and division of labour – are actually enforced. In the 
14
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2  In that sense, I see things the other way round from Erik S. Reinert’s, who sees in the Lisbon Agenda 
“the Schumpeterian icing on a solidly neo-liberal cake” (2006, 128); I see neo-liberal icing on a Schumpeterian 
cake, but I agree that for some time, to stay with the metaphor, the icing has started to suffocate the cake.
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most prominent case of hierarchy, there are mixed dynamics, as it is weakened by 
network models of organization but strongly enforced via the extreme control and 
coordination capabilities of ICT. But in sum, e-Governance and the NWS can rein-
force each other, and in fact seem to do so.
7. Public Administration and Lisbon Agenda 
And yet, in the papers mentioned so far, as we can see, NPM is clearly still the basis 
of all public administration considerations, if often already in a weakened form 
(such as in Määttä 2006 and Initiatives 2007), but a reorientation towards the NWS, 
or toward any post-NPM paradigm, has not taken place yet.
7.1 In the Member States
But what do the public administration reform initiatives in the Member States look 
like? While the “Initiatives” paper gives some descriptions and a narrative list of the 
measures (2007, 4-10, 13-14), a more comparable list would be helpful to see what 
happens, and thus, Thomas Duve has investigated this3 with the following results:
Table 4: Public administration reforms and NPM bias in Member States’ National 
Lisbon Programmes, 2006
3  Duve 2008; quantitative-qualitative study (in the context of the Estonian Science Foundation project, 
“Public Administration and Innovation Policy”, Tallinn University of Technology), looking for the frequency 
of general public administration reform keywords and then NPM ones in the 2006 National Reform Programmes 
(most recent available data, estimate for France, as the French programme is not available in English).
(Duve 2008, based on National Reform Programmes 2006)
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Contents-wise, e-Government initiatives (against which really nobody will put up 
resistance anymore) and one-stop shops (which are, in the end, NPM tools but good 
ones, if rather obvious and simple) as well as the reduction of bureaucracy are the 
dominant features. We do see, however, some tendency that countries with strong 
public administration reform activity also verge towards NPM.
The strongest NPM protagonists according to this study, Finland, Hungary, and 
Italy, are interesting in that they are very different. The Finnish model is to a large 
extent sui generis and happens on a very solid basis that can ‘afford’ NPM; also, in 
the Finnish scholarly public administration discourse, the end of NPM is very well 
understood, and the tendency, except perhaps on the municipal level, is ending – 
Finland is not for nothing by most indicators the most successful country in Europe, 
if not the world.4 As regards Hungary and Italy, further studies are necessary, but it 
may not be too far off the mark to lump these initiatives under the heading of politics 
and rhetoric; both have very strong, classical systems (in the case of Hungary, con-
sciously created after Weberian models; Italy, rather pre-Weberian) which do not 
seem to give way to fundamental reforms at the moment.
One should generally consider that (a) these are, again, programmes and not 
actually implemented reforms, which tend to be very different in public administra-
tion, that (b) it is never clear which kind of public administration reforms were 
already pursued and then written into the Lisbon Agenda reports, and that (c) the 
reports are usually compiled decentrally by all national ministries, so that in coun-
tries where no ministry is in charge of public administration, nothing will be listed 
either. Nonetheless, what we do see, no doubt, is an influence – if perhaps only 
declarative and performative – of the EU, via the Commission, on national admin-
istrations on the basis of the Lisbon Agenda. The ample literature on the 
Europeanization of national administrations has not touched this matter yet, but this 
may only be a matter of time. If we look at our matrix, we see that the focus was 
mostly on category 1, public administration as such on the Member States’ level; the 
issue of specific Lisbon Agenda administration, category 2, is not really considered 
yet, either.
7.2 In European Union administration
But if category 1 is neglected, we do not find anything about public administration 
reform on the EU level, i.e. as regards the administration of the Lisbon Agenda by 
the Commission and the EU administration itself. (From the Commission’s point of 
view, while categories 1 and 2 do not have a responsible Directorate General; 3 – 
practically to a very small extent – and 4 are located in the DG Admin, the DG for 
Personnel and Administration; responsible Commissioner is Vice President Siim 
Kallas.)
4  For me personally, it was clear that NPM had ended when a leading civil servant in the Finnish 
Ministry of Finance emphasized to me that Finland would use NPM tools rather than the ideology, and when 
a PhD student from the University of Helsinki referred to certain faculty members as holding “traditional” 
views, with which he meant NPM.
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We may say that there is no thinking about Lisbon Agenda administration within the 
Commission, category 3, at all, or at least it is not visible – except the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) –, but that category 4 has been a subject of great attention, 
especially because this is also a popular issue (in the sense of a genuine general 
popular animus against “the bureaucrats in Brussels”). It is well-known, or at least 
the general opinion, that basically, the EU staff formed a Continental civil service 
system, even among French lines, and proverbially bureaucratic. Partially to cater to 
fashion and driven by scandal, partially for serious reasons, there have been serious 
reforms, especially under the previous Commissioner in charge, Neil Kinnock, in 
2000. (Kinnock 2004) More or less, these were managerialist reforms along NPM 
lines that were imposed from above. (Bauer 2006, 276-277; see Kassim 2004) EU 
scholarship has basically praised the Kinnock reforms, either as a success or, if not, 
then as well-intended. (See, e.g., Bauer 2006, Kassim 2004, Stevens and Stevens 
2006, more cautiously Levy 2003)
But by now, some shift, if not explicitly, towards the NWS is visible here as 
well. Commissioner Kallas, historically very sympathetic to NPM reforms, has 
recently emphasized that at least the senior civil service of the EU will remain a 
career system and will be, in fact, even more so than it has been in the past, with a 
strong emphasis on career advancement, identity, motivation, and precisely not 
recruitment from the Member States which has led to all kinds of problems, includ-
ing cultural adaptation. (Kallas 2008; cf. Bauer 2006 for the previous situation) In 
part, this is seen as a reaction to the problems of the Santer Commission’s stepping 
back after the Cresson scandals in 1999. In spite of all the NPM tools tried, what we 
can see here is a return to classically Weberian patterns (also echoing Akerlof) with 
a clear goal in mind, never mind what tools it takes to accomplish it. A transfer from 
these insights to the Member States may, however, take a while, because this could 
look to some not as a genuinely progressive shift from NPM to the NWS but rather 
as a turn backwards to bureaucratic rule.
8. Prospects
In sum, in spite of a change of focus for the good, we may say that the public admin-
istration context of the Lisbon Agenda is still not adequately represented. What is 
necessary, first of all, is to realize the importance of public administration for the 
Lisbon Agenda – it cannot succeed without high-quality public administration. 
Then, it needs to be clear that public administration is not policy, that it is not there 
to save money but, if anything, to enable the creation of wealth, and that ‘modern’ 
should mean ‘appropriate for the times’. If one then considers the advances of pub-
lic administration scholarship, it will be very clear that what is needed for the Lisbon 
Agenda is a kind of public administration that is NWS-based – on the EU level as 
well as on the Member States’ one.
As regards the latter, again, this is a contentious subject because the field is seen, 
partially rightly, as a national specific that should not be interfered with by the EU. 
On the other hand, if the success of the Lisbon Agenda hinges on high-quality pub-
lic administration, then this is an issue that concerns the entire EU, and therefore 
there is a certain mandate as an outcome of the Portuguese presidency as mentioned 
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above (Preparing 2007, Main Outcomes 3), even if listed under ‘modernization’, 
stating that public administration reform should “undergo regular analysis and 
exchange of best practices in particular in the context of the Lisbon National Reform 
Programmes.”
Yet, there is a genuine ambivalence as to whether one should not rather be happy 
that the Lisbon Agenda did not contain any reference to public administration 
reform. By and large, the impression one gets when reading those texts is that even 
many of those who supported the Lisbon Agenda favoured NPM, while depicting 
classical, ‘Weberian’ public administration – to which they inevitably belonged – as 
the enemy, partially for lack of information regarding public administration, but 
often with the best intentions. But only if proper attention to public administration 
specifics is guaranteed, then an OMC-like process regarding Member States’ public 
administration would make some sense. If so, it would therefore be important to 
coordinate it at the top with an office that has the capacity to deal with and focus on 
public administration, viz. with the commissioner in charge of public administra-
tion.
The Lisbon Agenda both requires and supports, in the sense of push/pull, the 
NWS and needs to change into this direction. This may be all the easier as NPM is 
not ‘cool’ anymore, but it requires a certain shift in emphasis and understanding. For 
the sake of the latter, the following development of concepts can be suggested: 
The key to the success of any strategy like the Lisbon Agenda is to have the admin-
istrative capacity and competence of the responsive and responsible state actors to 
implement it. The optimal solution for this today is a genuine post-NPM system, 
Weberian-based but with the lessons from NPM learned, which – and this is not less 
right for being a cliché – puts the human person into the centre of administrative 
decision-making, i.e. one that is in line both with the Lisbon Agenda and its goals, 
with the final goal of the Good Life in the Good State. (See Drechsler 2001) Whether 
it is the Neo-Weberian State itself or some modification thereof, or another model 
altogether, remains to be developed. “Putting knowledge into practice” (2006, 2) 
makes the one positive reference in our context to the EU’s “tradition of a strong and 
responsible public sector, which should be capitalized on.” For the sake of the suc-
cess of the Lisbon Agenda and of Europe generally, it is time that this insight is acted 
upon. 
9. Postscript
As this article goes to press, in mid-February of 2009, the global financial melt-
down, of which we have not seen the worst yet, has radically altered the context in 
which both Lisbon Agenda and Public Administration in Europe take place. The 
return of the state into the economy, on a scale unimaginable when this paper was 
Modern
Innovative public administration
Saving money
Appropriate
Innovation-enabling public administration
Return on investment
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delivered, has strongly corroborated and reinforced its basic tenets but has also made 
them somewhat trivial and superannuated. However, there are still those who believe 
that a state with so many additional tasks in the economic sphere can do so without 
a genuinely competent and motivated civil service, and that cutting public expendi-
ture at least in this realm is still a good idea (and this seems to include, more’s the 
pity, some of the institutions charged with containing the crisis). Naturally, however, 
whether one likes the new big state or not, it is not only inevitable, but it is already 
there – and it is in the interest of everyone, anywhere (excepting a few profiteers) 
that it is well-administered. This good administration, I think, clearly needs to be 
built along Neo-Weberian lines, both on the EU and the Member States’ level, and 
most certainly cannot be based on NPM, which in addition to everything else is the 
PA ideology that represents the thinking which has substantially contributed to 
bringing the current crisis about to begin with. In fact, the best hope for managing 
both the crisis and later recovery well on all levels is the ‘Return of the Mandarin’, 
i.e. of a highly capable, responsible, motivated, long-term-oriented senior civil ser-
vice, among other Neo-Weberian and indeed classical Weberian institutions. Why 
this is so is, it is to be hoped, still shown in a relevant way by this article.  
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ABSTRACT
Europeanization has become a popular concept among scholars of European studies. 
It orchestrates concepts from European integration theory, comparative politics and 
public policy analysis and links the field of European studies with other academic 
fields. Empirically, it is used for studying the impact of membership in the European 
Union (EU) on domestic policy making. As far as the country and region this article 
deals with, namely Finland and the Nordic countries, are concerned, only a few stud-
ies have been produced.
Institutionally, Finland does not yet have an independent administrative meso-
level and the central state controls agencies and institutions at the regional level, such 
as the Employment and Economic Development Centres and the State Provincial 
Offices. The Regional Councils – some scholars see them as coming closest to being 
“real regions” – were created after Finland joined the EU in 1995 and have been 
empowered thereafter but, according to some practitioners, sometimes fail to act as 
coordinators of different actors in the regions.
In implementing public policies, the status of actors in regional governance 
depends on the willingness of the central state to loosen its grip but also on the will-
ingness of regional actors to cooperate with each other. There are differences in terms 
of power potentials in regional governance. As concerns the implementation of 
ERDF-funds, in the view of some scholars and practitioners, the central state by no 
means easily vacates its powerful position. A contrast is rural policy and LEADER+, 
where the so-called local action groups can act fairly well outside the shadow of the 
hierarchy.
Introduction
Europeanization has become a popular concept among scholars of European studies. 
As a theoretical concept, it orchestrates concepts from European integration theory, 
comparative politics and public policy analysis. It also links the field of European 
studies with other academic fields. As an empirical approach, it is used for studying 
the impact of membership in the European Union (EU) on domestic policy making.
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A Study on Institutionalisation, Transformation and 
Europeanization
Michael Kull
MTT Economic Research Finland
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The growing popularity of studying aspects of Europeanization is reflected in an 
expanding body of publications. However, as far as the country and region this 
article deals with, namely Finland and the Nordic countries, are concerned, only a 
few studies have been produced. This article attempts, in a small way, to correct this 
shortcoming and will shed some light on how, after Finland joined the EU in 1995, 
regional and local governance have been constructed, institutionalised and trans-
formed. It will take a look at the transformation of regional governance, regional 
development policies as well as rural development policies.
This article will begin with theoretical reflections on Europeanization and relat-
ed approaches. In the second section, institutional transformations and reforms of 
public administration at the regional level will be highlighted. In my view, the con-
struction of administrative units at the regional level teaches us interesting lessons 
about the Europeanization of administrative practices in the Nordic countries. In sec-
tion three, I will look at the implementation of two related EU public policies. I will 
contrast EU Regional Policy and the Community Initiative LEADER+,1 which 
aimed at fostering economic development in Europe’s countryside. I will discuss 
issues of institutionalisation and sub-national power.
The Finnish approach to implementing LEADER+ and national rural develop-
ment programmes via tripartite governance units was an outstanding realisation of 
both the partnership principle and the bottom-up approach in implementing EU pub-
lic policies. Tripartite arrangements are very suitable for solving local policy prob-
lems and achieve greater acceptance by the local community. I will not only demon-
strate how new governance structures and forms of public-private partnerships, such 
as the principle of tripartition, facilitate the successful implementation of EU public 
policies but also how the so-called “LEADER” approach has been mainstreamed to 
serve as the underlying principle of national programmes of rural development. The 
“Finnish way” of including local residents and local businesses in implementing 
rural development policies – in spite of some problems and shortcomings – is out-
standing and could serve as a role-model for other EU states as well. In contrast to 
other EU member states, a more holistic bottom-up approach to these particular 
policy problems has been applied in Finland. Nonetheless, one should not neglect the 
powerful position of the central state, be it in the bargaining process for the budget 
or in designing the overall policy structure. The implementation of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) uses similar mechanisms. Despite its success 
in implementing the fund in this particular way, promoting or uploading this better 
practice to the EU proved to be rather difficult for Finnish governmental elites.
Local and Regional Governance in Finland
1  LEADER stands for “Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie Rurale”, which means 
“Links between development actions and the rural economy.” LEADER+ was a Community initiative financed 
by the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), one of the 
EU’s structural funds.
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Theoretical Approaches in Studying the Europeanization of Regional and
Rural Development Policies
The British political scientist Stephen George defined Europeanization as “the 
impact on domestic politics and policy-making of membership of the European 
Union” (George 2001, 1). Radaelli, one of the leading scholars in the field of 
Europeanization, perceives Europeanization “as a problem not a solution” (Radealli 
2004, 1). Although there are three main, differentiated but at the same time inter-
linked aspects of Europeanization that scholars are interested in – governance, insti-
tutionalisation and discourse – they have one “element” in common, “the emphasis 
on domestic change.” (Radealli 2004, 8) I approach the problem of Europeanization 
by theoretically and methodologically comparing Europeanization with European 
integration theory.
I suggest an approach that “learns” by taking concepts from related approaches, 
such as multi-level governance and structural constructivism, into consideration. 
This makes much sense since all three approaches – Europeanization, multi-level 
governance and structural constructivism – are interested in the consequences and 
impacts the process of integration has on “the domestic”, “the sub-national” and “the 
local”. Looking at the ontology and epistemology of approaches towards 
Europeanization, their advantage is, according to Radaelli, that they are “orchestrat-
ing existing concepts and theories, with major theoretical import from comparative 
politics and theoretical policy analysis.” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, 340).
Whilst in European integration theory, multi-level governance was the first 
approach to focus on sub-national actors in policy-making processes and on the 
interaction between EU institutions, nation-states and institutions at sub-national 
levels, it has been criticised for several reasons.2 In my view, it tends to overstate the 
potential power of sub-national actors.
The evaluation of my empirical findings regarding multi-level aspects of EU 
policy-making (see Kull 2008) led me to a conclusion similar to the one drawn by 
Klaus Eder. The EU’s system of multi-level governance can, according to Eder, be 
understood as a new space of competition between institutions situated at different 
levels. (Eder 2004, 98) According to Eder, this competition may result in “institu-
tional homogenization and synchronicity” and tends to divide Europe into two parts, 
a Europe of the strong and a Europe of the weak. This ontology requires the revealing 
of “hidden power mechanisms” and an analysis of the mechanisms that political 
agents employ to “reproduce and transform the European political order.” (Kauppi 
2002, 39) This perspective, the structural constructivist approach on EU integration 
introduced by Kauppi, was inspired by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.
It adds critical elements that the multi-level governance approach lacks and helps 
to paint a more nuanced and at the same time more realistic picture of EU polity. 
Focussing on the detailed, as opposed to the obvious, requires a deep and detailed 
analysis of multi-tiered structures. This is so because actors from different spheres 
Michael Kull
2  The American scholar Gary Marks introduced the concept of multi-level governance. See Marks 1993. 
Critical approaches are provided by Jordan 2001 and Bache 1998.
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with different institutional backgrounds and social capitals shape, construct and re-
construct different policy-fields in the EU. Thus, for collecting data I combined 
analysis of legal documents and policy papers with in-depth interviews.
Regionalisation in Finland and the Influence of European Integration
Ever since Finland gained independence in 1917, the local government has had a 
considerable degree of self-government. Fostering regional self-government and 
creating democratically legitimised regional bodies situated between a strong central 
state and municipalities that were equipped with a high degree of local self-govern-
ment, was not a top priority for Finnish political elites until the early 1990s.3  
Reforming public administration mainly affected state provincial administration.4  
Issues of regional self-government, such as elections or tax raising power as well as 
the regions’ relations to both the central state and the municipal level were not 
neglected in the debate on reforming public administration and central-local rela-
tions, but the reforms themselves were almost exclusively done in state provincial 
administration, such as the State Provincial Offices.5 
When Finland joined the EU in 1995, it was forced to construct institutions at the 
regional level. The administration of EU policies, especially EU Regional Policy as 
the second largest policy of the EU financially, needed structures to implement them. 
Regional Councils (RC) were set up for that purpose. In addition to the RCs and the 
State Provincial Offices, the Employment and Economic Development Centres 
(TE-Keskus) are also important institutions of administration in the Finnish regions.
In this section, I will discuss some aspects of the construction of these three 
regional entities. This process was closely linked to Finland’s integration into the EU 
but was also related to its membership of other international organisations, such as 
the Council of Europe. Considering the present structures of public administration at 
Finland’s regional level, it is worth reflecting on a project instituted by the Finnish 
Council of State in 1992. The aim was to achieve a “lighter, better integrated and 
more economical system of regional administration.” (Komiteanmietintö 1992: 33, 
1) One proposal brought forward by the rapporteur responsible, Mr. Jukka Hirvelä, 
was the creation of “regional authorities established jointly by neighbouring munici-
palities.” (3) These “regional authorities” were to be based on municipal cooperation 
Local and Regional Governance in Finland
3 While in the 1930s, inter-municipal cooperation fuelled the discussion on regional-self government, a 
decision in principle to centralise administration in the provinces was made by the Council of State in 1951.
4  There are a number of reports, proposals and decisions to be mentioned in this context, such as the 
Report on Regional Democracy in Finland – CPR (6) 2 rev Part II by the Council of Europe. There are a 
number of Committee Reports commissioned by the Finish Council of State (Komiteamietintö 1992: 33, 
Komiteamietintö 1992: 34, Komiteanmietintö 1992: 28) which provide good insights on elite perceptions of 
how to reform the regional administrative structure as well as the relations between the central state and the 
local levels of public administration.
5  The State Provincial Offices are joint regional authorities for seven ministries. They have responsi-
bilities in the fields of social and health care, education and culture, police administration, rescue services, 
traffic administration, competition and consumer affairs and judicial administration. More information on the 
tasks and composition of the State Provincial Offices is provided on the homepage of the State Provincial 
Offices run by the Ministry of Interior. This page is available at http://www.intermin.fi/lh/home.nsf/pages/C3
9729F9199D173AC2256D01002C3398?Opendocument.
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and be responsible for regional development. Furthermore, Hirvelä assumed that 
there would be less need to monitor the municipalities’ performance and suggested 
reducing the number of State Provincial Offices from 11 to 5-6.6 A third proposal was 
the construction of 9-10 industrial districts, each with its own Technology 
Development Centres, and 9-10 district labour offices.
Another Committee report (Komiteanmietintö 1992: 34) on regional government 
which had an impact on the present structure of regional governance in Finland was 
developed under the aegis of rapporteur Kauko Sipponen. The report warned that 
Finland was going be one of the few European countries that lacked a democrati-
cally legitimised regional administration. Instead of regions with a high degree of 
self-government and with their own tax raising powers, Sipponen, like Hirvelä, sug-
gested the creation of municipal associations focused primarily on regional develop-
ment. (See Komiteanmietintö 1992: 34, 9, 18)
In 1995, when Finland joined the EU, twenty RCs, responsible for the “manage-
ment of functions related to regional development” were set up. (See Finnish Local 
Government Act (365/1995) Two years later, fifteen Employment and Economic 
Development Centres (TE-Keskus) were established. These are institutions set up 
jointly by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, and the Ministry of Labour. They are also subordinate to these ministries. 
Besides their functions in the fields of labour policy and the promotion of farming, 
fisheries and rural enterprises, they occupied a central position in LEADER+ related 
rural development policies. 
As regards the RCs, for many Finnish scholars in the field the “real regions” in 
Finland (Ryynänen 2003, 167), their enhanced relevance constitutes the most impor-
tant change in the administrative structure of the country in the 1990s (Ryynänen 
2003a, 7). One important task of the RCs is the implementation of EU Regional 
Policy. In cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, the RCs were – at least on 
paper – the central actors in EU Regional Policy. Some scholars argue that the RCs 
are overshadowed by the central state level. However, ministry officials were not 
aware of any major problems regarding the cooperation between the Ministry of the 
Interior and the RCs during the programming period 2000-2006. The cooperation 
functioned smoothly, and, as an interviewee put it, the Ministry was “in a way” the 
RCs’ “friend from the central administration.” (Interview 5) I will return to this dis-
cussion in the next section.
In comparison to regional levels and the political legitimacy of regions in other 
countries, the RCs are rather weak. Their composition is not based on direct elec-
tions. They are indirectly legitimised through municipal elections and have strong 
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6  The State Provincial Offices taking part in Hirvelä’s survey argued that due to amendments of munic-
ipal law empowering local government, less steering and monitoring is needed. See Komiteanmietintö 1992: 
33, 49. Up until 1997, Finland had 11 State Provincial Offices, whilst today there are six State Provincial 
Offices in the country. These are situated in the provinces of Åland, Eastern Finland, Lapland, Oulu, Southern 
Finland and Western Finland. The key legislative text defining the powers and responsibilities of the State 
Provincial Office today are the State Provincial Offices Act (Lääninhallituslaki 22/1997), which for instance 
reduced the number of provinces. The amendments laid down in a law on reforming the State Provincial Offices 
(Laki lääninhallituslain 2 and 4 §:n muuttamisesta (348/2000)), further defined the responsibilities of the State 
Provincial Offices and stipulated that the President appoints the governor proposed by the Council of State.
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bonds to the municipal level. The Finnish Local Government Act (365/1995) stated 
that the RCs are “joint municipal boards of which the municipalities in the region 
must be members”, (Finnish Regional Development Act (602/2002), Section 4) and 
that “the members of the supreme decision-making body of a regional council must 
be councillors in the member local authorities.”7 The highest decision-making body 
of the RC is its assembly consisting of delegates elected by those municipalities that 
are members of one RC.
Another reason for the political weakness lies, according to Ryynänen, in the “lack 
of top politicians taking care of their regions in the long run. Many perceive member-
ship as a steppingstone into the national parliament.” (Ryynänen 2003c, 169) Thus 
participation in RCs often contributes to the accumulation of the social capital of its 
members. According to Mäenpää, the RCs were no more than channels of funding but 
their status has slightly improved over the past years. (See Mäenpää 1997, 11)
In my view, these Finnish regional reforms were not only the result of “adapta-
tional pressures”8 but also propelled by the participation of Finnish sub-national 
actors in EU institutions, such as the Committee of the Regions (CoR). In addition 
to the EU, participation in the Council of Europe and especially in the Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities, were important factors, too.9 In its 1999 Report on 
Regional Democracy in Finland, the Council of Europe noted that the Finnish 
regions consisted of “various territorial structures, at levels between local self-gov-
ernment and central State administration; State administration (mostly but not only 
at provincial and regional levels) on the one side, and various forms of co-operative 
government between municipalities on the other side, also at different levels.” 
(Report on Regional Democracy in Finland - CPR (6) 2 rev Part II, 4)
The relations between the Ministry of the Interior and the RCs in the context of 
EU Regional Policy in particular as well as the tension between the Economic and 
Development Centres (TE-Keskus) and the RCs in general had a considerable impact 
on the status of the regional level of governance in Finland. The creation of the new 
“Super ministry” (Ministry of Employment and the Economy) is going to have an 
important impact as well. Since the beginning of 2008, both the coordination of the 
Economic and Development Centres and the coordination of the cooperation with 
the RCs have been in the sphere of responsibility of the new ministry.
In the future, the core functions of the RCs could be to group together, to create 
networks among, and coordinate, different actors from the regions. At present, for 
some individuals from the Ministry of the Interior, the RCs appear as actors among 
other actors, not as coordinators. For some, the RCs are rather interested in pushing 
through benefits for their municipality vis-à-vis other state authorities instead of 
bringing all the different regional actors together. One interviewee criticised the fact 
that some RCs “do not manage to combine all interests, only those of the munici-
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7  See Section 86a, Composition of the Regional Council. The section continues: “Each member author-
ity must have at least one representative on the supreme decision-making organ of the regional council.” See 
Finnish Local Government Act (365/1995) published under http://www.kunnat.net/k_perussivu.asp?path=1;16
1;279;280;37560;44307.
8  On the definition of adaptational pressure created by misfit and Europeanization as institutionalisation, 
see Radaelli 2004, 6-7.
9 Finland signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government in June 1990 and ratified it a year later.
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palities.” (Interview 5) As a result, regional structures appear to be highly fragment-
ed, and, as I discuss in more detail in the next section, competence struggles between 
different institutions are also taking place in Finland’s regions.
The Implementation of EU Regional Policy and EU-sponsored Rural
Development Policies in Finland
EU Regional Policy
Regarding the programming period 2000-2006 and according to the Finnish Regional 
Development Act (602/2002), the RCs and the Ministry of the Interior were key 
actors in the national administration of EU Regional Policy. After the Government 
decided on national and regional development targets for a fixed period, (see Finnish 
Regional Development Act (602/2002), Chapter 3, Section 9 (1), National and 
Regional Development Targets) ministries appointed by Government decision then 
defined those targets. (See Finnish Regional Development Act (602/2002), Chapter 
2, Section 8 (1), Regional Development in Different Administrative Sectors) 
According to the Finnish Regional Development Act’s chapter 3, section 13 on 
Regional Structural Fund programmes of the European Community, the RCs are 
responsible for “drawing up proposals for regional Structural Fund programmes 
concerning their areas which are to be financed out of European Community 
Structural Funds.” Section 13 continues by laying down that “proposals concerning 
programmes shall be worked on jointly by State authorities, municipalities and the 
other bodies under public and private law involved in programme implementation.”
According to interviewees from the Ministry of the Interior, this form of multi-
level governance, in general, worked smoothly. While the RCs have “the legitimacy 
to do this work and this is not questioned by others, the problem seen from the state 
perspective is how to implement a national strategy in these regional strategies.”(Inter- 
view 4) On the following pages, I will discuss the different phases in policy making. 
I will first look at the implementation phase of the last programming period 
(2000-2006) and highlight some issues that I consider important, both in terms of 
further conceptualising the power-dimension in multi-level governance and for the 
debate on Europeanization. Furthermore, the problems of establishing the Finnish 
approach on the EU level in order to realise the partnership principle as a form of 
“better practice” also adds important new aspects to the debate on Europeanization 
in Europe’s regions. Finally, I will look at the multi-levelled process of programme 
formulation for the current programming period (2007-2013) and the problems of 
matching Finland’s diversified approach with the EU’s more focussed and concen-
trated approach.
The Implementation of Structural Fund programmes in 2000-2006
The implementation of Structural Fund programmes in the programming period 
2000-2006 was, according to Kettunen, “strongly dominated by the state ministries, 
especially those of the Interior, Education, Trade and Industry, Agriculture and 
Employment.” (See Kettunen and Kungla 2005, 369) In this context, the question of 
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the self-perceived role of the Ministry of the Interior in this policy cycle and wheth-
er it saw itself as occupying a dominating position is of importance. Interviewees 
from this ministry perceived themselves as key players in this field since the ministry 
had acted as the managing authority. While one interviewee argued that in every 
country the managing authority “dominates as it is the one who looks after things”, 
(Interview 4) two other interviewees did not share the opinion that the ministry 
dominated, especially not in the implementation phase. (Interview 5) They perceived 
their role as partners of the RCs, who are not subject to their steering unlike, for 
instance, the Employment and Economic Development Centres. Other ministries that 
deal with structural funds (e.g. the Ministry of Trade and Industry) were different if 
compared to the Ministry of the Interior as they have administrative bodies in the 
regions and the capacity to steer.
Tensions arose between the Employment and Economic Development Centres 
and the RCs. This was so for several reasons. Firstly, while the money came from the 
state, the strategies came from the region. Secondly, with the ministries having 
administrative presence in the regions, the Finnish system is quite sectored, with dif-
ferent ministries involved. One interviewee argued that the system is very much 
region-based and more money being directed via the RCs would further empower the 
RCs. While there was a model developed and legislation drafted to prepare for more 
resources directed through the RCs, there was some doubt whether the amount of 
state money envisaged should be given to municipal authorities to decide on its 
usage. A state-centrist solution envisaged that the national parliament would declare 
quite specifically how this money was to be spent by the RCs. If the RCs followed 
this centralist formula, they would “sell the interest of the region for their own inter-
est of power”, (Interview 4) and as a result create a huge gap between the “bottom-up 
assessment of needs and the allocation of money.” (Interview 4)
Establishinging the Partnership Principle
Despite the problems discussed in the previous section, the cooperation of different 
stakeholders and the realisation of the partnership principle in implementation were, 
in comparison to other EU member states, and in the field of economic development 
of the countryside, better achieved in Finland than in other countries, such as in 
Germany. (See above or Kull 2008) Also in the context of the other regional develop-
ment funds, tripartite cooperation is mandatory at the monitoring committee level 
(Regional Management Committees). In contrast to other member states, tripartition 
is realised at a much earlier stage. One interviewee added that he is not aware of any 
other country where this was the case. (Interview 4) Whilst this much advanced 
practice and form of the partnership principle functions very well in Finland and 
might serve as a model for other countries, establishing it on the EU level proved to 
be difficult. This is noteworthy given that the EU Commission has projected the 
image of being very interested in fostering partnership in multi-level decision mak-
ing. An interviewee summarised his experience within the Commission and with 
experts from other EU member states:
 I presented our model many times to colleagues from other member states.
 Some critical remarks I received were addressed at how we take the political 
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 will into consideration. When you look at those systems that consider the
 political will, this happens at a much higher level with national ministers
 intervening in negotiations at Nuts-2 level. In my view, this does not really
 take regional needs into consideration. This is a power game. (Interview 4)
It is worth mentioning that some EU member states that applied a more decentralised 
approach to administering and implementing regional development funds in the past, 
have centralised programme implementation in the new programming phase. While 
in Finland the RCs are in a key position, interviewees from the managing authority 
criticised the fact that too much emphasis is put on public authorities, such minis-
tries, regional and municipal authorities. (Interview 5) According to some intervie-
wees, the participation of actors from the private sector, from the field of research 
and from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) needs to be fostered in the future. 
However, a more intense inclusion of private and social actors often fails due to 
structural problems, such as a lack of resources preventing some organisations from 
participating. Another problem is the specificity of EU-speak (no vernacular) which 
deters local actors from participating. As a result, even though it would be fruitful to 
have particular NGOs involved in Regional Policy, and they are often invited to 
participate, they are not able to take part.
The EU Commission raised a number of questions in the debate on the future of 
the structural funds and regional policy. Some of these were directly related to the 
issues discussed above. One question was: “Given the need for efficient management 
of cohesion policy programmes, what is the optimum allocation of responsibility 
between the Community, national and regional levels within a multi-level gover-
nance system?”10 More flexibility and more freedom to conduct implementation 
according to own national standards were favoured by some interviewees from the 
managing authority, who were also well aware of the difficulties in vesting more 
responsibility in the member states. (Interview 4) According to one interviewee, “the 
current system is about what you can get without losing the EU’s right of control. 
Even now, when the intention is that the responsibility should clearly be with the 
member states’ governments, the Commission needs to do a lot of unofficial follow-
up. The Finnish way to administer this is quite complex.” (Interview 4) I will now 
turn to multi-level aspects in the development of programme proposals for the cur-
rent programming period 2007-2013.
Multi-level Interaction in the Programming Period 2007-2013 
As a first step, RCs or major regions (suuraluet) made programme proposals to the 
Ministry of the Interior. On the basis of these proposals, the Ministry of the Interior 
drew up programmes to be considered by the Finnish government. This was to hap-
pen “jointly with other ministries, RCs, and other bodies and organizations involved 
in implementing the programmes.” (Regional Development Act (602/2002), Chapter 
3, Section 13 (2), Regional Structural Fund Programmes of the European 
1 0  Press release IP/07/721, 30 May 2007.
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Community) At the stage when the programme proposals were drafted in the regions, 
the most important players were, according to interviewees from the Ministry of the 
Interior, the RCs. Work on designing the programmes was led by the RCs. This phase 
was not free from friction and conflicts. One interviewee explained that in Southern 
Finland, for instance, “there are five RCs and one has to look how they cooperate 
when they make their proposals before they are submitted to us. In addition, there 
are internal games within the regions. Each RC has its own focus, its own strategy. 
The programme cannot be too wide-ranging. In general terms, I have the feeling that 
the cooperation between the RCs functioned better during the previous programme 
drafting period.” (Interview 5)
At the stage when the regional programmes, composed of proposals from the 
regions, are pulled together, the RCs are also said to be the key players. The Ministry 
of the Interior was “to pull together the global strategy, the national strategic frame-
work.” (Interview 4) The Commission closely followed this stage and the Ministry 
of the Interior acted as a sort of broker between the Commission and the RCs. The 
ministry had to defend a rather diversified approach to the Commission, which, 
according to one interviewee, “would have liked to see a more focussed approach.” 
(Interview 4) The Commission was very interested in fostering the goals set out by 
the Lisbon Strategy in this context, too.
The Ministry of the Interior was largely advocating this approach at the EU level. 
According to one interviewee, Finland enthusiastically supported the Commission’s 
idea of connecting the Structural Funds to serve the Lisbon Objectives and some-
times even had to defend its more far-reaching position. (Interview 4) One key issue 
which concerned the central government was how to keep the whole package of 
structural funds in Finland focussed. In terms of power and influence, considerable 
emphasis was put on its regional dimension. According to interviewees from the 
Ministry of the Interior, the largest share of preparation was done in the regions, 
more specifically in the Regional Management Committees. While it received infor-
mation on what was discussed there, the ministry did not really push the national 
strategy from above. (Interview 4) The national strategy was rather built from below. 
The ministry was engaged “but not that strongly.” (Interview 5) According to inter-
viewees from the Ministry of the Interior, the strategy provided enough room to meet 
the demands of the regions. The rationale behind this was that “the national strategy 
must not be too rigid because then it would not allow the consideration of regional 
differences.” (Interview 5) In addition, the Finnish administrative culture is condu-
cive to pushing through “a very strict strategy from above.” (Interview 5) Regarding 
structural funds managed by other ministries, such as the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) managed by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, Finland was, from a comparative perspective, rather quick in develop-
ing its national programme for approval by the Commission. However, the start of 
the new programming period 2007-2013 was delayed, among other things, due to the 
reorganisation of central administration.
In terms of the ERDF, there is no national programme as such but four pro-
grammes for Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern Finland. Åland has its own 
programme based on the self-administration of the region. Finland was not among 
the first countries to have their programmes approved by the Commission. The 
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Commission demanded some changes. As a result, the start of the current program-
ming period was slightly delayed. Finland’s strategy had a slightly different focus to 
the one the Commission would have liked. A Finnish negotiator summarised the 
discussions with the Commission: 
 We defended our approach. This delayed the start of this programming
 period. The Commission was persistent. We agreed at the level of regulations
 and that we should clearly implement actions which support the Lisbon
 Strategy objectives and be more focussed. But then we would give conside-
 rable freedom to the regional level to decide their agenda in this framework.
 This proved to be very difficult to accommodate. We, as an authority, are
 strong advocates of this more focussed strategic approach. (Interview 4)
Both as regards the interaction with other actors in Finland and vis-à-vis the EU, the 
debate over the development of regional programmes in the previous round of struc-
tural funding had gone more smoothly. There were fewer disputes than was the case 
in the current period. One interviewee saw these problems particularly connected to 
central administration. In her experience, as regards cooperation with the regions, 
this functioned rather smoothly. It is important to see that national governments are 
not willing to give up their influential positions in this policy field. They often act as 
“gatekeepers”, as Bache has demonstrated in several studies.11 As far as EU Regional 
Policy is concerned, national authorities draw up Regional Development Plans and 
Operational Programmes.
Central ministries in Finland had important functions in coordinating and man-
aging EU Regional Policy (the Ministry of the Interior) and LEADER+ (the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry). The national coordination of the Structural Funds did 
not function outside the “shadow of hierarchy”. (Bache 1998, 344)
LEADER+
LEADER stands for “Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie 
Rurale”, which means “Links between development actions and the rural economy.” 
It was one of four Community initiatives and was financed by one of the four 
Structural Funds, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF).12 LEADER+, implemented during the programming period 2000-2006, 
was part of the Commission’s strategy and goal to improve living conditions in the 
peripheries of the EU for marginalized groups.
In an earlier study comparing Germany and Finland, (Kull 2008, 153) I con-
cluded that LEADER+ offered a space for multi-level interaction and local-level 
involvement. This space consisted of highly motivated people actively contributing 
1 1  See, above all, and very detailed, Bache 1998. A nice summary is provided in Bache 1999.
1 2  The other three Community initiatives are URBAN, INTERREG and EQUAL. The following struc-
tural funds were implemented in 2000-2006: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European 
Social Fund (ESF), the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and the European Agricultural 
Guidance & Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).
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to the improvement of the quality of life and the economy in Europe’s countryside. 
However, it was also dependent on and restricted by, national administrative prac-
tices, implementation approaches and cultures. Despite the empowerment of sub-
national actors in the implementation phase – in Finland to a much higher degree 
than in many other EU member states – it would be correct to say that central state 
levels remained in a crucially important position. They were engaged in the bargain-
ing over the overall financial framework and also acted as managing authorities.
In analysing the function of governmental institutions and the transformation of 
local action groups (LAG) after the construction of the LEADER programmes in 
Germany, Bruckmeier argued that “rural development projects became more politi-
cally controlled, standardized and administered; the independent actors and action 
groups have, in effect, become ‘Quangos’ (quasi-non-governmental organizations). 
The influence of governmental institutions has thus been strengthened and the finan-
cial basis enlarged; the programme has ‘golden chains.’” (Bruckmeier 2000, 221) 
However, partnership is a core rationale in this policy field and deserves some 
closer analysis. Former EU Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Mr. Franz Fischler, once said that “the partnership is in my view a fundamental part 
of LEADER and the future Community Initiative for rural development. The projects 
must be elaborated locally and not anywhere else. The principle of partnership must 
not only be maintained but also reinforced.”13 According to an interviewee from the 
EU Commission’s LEADER+ Observatory, partnership has been reinforced over the 
past few years. The main reason, according to him, is the “50% rule”, which means 
that no more than 50% of the members of LAGs must be from public administration. 
This “golden rule and one of the core elements of the LEADER method” is, accord-
ing to the interviewee, well accepted throughout the EU. (Interview 3)
The LEADER+ Programme for Finland defined partnership as “extensive co-
operation on an equal standing in the composition and activity of the LAG.”14 The 
LAGs were “open to all local persons and organisations who are interested in rural 
development.”15 By applying the so-called principle of tripartition, the Finnish 
LEADER+ programme went further than many other national LEADER+ pro-
grammes throughout the EU. Tripartition concerned the composition of the local 
action groups’ executive committees, which should “as far as possible consist of an 
equal number of representatives of individual rural residents, local associations and 
companies as well as the local administration.” (“Leader+ Programme for Finland”, 
1 3  At the European Conference on Rural Development, Cork, Ireland, 7-9 November 1996. The citation 
stems from: “Special LEADER Symposium towards a New Initiative for Rural Development: 800 Leaders Give 
their Views” and is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/leader2/rural-en/biblio/coll/art04.htm.
1 4  See “Leader+ Programme for Finland”, 72. The other general eligibility criteria for LAGs are as 
follows: the area must be rural, the area must have the appropriate size, strategic cohesion in the development 
plan and the development strategy must be consistent with one or two themes. These themes are listed in the 
LEADER+ Programme. LAGs had to choose between (1) Using new know-how and technologies to make the 
products and services of rural areas more competitive, (2) Improving the quality of life in rural areas, (3) 
Adding value to local products; facilitating access to markets for small production units via collective actions, 
(4) Making the best use of natural and cultural resources, including enhancing the value of sites of Community 
interest selected under NATURA 2000, (5) Slowing down migration from rural areas to population centres, 
encouraging migration towards rural areas, and (6) Increasing interaction between rural and urban areas.
1 5  See footnote above.
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72) Tripartition was supposed to guarantee “openness and equitability in the deci-
sion-making required in the LEADER+ programme as well as the involvement of 
new people in the local development work.” (72) The principle of tripartition in 
organising the executive committees of LAGs was outstanding when compared to 
other European countries and should serve as a model for local partnerships and 
bottom-up approaches in implementing structural funds.
I see this application of the principle of tripartition as a success in terms of both 
decentralising decision-making power and including a broad range of different social 
groups and institutions. In Finland, key individuals in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry sought to cover the whole countryside with LAGs in order to utilise local 
expertise and thus increase efficiency, and succeeded in doing so. An important fea-
ture of rural development in Finland is the fact that the LEADER approach was a 
role model for national programmes of rural development. In 2006, 419 of all 444 
Finnish municipalities were covered by LAGs. In mainstreaming this particular form 
of the partnership principle in Finland, namely the principle of tripartition, Finland 
is a role model for other EU member states. Due to the principle of tripartition and 
the mainstreaming of the LEADER-approach in Finland, the inclusion of different 
groups in the LAG was realised here much more than was the case in Germany, for 
instance. Furthermore, in comparison to Germany, the representation of public 
administration in steering committees was much more limited due to tripartition.
Respondents to a survey I conducted between 2005 and 2006 described coop-
eration with actors from different institutions of public administration as positive. 
While further empowering LAGs was favoured by many respondents participating 
in my survey, there are a number of reasons for supporting the preservation of the 
present structures in Finland. For instance, giving full decision-making powers to the 
LAGs would endanger the basic idea of local action groups, which are public private 
partnerships, not public authorities. Thus, a full-fledged decentralisation with all 
decision-making power conferred upon the LAGs and decoupling the decision-
making authorities (Employment and Economic Development Centres) from policy 
making was not an option for the managing authority.
In addition to tripartition and mainstreaming, another issue that seems to have 
functioned better in Finland is cross-border cooperation. One interviewee from the 
EU Commission, based on his experience with other Community Initiatives, argued 
that some areas in Europe seek cooperation more intensively than others. Cross-
border cooperation between neighbouring regions has a tradition in some areas, such 
as in the Baltic, in Scandinavia or in the Mediterranean. In addition to tradition, 
cooperation between LAGs has to come from the local side and is supported by 
LEADER axes in rural development programmes. National authorities should act as 
a motivator. They should not act as a barrier to cooperation as I observed in some 
areas in Germany.16
1 6  Interviewees from the Land Niedersachsen stressed, in a critical sense, that the managing authority 
has imposed such strict regulations on the financial support of networking that it made cooperation almost 
impossible (for instance Interview 1, conducted on 4 May 2005). Applicants had to demonstrate a clear added-
value from cooperation.
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While Finland should act as a role model, my reading of and partial explanation for 
the reluctance in adopting the Finnish model relates to the different traditions of 
public administration that exist in member states. While most German interviewees 
said that the Finnish model is desirable and is closer to the LEADER rationale of 
locally based partnerships than any other model applied throughout the EU, they are 
also aware that many managing authorities are reluctant to impose it. The intervie-
wee from the EU Commission was rather pessimistic in this context. The interviewee 
argued that
 Being realistic, I do not see this model being applied elsewhere. In Finland
 they spoke about history. In Finland they have this tradition of collective
 action, with a strong involvement of the people. So (this model) is very
 typical for Finland, quite normal. They focus on people and not on systems 
 or the organisation of institutions. The Finns are very practical. They are 
 really oriented towards finding solutions. Rules do not have an absolute
 value; Finns always find ways to solve problems pragmatically. This is what 
 I like in Finland. (Interview 3)
I agree with Kauppi, who argued that each field, in this case the national political 
field, has its “own dominant habitus, a culture or internalized set of action, prefer-
ence and evaluation that regulates resource accumulation. This specific, internalized 
culture or set of “internalized” institutions constrains and empowers individuals, 
assigning them roles and providing them guidelines for legitimate behaviour.” 
(Kauppi 2002, 24)
Conclusions
The construction of institutions to implement structural funds in Finland was pro-
pelled by adaptational pressure and “vertical mechanisms of adaptation” (Börzel and 
Risse 2003; Radaelli 2004) in terms of Regional Policy and facilitated coordination 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Radaelli 2004) in terms of the Community Initiative 
LEADER+. In addition, as far as the construction of the RCs to implement Regional 
Policy programmes is concerned, other European institutions not belonging to the 
EU, such as the Council of Europe and the Council of European Municipalities and 
Regions were of importance. Thus, discourses and the exchange of ideas on forms 
of self-government in institutions that only dispose soft pressure were highly impor-
tant, too.
Finland does not yet have an independent administrative meso-level.17 The cen-
tral state controls agencies and institutions at regional level, such as the Employment 
and Economic Development Centres and the State Provincial Offices. The RCs – 
some scholars see them as coming closest to being “real regions” – were created after 
Finland joined the EU in 1995 and have been empowered during the processes that 
led to deeper EU integration and Europeanization. Having no right of taxation, they 
are principally financed by their member municipalities. Furthermore, their assem-
1 7  See also Modeen, who comes to a similar conclusion (in Schäfer 1998, 27).
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blies, the highest decision-making bodies, are composed of municipal councillors. 
While there is no regional self-government in Finland, the model of local self-gov-
ernment is one of the most advanced in the world. In his Report on Regional 
Democracy in Finland rapporteur Leinen from the Council of Europe concluded, that 
regional government in Finland “does not represent genuine regions.” (Report on 
Regional Democracy in Finland – CPR (6) 2 rev Part II, 1) The report triggered some 
rethinking. The Finnish government has launched a number of projects to tackle the 
democratic deficit in the regions. These projects emphasise inter-municipal coopera-
tion and cooperation between the public and private sector. (See Ryynänen 2003c, 
163-165) However, the regional structures in Finland are still highly fragmented.
In my view, the status of actors in regional governance depends on the willing-
ness of the central state to loosen its grip but also on the willingness of regional 
actors to cooperate with each other. In my discussion of two related policy-fields, EU 
Regional Policy and the Community Initiative LEADER+, I realised that there were 
some differences in terms of power potentials in regional governance. As concerns 
the implementation of ERDF-funds, the central state is, in the view of some scholars 
and practitioners, by no means easily vacating its powerful position. A contrast is 
LEADER+, where the so called local action groups can act fairly well outside the 
shadow of the hierarchy. Regarding the partnership principle and the mainstreaming 
of the area-based approach to implement structural funds, Finland should serve as a 
model for other EU member states. However, Finnish governmental elites faced dif-
ficulties in establishing the Finnish approach.
The creation of a new “Super-ministry” (Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy) in 2008 will have an impact on regional governance as well. This reform 
responds to the need to clarify the division of work between the RCs and the 
Employment and Economic Development Centres (TE-Keskus). The programme of 
Mr. Vanhanen’s government provides a somewhat ambivalent context as it is, on the 
one hand, “very ambitious in giving more powers to the RCs” but on the other hand 
it also “wants to establish a new dynamic and effective organisation for economic 
development.” The latter might result in centralised steering and monitoring. 
This article sought to contribute to a more systematic and comprehensive picture 
of the Europeanization of Europe’s regional level of governance by reflecting on 
Finland, an understudied country in this context. In my view, the Nordic countries 
are very interesting cases since they form a relatively homogenous region in fields 
such as culture, language, identity or administration. However, as the Nordic coun-
tries dispose of very divergent strategies to cope with EU membership and European 
integration, further comparative case studies in the policy-fields focused on in this 
article would be very welcome. Regarding Finland, important issues to be studied in 
the future concern the mechanisms of information provision, the degree of steering 
and monitoring by national level actors and the status of different regional and local 
actors in the administration of structural funds. The most crucial issues for Finnish 
regional governance in the years to come are how the regional administration will be 
re-organised and how regional authority is going to be distributed after major region-
al reforms take place in 2010.
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Appendix
Interview-number
1
2
3
4
5
Interviewed Person
Manager of a LAG from Northern Germany
Civil servant from a decision-making authority 
in Niedersachsen
Civil servant of the DG Agriculture, LEADER+ 
Observatory, European Commission
Civil servant from the Finnish Ministry 
of the Interior
Group interview (2 civil servants) conducted in 
the Finnish Ministry of the Interior including 
one senior civil servant and one civil servant.
Date
4 May 2005
10 May 2006
9 June 2006
7 September 2007
26 September 2007
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The current study attempts to find correlations between the Europeanisation of 
national and territorial public administrations and the requirement system of 
Structural Funds’ management. The paper introduces the development of territorial 
administrations and the system of regional development policy management in three 
member states (first of all in Hungary based on our own research experience and 
relying on less detailed literature and information from Poland and Slovakia). The 
analysis of processes affecting territorial public administrations and the analysis of 
the driving forces will point out the conflicts of the administrations’ Europeanisation 
and the barriers of adapting external models in a Central or Eastern European region 
lacking real traditions of decentralisation and similarly regional identity. The future 
of the Structural Funds beyond 2013 is an even more open question. However, this 
fact does not exempt the CEE countries from the responsibility of treating the meso-
tier decentralisation.
Introduction
The European Union in general considers the structure and functioning of public 
administration as a national internal affair. Despite this approach, the public admin-
istrations of the member states undergo a strong Europeanisation and convergence 
process, since the implementation of European public policies depends mainly on the 
performance of national administrations. (D’Orta 2003) The European administra-
tive space has become a normative programme, relying on the relationships between 
the different tiers of governance as well as on the elaboration of common procedural 
and professional standards. (Cardona 1998, Olsen 2003, Goetz 2006)
The regional policy of the EU is crucial for national public administrations 
(Bovaird et al 2002), since bearing significant resources, it is one of the political 
means of deepening and enlarging the integration. The intensive invasive effect of 
the Structural Funds on national administrations of Eastern and Central European 
countries is explained by the strong motivation to acquire development resources 
eligible for less developed regions. It means that the so-called Europeanisation and 
conditionalism was generated directly by the management of the Structural Funds. 
(Hughes et al 2004)
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Although the homogenisation of public administrations does not supervene in a 
structural sense, yet regionalism, the emergence of new, larger administrative tiers 
and the EU’s regional policy definitely correlate. The European principles of subsid-
iarity and partnership, applied preliminarily in cohesion policy, included the regions 
into the decision-making processes of the Union and as a result, regions became the 
most virulent factors of multilevel governance. (Bache 1998)
If we acknowledge the member states’ public administrations’ structural and 
functional approaches as one of the manifestations of Europeanisation, we must 
accept that the motivation of accessing the Structural Funds played a significant role 
in this process especially in the cohesion countries, in many aspects such as:
1. The delimitation of the so called NUTS 2 regions (Nomenclature of Units of
 Territorial Statistics) in compliance with the regulations by the European
 Union, has became the basis of territorial reforms of public administration in
 several countries. (Although the European Council first adapted a compul-
 sory regulation concerning the size of NUTS regions in 2003 (between
 800.000-3.000.000), the eligibility size for units to be NUTS 2 regions at a 
 scale of about one million predates this).
2. The establishment of regional consulting bodies based on the principles of 
 subsidiarity and partnership became widespread.
3. Managing authorities had to be established for the management of structural
 funds, and their institutionalisation once more raised the issue of accommo-
 dation to national public administration.
The current study attempts to find correlations between the Europeanisation of 
national and territorial public administrations and the requirement system of 
Structural Funds’ management. The paper introduces the development of territorial 
administrations and the system of regional development policy management in three 
member states (first of all in Hungary based on our own research experience and 
relying on less detailed literature and information from Poland and Slovakia). 
Further, we discuss the achievements and dilemmas of the rescaling of the adminis-
trative meso-level, and the establishment of management systems for regional policy. 
We will deal with the emerging conflicts between traditional public administration, 
the local government system and the new partnership networks. The selected coun-
tries apply different techniques in the reform of territorial public administration and 
in the management of Structural Funds; actually each represents in many respects a 
model among the countries acceding to the EU in 2004. Nevertheless it is a valid 
statement regarding all models that the motivation to accede and acquire European 
resources takes a stronger effect on their ambitions concerning the regional tier than 
any other driving force of regional policy. The analysis of processes affecting territo-
rial public administrations and the analysis of the driving forces will point out the 
conflicts of the administrations’ Europeanisation and the barriers of adapting exter-
nal models in a Central or Eastern European region lacking real traditions of decen-
tralisation and similarly regional identity. The reason of following uninteriorised 
models may be the inadaptability of the selected model, that is the model’s incompat-
ibility with Eastern and Central European governance patterns, but also the rapidity 
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and inflexibility of adaptation. Further, the analysis of concrete examples will high-
light that the applied models and means of convergence between national administra-
tions may be fairly varying, and that structural changes do not necessarily lead to an 
optimal outcome.
Changing picture in meso-level administration in Europe
We shall examine to what extent and in what way, Europe was regionalised as the 
selected countries acceded to it. Public administrative diversity is a characteristic 
feature of European political circumstances, despite the number of administrative 
reforms carried out in the 20th century alone. These changes – both in Eastern and 
in Western Europe – were bound partly to political transformations and partly to the 
socio-economic and political development within national frameworks. Despite that, 
the 1980s and 1990s elapsed in the spirit of a Europe of regions, implementing sig-
nificant decentralisation and regionalisation reforms in many member states. 
(Larsson et al. 1999, Keating 2004) However, the driving force of regionalisation 
was not exlusively the structural fund, but often, it was of cultural ethnic and his-
torical character (Spain, Belgium, Great Britain), or in other cases, the aspects and 
motivation of modernisation, size efficiency or political decentralisation (France, 
Germany) played important roles. Some reforms were classically top-down (French, 
German), while in some other cases, the ambitions of local political elites can also 
be detected (Italy, Belgium, Great Britain). Therefore literature distinguishes between 
bottom-up and top-down regionalisms. (Keating 2004)
Thus we can state that in the previous decades, changes occurred in the structure 
of governance. Alongside those changes, the countries of the European Union can be 
classified by structural types in terms of political science:
 In the federal state model, the meso-level bears several features of an inde
 pendent state (legislation, provincial parliament, government) (Germany, 
 Austria and Belgium).
 The regionalised state model consists of constitutionally regulated meso-
 level units with wide autonomy and legislative competencies although this
 autonomy is not complete (Italy, Spain and – according to some classifica-
 tions – Portugal).
 In the decentralised state model, the regulation defines the regional tier as a
 unit administered by elected bodies, performing its tasks – in some cases 
 under constitutional protection – independently. Similarly to the previous
 type, the medium tier performs its activities partially in a self-financing way
 (France, the Netherlands, Sweden, etc. belong to this group).
 The unitary state model’s most characteristic feature is strict central control
 of the meso-tier, and it is financed mainly from the central budget (Denmark,
 the United Kingdom, Finland, Greece can be classed into this group).
Investigating the legal status and functions of the territorial meso-tiers of the member 
states, we found that in the majority of unitary and in both types of decentralised 
·
·
·
·
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states, a shift of competencies was carried out to the benefit of the meso-tier during 
the 80s. (Loughlin 2001)
However, strengthening the meso-level not always means decentralisation in the 
political sense. The central state often prefers the regionalisation of state-provided 
services and public administration, that is, the allocation of deconcentrated organs in 
the regions (England, Greece, Portugal, etc.). For instance, Finland introduced 
reforms, but has no directly elected meso-tier governments. Another example are the 
Swedish counties, which remained centralised, and the only result of reforms was the 
decision not to eliminate them.
Therefore we may declare that the phenomenon of regionalism and regionalisa-
tion is not identical with political decentralisation and not dependant on the physical 
scale of units, either. National characteristics strongly differentiate meso-tier admin-
istrations, despite some factors contributing to the strengthening of the sub-national 
tiers in general.
Overall, we claim that the dominating trend in public administration is spatial 
integration, the development of larger territorial scales. Still, we have to underline 
that no general schemes for territorial integration exist; therefore Central and Eastern 
European countries shall take their own way in order to achieve a desirably good fit 
between European regionalisation and domestic regionalism. (Cowles et al. 2001)
General impact of European regional/cohesion policy on governance 
structures
Regional development is one of the responsibilities of sub-national levels in every 
European country. The new economic paradigm of the previous decades had a sig-
nificant impact on the development of regional policy:
 New regional policy as an innovation-oriented or regionally initiated deve-
 lopment model.
 The establishment of regional and local co-operative networks of enterpries.
 Institutionalisation of information, innovation and business-incentive 
 transfers.
 Organisation of the local-regional development coalitions of different inte-
 rest groups, harmonisation of rigid administrative hierarchies and the estab- 
 lishment of flexible decision-making procedures.
 Transformation of the quality of living space, supplying capital attracting
 factors. (Danson et al. 1997)
European regions which were able to elaborate, enforce and implement development 
strategies matching their needs and demands stabilised their situation within a short 
period and the new structures started growing.
 The new regional policy required new management in general that is closer 
 to the region and also to the partners interested in the development: In seve-
·
·
·
·
·
·
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 ral countries, quasi-governmental or non-governmental tripartite/corporate
 organisations (councils, assemblies, chambers, forums, etc.) were set up, 
 specifically designed for the preparation and implementation of regional
 policy decisions and for harmonisation of interests of central state and local 
 governments, the employees and employers.
 The most important and wide-spread institutions are the development agen-
 cies mostly with a quango status. Development agencies were first estab-
 lished in the 50s-60s in Western Europe. They have a number of different
 status types (therefore it is hard to define them in terms of organisational
 features), yet their common feature is that they are not part of the hierarchic
 state administration but financed by the central budget. Their main distinc-
 tive function is the promotion of the economy. (Halkier 1998)
As has been described, the demands of economic development themselves have 
generated changes in the structure and functioning of governance, and these changes 
were accelerated by the EU’s Structural Funds. The new model of European region-
al policy contributing to Europeanisation in the 1980s-1990s meant a crucial chal-
lenge for the member states’ public administrations in the following fields:
 Regionalisation: its most important impact was the strengthening of the ter-
 ritorial approach. Regional policy in Europe reached the development phase
 in the 1980s, where the former centralised system on the basis of central 
 redistribution was replaced with a bottom-up model involving local resour-
 ces. Subsequent to the punctual development projects aimed at treating crisis
 areas, the system became more holistic and comprehensive covering larger
 territories. By introducing the NUTS system and different categories of
 development objectives, the Commission pushed national governments to
 designate eligible areas at the regional level. This phenomenon launched a
 series of reforms in the territorial structure of the meso-tier governance and
 the establishment of new, larger administrative tiers or the amalgamation of 
 former ones. Therefore, the most important accelerator encouraging regio-
 nalisation were the Structural Funds. (Keating 1998)
 Programming: Replacing the series of short-term independent projects, plan-
 ning became more comprehensive and now covers an extended horizon of 
 time. Programming as a profession required better processed and analysed
 information and a strategic perspective from planners. Development pro-
 grammes became more complex, and this complexity necessitated the
 improvement of performance capacity as well as new functional solutions
 within the management. The programmes themselves require comprehensive
 analysis of the situation and development prospects within the regions. 
 Further, the more structured development programmes urged co-ordination 
 between the branches and sectors.
 Efficiency professionalism: The increasing public involvement in economic
 development, closer links to the business sector and the new market-oriented
 system of economic support required more flexible behaviour of the public 
 administrative staff making it interested in the performance.
·
·
·
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 Partnership horizontality: Regional policy requires by its nature comprehen-
 sive co-operation between the sectors and tiers. This is especially true for its 
 newest model, which is not based on central state subsidies anymore but
 much more on the involvement of local resources. According to the regula-
 tions of the Structural Funds and the Maastricht Treaty, the European adapta-
 tion of the principles of subsidiarity and partnership took place. The principle
 of partnership challenged the national public administrative systems, espe-
 cially those models that lack tradition in the partner type of co-operation
 between tiers or sectors. Vertically managed relationship systems of sectoral 
 departments and sectoral deconcentrated organs shifted towards a new direc-
 tion subsequent to passing the act on regional development and became more
 horizontal. The necessary involvement of external resources and the more
 comprehensive measures naturally strengthened horizontal relationships as 
 opposed to vertical ones. In advance, we add here that in this element the 
 influence of the Commission was probably the least direct. The evaluation of 
 the partnership principle showed that the vague formulation of this require-
 ment resulted in fairly diverse and varyingly efficient solutions in the mem-
 ber states. (Kelleher et al. 1999)
The specialities of adaptation in the new member states
The new Eastern and Central European democracies faced a twofold challenge in the 
1990s:
 First, they had to establish a democratic state and political system on the
 basis of political plurality, not simply as a democratic principle, but also as
 a principle that is able to effectively tackle the problems raised by the sys-
 temic change. In order to achieve this task, not only was adaptation to the
 general model of Western democracies required, but also and parallel the
 consideration of national characteristics and historical roots was necessary.
 The new democracies, on the other hand, hoping for accession to the
 European Union, were to find a state administrative, institutional model
 which was able to match the requirements of “acquis communautaire”. The
 adaptation to this twofold, internal and external system of requirements and, 
 in addition, the time pressure concerning their implementation, was not, by
 any standards, easy and was not free from contradictions either.
The preparation for the EU accession and the reestablishment of the national power and 
administrative structures in the Eastern and Central European states were usually paral-
lel processes, supporting each other, and they were accompanied by several conflicts.
 In the spirit of conditionalism, the adaptation process was controlled fairly
 strictly, but in return, it was financially supported by the EU Commission.
 (Hughes et al. 2004) Since the accession countries had to design their own
 management system for the Structural Funds parallel to the setting up of their
 public administrative systems, these new, fragile national public administrati-
 ons were not able to meet the professional requirements set by the Community.
·
·
·
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 A further difficulty of the adaptation process was that the new member states
 with their completely different administrative culture and strong historical 
 heritage of centralisation could hardly integrate the new, alien elements of
 governance. The logic of NPM flourishing in Europe in the last decades was
 completely strange for the fairly bureaucratic structures of ECE countries.
 Finally the time pressure also hindered the learning process but also pushed
 the “pupils” imitating to real performance.
We can therefore assume that the regional reforms carried out in the member states 
that have acceded to the EU in 2004 belong to the top-down type of regionalisation. 
The interests and identity of local society and local elite were less enforced as this 
phenomenon was generally characteristic during the modernisation process after 
1990. (Pickvance 1997)
The generally unsuccessful responses to the challenges by the European gover-
nance imply that these countries need internal driving forces and commitment in 
establishing modern and democratic territorial administrative systems. In the follow-
ing, we will point out the difficulties of adaptation and the causes eliciting these dif-
ficulties in the mirror of the regionalisation efforts of the selected three countries.
Regionalised Poland with historical tradition
Poland has regional traditions, since it already had a regional public administrative 
arrangement during its history similar in scale to the current system prior to the 
reform performed in 1975. However, as we will highlight later, Poland had no tradi-
tion in real decentralisation of power. Furthermore, in the course of the delimitation 
and naming of new regions, the aspects of territorial identity and traditions were fully 
neglected. (Sagan 2007) The initial system in 1990 consisted of 49 medium-size state 
administrative regions and 2,800 communes. At the beginning of the 1990s, sectoral 
fragmentation and the preference of local technical infrastructure was generally char-
acteristic, mainly due to the weakness of the medium tier. (Davey 2003) After having 
recognised the necessity of change, one of the reform alternatives was to empower 
the 49 units with the right of self-governance. The second alternative was the estab-
lishment of larger regions and a further county tier. Poland followed a fairly ambi-
tious model of adaptation to European regional policy. As a result of hard efforts, 
Poland implemented comprehensive territorial reforms and introduced new self-
government units at the regional and county levels in 1998. As regards the reform 
process and the problems of implementation, although development policy was 
among the rationales of the reform, no decision was made with respect to this domain 
during the reform process. (Emilewicz and Wolek 2002) Although during the prepa-
ration phase, the hottest debates discussed the number and the delimitation of regions 
(originally 12 regions were planned but due to the strong opposition, the number was 
finally increased), competencies became the key elements in assessing the success of 
decentralisation. From this angle, Polish regionalisation also failed in spite of the 
deliberate structural coincidence of regional developmental and public administra-
tive units. The new regions were not equipped with competencies and funds; in other 
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words, region building was in fact not accompanied by the decentralisation of com-
petencies and tasks. (Regulskí 2003)
As a result of the reforms taking effect in 2000, 16 voivodships, equivalent to 
NUTS 2 and 315 powiats (and 65 urban gminas with powiat right) corresponding to 
NUTS 4 (45 of these NUTS 3 subregions are not administrative units) have come 
into existence. For all that, the former and the current territorial units of Polish pub-
lic administration (17 regions till 1975, 49 regions 1975-1998) cannot be compared 
with each other; they are only similar in their scale but they differ in their concrete 
geographical borders.
In Poland, traditionally there is a dual structure of public administration at the 
regional level, and this lead to fragmentation. The governmental office is headed by 
the voivod and the self-government is lead by the marshall. The regional assembly 
is empowered to adopt the development strategy for the region. The marshall is 
responsible for creating a proper environment for regional development, shaping the 
regional labour market, developing regional infrastructure, financial management of 
projects, regional innovation, etc. The marshall is the key institution responsible for 
the preparation of a regional development strategy. The voivod as a representative of 
central government has only legal supervisory competencies and is responsible for 
the transfer of public finance flows to the region. Furthermore, the voivod, as the 
head of the voivodship office is the representative of the Minister of Economy in the 
region. He and his office act as an intermediary between the central government and 
the regional self-government.
In the year 2000, the Polish Parliament passed the act on the principles of 
regional support. From among the Community’s principles, programming has the 
greatest impact on Polish regional policy. (Karasinska et al. 2002) National 
Development Plans were adopted in 2000 and 2002; at the same time, all regions 
adopted their own regional development programmes. The very fragmented and dif-
ficult system is co-ordinated by the voivodship contracts. The contract, as the docu-
ment of mutual obligations for the central government and regional self-governments, 
is based on the priorities set in the national and regional development strategies.
The biggest contradiction is the fact that the reallocation of tasks from the 
national to the regional level was not accompanied by the reallocation of sufficient 
resources. This limitation of the resources of the newly created self-governmental 
tier proved to be the major hindrance of the performance of an autonomous develop-
ment policy. In this context, 80% of the voivodship’s budget originated from the state 
budget. Due to and in accordance with the lacking funds, the programmes launched 
were of fairly low significance. Notwithstanding, the trend is improving considering 
resource concentration. According to an analysis, regional policy principles succeed 
with very weak efficiency in the financing of sectoral programmes. (Davey 2003, 
123) In other terms, regionalisation had a positive impact on development policy; 
and despite their fragmentation and weak competencies, regions still offer a more 
efficient institutional framework than sectoral ministries.
Further decentralisation and stronger dominance of representative organs against 
central state administration were expected, approaching the accession to the 
European Union. Thus, with reference to the first experiences of managing Structural 
Funds, we must conclude that the formal adaptation was completed but unfortu-
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nately without having solved the problem of power decentralisation. Still, consider-
ing the investigated countries, Poland was the one which can report a number of 
positives developments. In Poland, during the first programming period (2004-
2006), 40% of EU funding was allocated to regional operative programmes. As 
compared with the other new member states, this was actually the highest proportion. 
(Bachtler and McMaster 2008) At the same time, the management of the ROPs was 
centralised in the ministry responsible for regional policy. It means that only a frag-
ment of the EU funding was managed and controlled at the regional level, which was 
a real disappointment for regional actors, since they were very ambitious in prepar-
ing regional operative programmes and establishing regional administrative capaci-
ties. Despite the serious efforts made, the regions had representatives only in the 
regional monitoring committees, which, on the other hand, had no decision-making 
power. The situation slightly changed during the next programming period as a result 
of the stronger regional pressure. In Poland, 16 ROPs were formulated, and they are 
managed regionally by the self-government and the voivod’s office, although the 
central control remained unchanged. (Bachtler and McMaster 2008)
In conclusion, we wish to state that historical traditions in terms of geographical 
scale could have supported the Polish regionalisation, but the reforms were with no 
respect to these; moreover, they even generated powerful conflicts among the towns 
of the regions. Refilling the regions with autonomous power and resources was an 
even harder task. The voivod is a determining actor in territorial public administra-
tion; against him, the regional government and its president can hardly obtain posi-
tions. The process of regionalisation was in fact accelerated by the European acces-
sion and the constraint of treating the economic crisis. At the same time, the subven-
tion of local governments, especially the towns, and the economic sector were con-
sidered among the weak factors of regional capacity building. Exactly this is the 
reason why the evaluators consider the essential change of economic and social con-
ditions as the immanent and indispensable precondition of strong regionalisation. 
(Sagan 2007) At this place, we must mention that the relative success of the region-
al reforms is closely connected with the stronger civil traditions and the historical 
embeddedness of the scale, and also the capability of the new regional governments 
to exert pressure on the central government in the interest of continuation of decen-
tralisation. (Emilewicz 2002, Sagan, 2007)
Slovakia – rapid catching-up, dilemmas of nation and region
In 1990, settlements were authorised to self-governance, and the territorial tier of 
public administration underwent significant restructuring. Former regions were 
eliminated from the system, 121 districts replaced them. Slovakia became an inde-
pendent state in 1996 making explicit centralising efforts, quite understandable in 
view of its nation-building ambitions. Behind the new spatial structure, hidden 
political intentions were to be detected, like the partition of territories settled by 
Hungarian minorities or different electoral technical considerations. (Mezei and 
Hardi 2003) Most of the escalating conflicts emerged alongside nationalistic and 
partially modernising ambitions. The story of coalition-building also demonstrates 
the macro-political importance of minority issues. (Malikova and Staronova 2005)
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After 1996 the territory of Slovakia was divided into 8 large state administrative 
regions and 79 districts. The seats and borders of the administrative regions were in 
some cases appointed and delimited on the basis of political considerations directed 
to the Hungarian minorities. Similar techniques were also applied in the course of the 
delimitation of districts. We mention that the Council of the European Union even 
criticised the dramatic divergence from the former traditional administrative configu-
ration. However, ministries were powerful enough during the 1996 reforms to main-
tain the network of deconcentrated organs set up subsequent to the systemic change. 
(Bucek 2002)
The next reform of public administration was carried out in 1998 as the outcome 
of long lasting debates. Political discussions of the parties were coloured repeatedly 
by the national minorities’ dimension. (Ficza 2005) In 2001, the decision was made 
to carry out a direct election of county self-governments in the eight former state 
administrative regions. However, the transformation of counties into self-governmen-
tal units was slowly progressing, especially in terms of allocation of competencies 
and financial resources, as was usual in post-communist countries. (Bryson and 
Cornia 2004) The formerly territory-based deconcentrated public administration was 
not willing to delegate its powers.
In 2004, more comprehensive territorial reforms were implemented; the former 
79 districts were eliminated, and their competencies were taken over by the eight state 
administrative county offices, by 50 district offices and 221 special state administra-
tive offices.
Establishing the institutional system of regional development was characterised by 
conceptual changes in terms of public administrative spatial division and by various 
uncertainties. The four NUTS 2 regions rely on a county/district-division, the NUTS 3 
level is equivalent to the eight counties and NUTS 4 (today called Local Administrative 
Units LAU1) consists of the former 79 districts and not the new 50! This means that 
the NUTS division completely differs from the administrative division, indicating that 
there was no stable vision regarding the territorial division of the country.
The institutional system of regional development is, in practical terms, the net-
work of regional development agencies set up by the government in the year 2000. 
The task of the agencies financed by the central government is to assist the govern-
ment and the local actors in utilising the Structural Funds. (Rehak 2007) Besides the 
agencies, 13 regional consulting and information offices operate, designed for pri-
marily supporting the business sector. (We note that in the course of the regional 
reforms, the idea of establishing 12 regions was also put forward.) It is clear that these 
institutions do not follow the NUTS system. This divergence also indicates that the 
territorial reform in Slovakia was not exclusively motivated by the compulsory adap-
tation to the European Union, and the fact that public administrative reforms did not 
take the NUTS 2 units into consideration attracted criticism. (Nemec 2002)
Slovakia established so-called regional managing and monitoring committees 
and their secretaries in the NUTS 2 regions, and their task is to participate in the 
management of the Structural Funds. Within the NUTS 3 counties, the management 
of development policy and the adaptation of development programmes are the 
responsibility of county assemblies. However managing authorities and monitoring 
committees operate at this tier too, in cooperation with partnership organisations 
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including local governments, state administrative and non-profit professional organi-
sations. (Ficza 2004)
Following the accession to the European Union, the management of programmes 
is a kind of alien body outside the ordinary public administration, experiencing func-
tional problems. This structure could not provide an appropriate basis for the manage-
ment of Structural Funds providing an explanation why the European Commission 
picked the centralised model of Structural Funds’ management for Slovakia.
In the first programming period, Slovakia had no regional operative programmes, 
only one single programme aimed at the basic infrastructure and managed by the 
ministry responsible for regional development demonstrating that the accelerated 
modernisation required centralised control. In the recent programming period, region-
al issues finally got priority as project-selection criteria. (Batchler and McMaster 
2008) Finally eight regional operative programmes were established (instead of four 
in the NUTS 2 regions). However, this solution clearly implies that the number and 
borders of regions are still unstable. Moreover, the actual managing authorities of 
these programmes remained in the central tier within the ministry responsible for 
regional development. Similarly, the implementation of the Lisbon strategy in the 
new programming period also indicates the incomplete character of regionalisation, 
which actually has appointed concrete settlements as innovation development poles 
instead of the regions, questioning from the very beginning the authenticity of region-
al decentralisation. (Rehák 2007)
Thus, what we experience is that in Slovakia, the establishment of meso-tier 
administration is fairly loaded with uncertainties deriving from the lack of historical 
traditions, regional cohesion and identity, and the European cohesion policy and the 
establishment of NUTS 2 regions could not counteract these. The institution system 
managing the Structural Funds is centralised, the regional system is fragmented and 
lacking resources, although the chance for regionalisation is dependent on the rein-
forcement of regional governance capacities. The regional identity of the local society 
theoretically supporting political decentralisation is absent, and the ethnic segregation 
does not really support the strengthening of regional identity. These factors actually 
imply the durable weakness of territorial governments.
Hungary: from eminent student to lagging behind
I will dedicate more attention in my study to the Hungarian regionalisation not only 
because as a Hungarian researcher, I have the most research experience on Hungarian 
processes, but also because the Hungarian example produces the most explicit evi-
dence for the fact that top-down regionalisation, adapting to external expectations, 
can not expect lasting success. Lacking internal political support and professional 
consensus, regional structures remain fragile.
Traditionally, the county has been a very strong unit of the Hungarian public 
administration ever since the foundation of the Hungarian state in the eleventh cen-
tury. The Act on Local Governments, enacted in 1990, brought about a completely 
new situation in the spatial distribution of power. Instead of the former medium-level 
county organisation, municipality became the key element of the local government 
system. The lack of competencies, means and resources was accompanied by unstable 
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political legitimacy and distrust towards county assemblies. This change led to the 
strong centralisation of the entire public administrative system.
Experts identified the problem relatively early, but a solution has not been found 
yet. The debate on the status of counties and the meso-level governance in general is 
ongoing since 1990, raising questions like ‘Which should be the territorial tier of 
Hungarian public administration?’ The absence of answers postponed the stabilisa-
tion of power at the medium tier and generated uncertainty about the scale of meso-
level government.
The weakening of the democratically elected medium-level governments (coun-
ties) contributed to the increasing influence of the central government. The Hungarian 
state’s shape is similar to a sand-glass, with a too strong (wide) top and a too strong 
(wide) bottom, causing many functional and democratic deficits, therefore Hungarian 
local governance suffers not only from efficiency problems but from democratic 
deficits too. The stable and powerful local elite is not willing to share its power with 
the local society, and as highlighted later, the missing social control at the meso-
level contributed to the dominance of uncontrolled networks.
In 2002, the government announced brave reforms within the public administra-
tive sector, planning the establishment of directly elected regional self-governments 
by the year 2006. The objective of the reform was to finish the decade-long debate 
on the counties by transferring territorial power to the regions, thus eliminating the 
self-governance status of the counties. This programme proved to be too ambitious. 
Anyway, at that time, many experts were pessimistic about this intention, because 
regions are artificial formations in Hungary; the regional identity of the Hungarian 
society is obviously very weak. The civil society did not evolve and political institu-
tions were not established at the regional level. Consequently, the democratic control 
over the regional bodies, as well as over the relationships of these bodies to the elec-
tors and the social or political institutions, would have been very weak. It is an 
extremely important question whether top-down initiated regionalisation, together 
with a weak and unintegrated local society, can lead to an actually decentralised 
power structure? There was a danger that a forced regionalisation would become an 
instrument in the hands of not the local, but the central power.
Fears proved to be unjustified, but not because they were unfounded, but rather 
because the reform efforts died away. The government in power in the cycle 2002-
2006 did not prepare or submit any legal acts on the regional reform. The excuse was 
– permanently communicated – that the reform probably would not have gained the 
support of the parliamentary opposition. Anyway, regionalisation in Hungary 
requires the amendment of the Constitution, and therefore the qualified majority – 
the vote of two thirds of the representatives – must support it. So such reform is only 
possible if a consensus with the opposition is reached.
Preparing for the accession, one chance to stabilise the ‘meso’ was the legislation 
on the European type of regional policy. The Hungarian regional policy was system-
atically adapted to the bottom-up model of European regional policy dominant in the 
last decade. The act on regional development was passed in 1996 bringing about 
basic changes in the territorial power structure. (Pálné 2001) The institutional system 
of regional development in Hungary is not based on the territorial public administra-
tion or local government system. It was simply impossible to integrate regional 
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policy into this fragmented administrative structure lacking a strong territorial/meso-
level of public power. The central government and the municipalities were not inter-
ested in strengthening the county.
According to the Hungarian regulation, the development councils established at 
the national, regional, county and micro-regional levels were created by delegation. 
A great dilemma was whether the micro-regional (NUTS 4), county (NUTS 3) or the 
regional (NUTS 2) level should be the main action arena of regional political inter-
vention and the institutional system. The answer was based on fairly pragmatic argu-
ments. The legislator decided to establish special institutions at all three territorial 
tiers. This over-fragmented institutional system, the conglomeration of development 
councils operating at three territorial tiers contributed to the fragmentation of the 
development resources, the competition of the tiers among each other and conflicts 
evolving due to the lack of a clear division of labour and, what is most important, the 
macro (NUTS 2) regions could not become key actors in the regional policy.
Looking back on more than ten years, we can state that the three territorial tiers 
and their fairly complicated institutional system were unable to counterbalance the 
weight of the central government. This solution further fragmented development 
resources, intensified the competition among the tiers and raised several new con-
flicts deriving from the lack of a clear division of labour.
Paradoxically, it could have been just the accession to the European Union that 
made the government change its opinion on regionalisation. The accession in 2004 
caused shock and disappointment. Referring to the “weak regional capacity”, the 
European Commission insisted on the centralised management of Structural Funds; 
therefore, the regional institutions (regional development councils) have almost 
completely lost their former influence on regional policy. The management authori-
ties were integrated in the central government, the regional actors only received co-
operative functions. Hungary had to realise that the EU does not insist on the active 
role of the regions, it does not want to take risks with decentralised structures. The 
adaptive pressure of accession pushed the country towards centralisation and 
neglecting the regions, whereas the previous decade was characterised by regional-
ism and decentralisation.
The government re-elected in 2006 made another attempt to carry out the reform 
of regional self-governance, although it was not very convincing. After the elections, 
the government made proposals in an extremely swift manner for the amendment of 
the act on local governments and the constitution, which were submitted to the 
Parliament before the beginning of the summer, without any social or political rec-
onciliation. No wonder that the opposition did not support the proposal. The issue of 
regional self-government is not on the schedule any more, and it is uncertain when 
it will be put back again, but the government has a firm intention to carry out region-
alisation of state administration and services. Such a regionalisation leaking through 
the back door bears the danger that the positions of the central government are rein-
forced against the local society.
This is why it gained a special importance in the planning of the second National 
Development Plan. However, the government did not focus its regionalisation efforts 
on those fields where it would be the most necessary. During the preparation of the 
second National Development Plan, for the 2007-2013 period, the government 
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placed emphasis on the role of the regions; therefore seven independent regional 
operative programmes were included in the plan. On the other hand, the government 
created a fairly centralised management, and regional development agencies and 
councils were given an intermediary role again. This process indicates the conclusion 
that the territorial reform can and should not be exclusively treated as a part of the 
European adaptation process and made subordinate to the needs of regional policy.
The government was more committed to regionalism on the field of deconcen-
trated administration, as it decided to integrate the county divisions of state admin-
istrative organisations into regional units. This regionalisation strengthened the 
regions as a state administrative tier, proving that the top-down regionalisation will 
not necessarily result in the real decentralisation, devolution of power. It is not acci-
dental that exactly the representatives of the parliamentary opposition have called 
upon the Constitutional Court for the issue of whether the public administrative 
reform meets the requirements of the Constitution, which introduces new geograph-
ical frameworks of power without having modified the Constitution.
Summarising we can conclude that Hungary attempted to adapt to the chal-
lenges of European regional policy. This adaptation process was successful in terms 
of institution-building and the adoption of know-how by technocrats, top officials of 
public administration. On the other hand, the adaptation was only formal and did not 
contribute to the real decentralisation. So we are in the situation that we have sev-
eral meso-tiers and several types of regionalised institutions, but the system as a 
whole remained centralised.
Many questions remained without answer, such as:
 Which one of the three existing territorial units will (shall) be the real meso-
 level of public administration? It seems that regional policy was an insuffi-
 cient motivation to transform the territorial structure of power.
 Is there any other motivation besides the Structural Funds for achieving a 
 more professional and flexible public administration at all levels?
 Why does the external adaptation pressure have more influence on the public 
 administration than everyday internal, personal experiences of malfunctions 
 and failures?
 What local social and economic forces will be able to support political 
 decentralisation? 
The delay of responses to these questions is not only due to the political culture and 
motivation but also to the lacking systematic scientific analysis and real political 
intention to face the problems of Hungarian public administration, which have to be 
treated anyway, regardless of the European accession.
Conclusions
We can conclude that the EU’s regional policy has proved its crucial motivation for 
modernising national public administrations in the sense of regionalism, managerial-
ism, partnership or more flexible governance. Over the last few decades, the 
·
·
·
·
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European public administration underwent significant transformations and will prob-
ably continue changing in the future. These changes indicated two principal trends: 
the first type is structural, organisational transformation, and the second is func-
tional change concerning its operation. The role of these two types of changes and 
their interrelationship can hardly be generalised. The new challenges could be 
answered by functional adaptation as well, and several member states were success-
ful in the absorption of Structural Funds without dramatic structural changes in 
public administration. The reason may be that Western democracies had a much 
more stable (and integrated) public sector than the newcomers. (Potucek 2004) In the 
spirit of incrementalism, the slow but deep changes, the model of step-by-step adap-
tation, modernisation is often applied. Despite this fact, the modernisation of nation-
al public administrations and local governments has been typically carried out in the 
form of structural reforms in Europe in the last few decades. (Wright 1997)
The adaptation of Eastern European countries is moving on in a fairly contradic-
tory way. The accession countries have formulated and established their territorial 
public administration parallel to the institutions of the regional support system of the 
European Union. The territorial harmonisation of the two systems is not successful 
in every case, and the replacement of traditional public administrative units by new, 
larger ones is a difficult task. Alongside structural changes, organisational changes, 
functioning and behaviours often remain unchanged, and structural reforms may be 
inefficient. This means that “radical” reforms implemented on the surface reshaped 
only the structure but not the content, not the values and attitudes of the civil ser-
vants. (Lazareviciute and Verheijen 2000)
The institutionalisation of the flexible management and partnership required by 
regional policy often happens outside the ordinary public administrative system. This 
solution was preferred since these institutional reforms were implemented exclu-
sively top-down, with the decision of the central government using the European 
requirements as reference. It is namely an easier solution than the improvement of 
the rigid autocrat apparatuses. The changing geographical borders and the coinciding 
organisational structures are new phenomena, which actually point towards 
democratisation and decentralisation, but their real success can hardly be measured 
yet and depend on the parliamentary relations. (Wolmann 1997) Generally, the logic 
of partnership in European regionalism has been used as a tool rather than a target in 
Eastern and Central European politics. It has become a tool of centralisation, the 
resource distribution alongside clique interests, bypassing the directly elected self-
government bodies and the publicity. Literature often cites the opinions indicating 
the negative effects and consequences of partnership, corporate institutions, associa-
tions, ad-hoc groupings and informal networks. (Olsson 2001) The transparency, the 
direct participation may easily be violated especially when the regional and local 
self-governments and the civil society are not strong enough. Western European 
experiences show that the adaptation is not always achieved by structural reforms. 
More flexible, informal formations may bridge the problems of “misfit”. However, 
we have to pay attention to the fact that the new challenges of regional policy may 
not endanger the political controlling role of the territorial self-government units. 
This danger is well illustrated by Hungarian regionalisation, where the jungle of new 
bodies has damaged the transparency, pushed representative bodies to the periphery 
55
Europeanisation of Territorial Governance in Three Eastern/Central European Countries
and did not create regional publicity. As previously described, real decentralisation 
was difficult even in Poland, although the elected regional governments served as the 
framework of governance.
The forms and scales of public administration are already Euro-conform, but the 
content is more similar to the Eastern political culture. Therefore the first task prior 
to the modernisation challenge of regionalism is to implement real decentralisation 
and meet the traditional challenge of participative democracy, otherwise the original 
logic of regionalism may be violated, and the old, centralised, antidemocratic politi-
cal attitudes may survive within the framework of new geographical boundaries and 
organisational forms.
The main problem of accession countries is that in the spirit of regionalism, they 
were not able to decentralise their public power system, they actually only rescaled 
it. The reason is that in the selected countries, the driving forces of regionalisation 
are in the central governments; the local elite tried to exert pressure only in the 
delimitation of the most developed regions (such as in Poland and Slovakia). On the 
basis of all this, it is difficult to predict the future of regionalism in the countries 
investigated in this paper. And we have to take into account the phenomenon that the 
future of regionalism is not so clear even in the enlarged Europe. The distrust of the 
EU’s Commission towards the Eastern European regions shows that the renaissance 
of regionalism will not be necessarily continued in the twenty-first century. This 
undeniable reversal may even be understood in a way that the Commission has rea-
lised that “Union’s prescriptions” are not the therapy; and even while prescribing the 
medication, the concrete condition of the patient should also be considered. The 
future of the Structural Funds beyond 2013 is an even more open question and thus 
the European emphasis of the regional dimension too. However, all these do not 
exempt the CEE countries from the responsibility of treating the meso-tier decen-
tralisation as a priority of the modernisation of their governance, as an important 
element of European “good governance”.
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ABSTRACT
Europeanisation has manifold impact on national public policies. One of them is 
increasing interest to learn from reform experiences in other member states and 
adjust domestic policies accordingly. Education as a traditionally very national field 
of policy has only recently become an object of Europeanisation. Yet, today common 
EU objectives and benchmarks in education and training stimulate member states to 
look more carefully to the countries that perform well.
The current paper deals with this new multi-level situation in policy-learning 
where EU member states draw lessons from each other in order to adjust their 
domestic policies to the EU objectives. The education policy of Estonia, which used 
to draw lessons from the neighbouring Finland, serves as an empirical case for inves-
tigation. The aim of this paper is to study whether the role of Finland in the adjust-
ment of the Estonian education policy to the EU objectives has evolved in time. The 
analysis revealed a significant evolution in arguments and instruments of lesson-
drawing. Study findings suggest that Finland has played a catalyzing role in the 
Europeanisation of the Estonian education policy only for a short period. Today the 
EU has became a more important arena of learning than the neighbouring Finland.
Keywords: open method of coordination, policy transfer, policy learning, policy 
actors, “Work Programme on Education and Training 2010”, education reforms
Context: “Comparative turn” in EU education policy and member states 
Education has been traditionally regarded as a field of explicit national responsibil-
ity. Yet, since the Maastricht treaty, the EU has increasingly expanded its interest in 
education both in terms of education areas and governance instruments. Reasons 
why education is on the top agenda today are manifold. Firstly, more than ever, a 
close link between education and the nations’ economic performance is stressed. 
According to the Lisbon strategy, Europe is aiming to provide everyone not just a 
job, but a better job. Additionally, Europe is supposed to become the world’s most 
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competitive economy, and education systems must contribute to this aim. It is worth 
noting that together with European educational statistics, data of the US and Japan 
as the main economic competitors are expansively provided in Commission reports. 
(COM 2007, COM 2008) Secondly, European countries have common concerns 
regarding national education systems and their linkage to the labour market. The 
level of students’ achievement, the compatibility of national standards with the 
demands of the international labour market and the openness of the educational sys-
tem to innovations are issues intensively discussed in member states.
The policy choice for the EU in this situation was to decide whether to allow 
member states to autonomously seek best practices around the world, or to govern 
the process through EU mechanisms. The latter was chosen by adopting the 
“Common objectives in education and training 2010” at the Barcelona summit in 
2002. The new method of policy governance (open method of coordination), already 
successfully implemented in European employment policy, has been expanded to 
education. While preserving national differences of education systems and allowing 
the choice of policy instruments, the EU sets common objectives and regularly 
evaluates progress towards them. However, even more remarkable than the formula-
tion of common objectives is the way how those objectives are presented – by statis-
tical indicators and benchmarks. This feature refers to some similarities between EU 
education policy and neoliberal practices in Anglo-Saxon countries where encour-
agement of competition and the publication of schools’ league tables are typical. 
According to Novoa and deJong-Lambert, market competition was the initial depart-
ing point of the EU policy towards creating benchmarks in education. Inter alia, the 
European Round Table of Industrialists played an important role in promoting bench-
marking as a tool for guiding policies. According to the secretary general of the 
round table, “The idea was to establish criteria relevant to competitiveness and then 
publish figures in a regular and systematic way that would encourage each country 
to try catch up with the best practices elsewhere, but without dictating the specific 
policy measures needed.” (cited in Novoa and deJong-Lambert 2003, 46) Today 
Europe puts more emphasis on the quantitative measurement of educational out-
comes than it used to do. In the 1980s and 1990s, international comparative surveys 
carried out by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievements (IEA) attracted attention amongst policy-makers mainly in the US and 
in the Far East. Yet, in Post-Lisbon Europe, data from IEA TIMSS and PIRLS stud-
ies and from OECD PISA and PIAAC surveys serve as formal benchmarks in mea-
suring educational progress. (COM 2007, COM 2008) Measurement of civic skills 
(as one of the 16 core indicators for monitoring progress towards the Lisbon objec-
tives) is based entirely on the IEA studies. (Hoskins et al. 2008) In the coming IEA 
International Civic and Citizenship Survey (ICCS 2009), a special European 
Regional Module was elaborated on request of the EU Commission. Also, the 
European Commission provides financial support to the member states (mainly in 
Central and Eastern Europe) covering up to 80% of participation fees in ICCS.
These developments illustrate the growing importance of international and 
supranational actors in education policy. The “comparative turn” in education policy 
started by the OECD (Martens 2007, 44) was soon adopted by the EU Commission. 
Harmonisation of statistical data within OECD, IEA and the European Commission 
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is not simply a process of collecting data. This is also a process of constructing a 
European identity based on statistical indicators. Through the arrangement of catego-
ries and benchmarks, a definition of the “best system” is proposed suggesting others 
to learn and move in this direction. (Novoa and deJong-Lambert 2003)
In addition to the horizontal learning across member states, countries are encour-
aged (or even enforced) to compare their policy outcomes with the EU objectives 
and benchmarks. National action plans are composed in accordance with common 
objectives and annual national progress reports reviewed by the Commission staff. 
Although the open method of coordination leaves some degree of freedom to mem-
ber states to choose their own path, it is hard to imagine that any of the member states 
can opt out the system entirely. (Novoa and deJong-Lambert 2003, Vanttaja and 
Rinne 2008) Due to the increasing cooperation between the EU structures and 
OECD, it becomes complicated to explicitly allocate the effect on national education 
policies to one of the mentioned actors. Educational policies of the OECD and the 
EU develop in the same directions and since the mid-1990s, both of them have influ-
enced national education policy-making in Estonia and Finland. (Vanttaja and Rinne 
2008) However, Estonia and Finland reacted to the international pressure differently, 
due to different attitudes towards national policy-making and the time when the two 
countries joined the EU.
Finland became an EU member in 1995 when European education policy was 
still in an embryonic phase. Thus Finland could continue in the old manner, meaning 
that education was regarded as a national business, and policy-learning occurred on 
non-standardised bases via contacts with neighbouring Nordic countries. (Vanttaja 
and Rinne 2008)
Finland had a strong position to base national activities in the EU firmly on the 
Nordic values. Although education was only a minor part of the “Nordic dimension”, 
the importance of equality and social justice in education was stressed within this 
framework. (Dahl 2003) To the contrary, the notion of a European dimension in 
education was seen as too heavily interfering into national policies and too focused 
on the economic needs of the Single Market. Nordic countries found that education 
should create democratic citizens as well as fulfil the needs of the industry, whereas 
the EU emphasised the latter. (Dahl 2003) However, in recent years, the gap between 
the Nordic and EU education policy values has been becoming less visible. “There 
is no trade-off between efficiency and equity”, declares the Joint Interim Report. 
(Council 2006) At the same time, Finnish education strengthens the orientation 
towards neoliberal values. (Naumanen and Rinne 2008)
Estonia applied for EU membership in the same year that Finland became a 
member of it. Three years later (1998), the negotiation process started. Estonia 
adopted annual national action plans, which were reviewed by the Commission in 
progress reports. Not surprisingly, education issues did not cause problems in imple-
menting aquis. In the same year that Estonia successfully closed membership nego-
tiations (2002), the Barcelona European Council agreed upon the “Work Programme 
on Education and Training 2010”, which marks the acceleration and deepening of 
educational policy on the EU level. Thus, when Estonia became a full member in 
2004, the Union had already lived two years under the new education-policy para-
digm. Estonia learned quickly to report on progress according to the OMC principles 
·
·
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in various policy fields such as employment, pensions, social exclusion and, lastly, 
education. Hence, for a new member state, the OMC was perceived as the normal 
way of EU intervention into national policies.
Estonia’s standpoint in the EU affairs was quite different from that of Finland. 
Firstly, there has always been scepticism towards domestic competencies in educa-
tion-policy-making. The state of affairs in education has been steadily under public 
criticism, and attempts to transfer policy experiences abroad have been made in edu-
cation since the beginning of the transition period in the early 1990s. (Ruus 2004) 
Secondly, Estonia did not have a strong platform on preserving national policy pat-
tern in the EU; instead the willingness to adopt European norms without big discus-
sions was dominant. Such conformism could be explained not by the low self-esteem 
of policy-makers only, but also by the good fit between Lisbon values and national 
goals of education. In post-communist Estonian education policy, competitiveness, 
entrepreneurship and freedom of choice have been more appreciated than social 
cohesion and equality. (Vanttaja and Rinne 2008) Already in 1997, i.e. five years 
ahead of the Lisbon strategy, the Estonian government stated the main goal of edu-
cational reforms as developing an educational system that will allow Estonia to 
compete successfully at the European goods and labour market. (VVk 1997) 
Criticism towards the domestic policy-making capacity and towards the question of 
whether the EU approach to educational objectives was a good fit created a situation 
that according to the research literature (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Rose 2005) 
favours policy transfer.
Method: applying the policy-learning approach
Theories of policy-learning have gained remarkable attention in the last decade. 
Europeanisation has played an important role in this by providing good grounds to 
verifying relevant theoretical accounts. Much research has pointed to OMC as a 
policy device intended to rely on the comparative method and on the potential of 
policy transfers. (Wallace 2001; Novoa and deJong-Lambert 2003; Rodrigues 2003) 
The first pieces of work on Europeanisation applied the policy transfer approach to 
the policy areas that belong to the single market. (Radaelli 2000; Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso 2001) Later on, when OMC became firmly established, policy-learning 
accounts were also used to study Europeanisation in soft policy areas including edu-
cation. (Phillips and Ertl 2003; Novoa 2001) The majority of the studies investigate 
how Brussels can motivate or oblige policy transfer. Fewer authors stress that the 
impact of EU institutions is not straightforward but mediated by various factors. The 
level of how well the EU policy fits with domestic structures and values (Risse, 
Cowles and Caporaso 2001), “horizontal effects” of Europeanisation understood as 
the result of increased competition or cooperation between countries (Vink and 
Graziano 2007) and the legitimacy of the EU in member states (Radaelli 2000) are 
studied as factors explaining the EU impact on national policies.
I will apply these approaches on mediated policy transfer to the education policy 
of Estonia, which used to learn from its neighbouring Finland. The aim of the article 
is to find out whether the role of Finland in drawing lessons has changed since 
Estonia entered the EU and whether this can be explained by the active interference 
·
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of the EU in educational policy. I assume that those EU policy objectives and indica-
tors gain priority in the Estonian policy agenda, where a feasibility to draw a lesson 
from Finland exists. Thus, another member state, which serves as an arena for policy 
transfer can play a catalysing role in enhancing the Europeanisation of national 
policy. In order to prove the hypothesis, I will study several issues in Estonian educa-
tion subject to policy transfer by asking the following research questions:
1. What are the arguments of actors in looking to reform experiences abroad?
2. What are the policy-learning mechanisms? Do they evolve in the course of
 time?
3. Are the Finnish experiences that have been transferred related to the EU
 policy objectives? Do they explain the variance in the success of learning
 exercises?
In order to carry out the analysis I will adopt the framework by Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000), who studied policy-learning by distinguishing arguments, main actors, 
mechanisms and arenas of the learning process. In soft policy areas, where the EU 
governs via an open method of coordination, it is not an easy task to define explicit 
tools of policy transfer. However, some previous studies stress the ability of the EU 
to frame the policy discourse and in this way affect perceptions and alter the direc-
tion of domestic policy debates. (Knill and Lemkuhl 1999, Jepsen and Serrano 
Pascual 2005, Moreno and Palier 2005, Örnberg 2008) Therefore, studying how 
policy issues are talked about and which vocabulary is used can be a workable tool 
to define the presence of Europeanisation in education policy. Interviews with key 
actors in the field and content analysis of national policy documents will be used for 
this purpose. Policy documents also allow defining how often an explicit reference 
to the EU Lisbon strategy or to the “Common objectives in education and training 
2010” is made, including use of European benchmarks and indicators. Additionally, 
typical mechanisms of policy transfer such as the use of foreign experts, study visits, 
translation of guidelines and manuals will be counted as evidence of the Finnish 
influence on Estonian education policy.
Given the broad scope of educational policy (Vocational Education and Training, 
Life-Long Learning, Higher Education), I will focus on primary and secondary edu-
cation only. Two arguments guided this decision. Firstly, the Finnish influence is 
more visible in Estonian primary and secondary education, whereas Estonian voca-
tional education used to look mainly to continental Europe, and higher education has 
more similarities with Anglo-American than Nordic traditions. The second reason 
lies in the history of EU educational policy. Primary and secondary education was 
included into the EU policy agenda quite recently and therefore, “adaptation pres-
sures” might be easier to detect. (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001, 8)
Out of the debate-intensive primary and secondary education policy, I selected 
three issues that have gained significant attention of domestic actors and are related 
to the “Common objectives in education and training 2010” framework. These issues 
are curriculum reform, revision of school evaluation and students’ assessment system 
and improving equal access to education.
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1  On 1 January 2003, the Ministry of Education was renamed the Ministry of Education and Research
The analysis is organised according to the two different periods because paying 
attention to the time sequences between EU policies and domestic change allows 
better to determine effects of foreign influence. The pre-accession period of 1995-
2003 and the period since 2004, when Estonia became a member of the EU, will be 
studied by exploring arguments and mechanisms of policy transfer.
Analysis: Two periods, different logic
Pre-accession period – from policy diffusion to contested approaches
In the early transition period, Estonia received assistance from various democratic 
countries. Besides the Baltic Sea neighbours, Canada and USA were active in pro-
moting democracy-oriented education. Still, the most massive exchange of expertise 
occurred with Finland, both at the grass-roots level and amongst policy makers. 
“There was hardly any school in Estonia that didn’t have a twinning school in 
Finland. Finns were also very active in creating and developing professional con-
tacts”, the Head of School Headmasters’ Association explains the situation. (Kaasik 
2005, 41)
The impact of Finnish experience was strongest in the curriculum reform. 
Already in 1992, a cooperation agreement was signed between the Estonian Ministry 
of Education (MER)1 and the Finnish National Board of Education (FNBE) on assis-
tance in writing the national curriculum. Finnish experts visited Estonia several 
times, and Estonian experts were invited to train in Finland. “In the beginning we 
were working as in fog. Finns’ advice gave us confidence that we are working in the 
right directions in order to compose a democratic curriculum for the independent 
Estonia.” (Ruus 2008) These words explain the dominating argument of policy trans-
fer. In this period, the curriculum reform was understood in Estonia as a tool of return 
to the Western world, away from totalitarian Soviet education. (Ruus 2004, 26; 
Alajõe and Ginter 2008, 40) In the 1980s, Finland played a role of the “window to 
the West” for Estonia; in the 1990s, this perception was still strong.
The Estonian curriculum was initiated and written by national working groups, 
but under regular consultations of Finnish experts. It was enacted in 1996 as planned 
in the government coalition agreement. The adoption of a new curriculum was justi-
fied not only by the necessity of democratisation (because this had already largely 
been done in the previous curriculum of 1989), but also by the willingness to transfer 
certain principles of the Finnish curriculum, such as increased autonomy of schools 
via drafting their own curricula and an explicit definition of learning outcomes. 
(Ruus et al. 2008, 17) Two years after adopting the curriculum, the Estonian Ministry 
of Education requested a peer review of the curriculum from the FNBE that served 
as a basis for the further development of the curriculum. (Ruus 2004, 19)
In conjunction with the curriculum reform, another policy-transfer issue rose 
onto the agenda. Finland had a system of national matriculation exams, and Estonia 
wanted to implement it, too, in order to measure learning outcomes defined in the 
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national curriculum. Here different stakeholders had different positions: policy-
makers were in favour of the exam system, whereas educational practitioners and 
parents were against it, being afraid of increasing competitiveness in education. 
Nevertheless, the national examination system was introduced in 1997.
This fact indicates the emergence of a neoliberal orientation in Estonian policy 
that became apparent at the end of the 1990s when right-wing political parties 
formed the government. Education-policy thinking started to converge with the 
Anglo-Saxon neoliberal model. (Loogma 2005) Although England was never men-
tioned in formal policy documents as a site for policy-learning, one can see the influ-
ence of British reform ideas. Issues of efficient resource allocation rose to the fore-
front; school autonomy, school choice and accountability of schools to the parents 
were also often debated. All these keywords characterised educational reforms in 
England in the 1980s and 1990s. (Gorard, Taylor and Fitz 2003) Yet, the neoliberal 
approach actively advocated by international organisations became a mainstream in 
policy-making for many countries in the 1990s. Therefore neoliberal features can 
also be found in Finnish education policy although to a lesser extent than in Estonia 
(Vanttaja and Rinne 2008, 342).
Neoliberalism had its impact also on the curriculum development, which was 
attacked by different parties. Domestic debates stressed that it does not leave enough 
choice to the students. Peer reviews by the Finnish Board of Education and OECD 
criticised the vague description of key competencies that did not allow an efficient 
measurement of study outcomes. (OECD 2000, FNBE 1999) This criticism led to a 
new round of the reform. Differently from the Scandinavian policy traditions, the 
task was outsourced to the special department at Tartu University. Yet, in 2002, the 
curriculum was enacted by the national government without radical changes com-
pared to the former version. In 2003, a new government was formed, and the Minister 
of Education, T. Maimets, was a keen advocate of Finnish education. He suggested 
among other things to adapt the Finnish curriculum as completely as possible. 
(Alajõe and Ginter 2008, 39) However, emerging educational interest groups 
opposed this simple solution.
In parallel to this continuous debate on curriculum reform, interest groups raised 
new issues referring to the existing Finnish good practices. These groups acted 
mainly under the umbrella of the Educational Forum, an NGO uniting school lead-
ers, educational practitioners and researchers. In 1998, the Educational Forum urged 
the development of a comprehensive long-term educational strategy and fundamen-
tal revision of all main legal acts in the field of education. One of the aims was to 
streamline the education system in order to facilitate student mobility within the 
system. The proposition was to abolish the existing division of schools into different 
tracks (vocational, general) and treat them on the basis of educational levels solely. 
This idea follows the pattern of the educational legislation reform in Finland, which 
was implemented in 1999. (Eurydice 2006) In 2001, the Ministry of Education 
approved the draft document of the educational strategy that created a good premise 
for adopting the Finnish school system. However, due to the reluctance of the 
National parliament, the proposed amendment remained in the draft status. 
“Regrettably the legislation reform is completely stopped”, declared one of the lead-
ers of the Educational Forum. (Aarna 2005, 36) The situation with the new educa-
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tional strategy was not better – instead of approving a comprehensive strategy, the 
government continued with twelve separate strategies in the area of education.
Thus, the situation in terms of policy-learning became more complicated at the 
turn of the millennium. One of the observable trends is the shift from simple policy 
diffusion to more complex learning. Policy diffusion occurs when countries are geo-
graphically close and have vital cooperation. (Walker 1969) Both these factors were 
present in the Estonian education policy in the mid-1990s. Using Finnish expertise 
for advice, training and peer-reviewing was a dominant tool of policy transfer then. 
The adaptability of Finnish experience in the Estonian context was not debated, nor 
was any strong pressure group in the arena, who could advocate some alternative 
model. The main motive for policy transfer was gaining confidence in building 
democratic education although it was not based on systematic comparative studies 
but rather “on eclectic experience and emotional wishes to achieve the Nordic neigh-
bours’ life standard, or on fears of adopting one’s own decisions.” (Alajõe and Ginter 
2008, 40)
Step-by-step lesson drawing attempts became more complex trying to catch 
various issues and tools. Additionally, educational reforms were put into the broader 
context of the welfare regime choice, where policy actors did not share a common 
view. Some actors valued social-democratic education with equal opportunities; 
some advocated the neoliberal vision allowing to arguably better meet quality in 
schooling. Using foreign experience to legitimise domestic policy change became an 
important motive of policy transfer. Instead of inviting foreign experts as in former 
years, domestic actors composed draft laws themselves by referring to relevant 
Finnish legal acts.
The success of policy-learning attempts varied. Some attempts failed (imple-
mentation of strategic planning, comprehensive legislation reform), some succeeded 
without revision (national exams), some were altered during the reform process (cur-
riculum). What can explain these differences? The literature on policy-learning sug-
gests that cultural and ideological closeness promotes lesson drawing (Rose 2005), 
whereas the complexity of the issue could hinder it. (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000) 
Additionally, the political power of actors advocating foreign experience increases 
the chances for success. (Marmor et al. 2005, Rose 2005) The current study confirms 
these arguments. Because the national testing system fit well within the popular 
doctrine of outcome measurement and school choice, it was implemented fast. The 
curriculum as a more fundamental issue faced different positions of political actors 
including reluctance to transfer policy from abroad. An attempt to implement an 
overwhelming educational strategy as it exists in Finland failed because it was too 
complex for fast solutions, and it was pushed by the non-governmental experts, who, 
in that period, were not yet involved in formal policy-making.
The post-accession period – towards increasing self-confidence in policy-making
In 2004, Estonia became a full member of the EU; at the same time attempts to 
transfer the best practices from Finland continued. Thus, the situation with policy-
learning became increasingly mixed in terms of objectives and influences.
The relevance of the EU common educational objectives for domestic policy was 
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quite vaguely understood in the beginning. As declared in the first Estonian National 
Report on progress towards EU indicators and benchmarks, the “fields that are most 
important for Estonia are given priority also in Europe.” (COM 2005, 5) According 
to the National Report, the fact that national and EU policy fit so well was the reason 
not to establish a separate mechanism for the implementation of the objectives as 
recommended by the Commission (Ibid).
At the same time Finland remained an attractive arena for policy-learning. The 
primary reason for that were the results of PISA 2003, where Finland performed 
extremely well. This urged an intensification of study visits to Finland. For example, 
at an international conference on the Finnish educational “miracle”, held in Helsinki 
in spring 2005, 10% of the participants were from Estonia. (Aarna 2005) These 
events opened up a new round in old debates on joining international studies and 
reforming the national curriculum.
The necessity to join the assessment surveys had already been raised by experts 
at the end of the 1990s referring explicitly to Finland as a good example of integrat-
ing national and international interests. (Ruus 2003, 9) However, “nobody/in the 
Ministry/did care, did not understand at that time.” (Ruus 2008) Now the situation 
started to change; Estonia participated in IEA TIMSS 2003 and decided to join 
OECD PISA 2006. On the one hand, this demonstrates the growing internationalisa-
tion of Estonian education policy. On the other hand, some EU indicators in educa-
tion (share of low achievers, achievement disparity, dispersal of higher order think-
ing, etc.) were taken from the PISA and IEA studies that increased the policy rele-
vance of international achievement scores.
Two aspects should be highlighted here in order to understand the policy-transfer 
mechanism. Firstly, Finnish education gained interest amongst Estonian policy-
makers because of its great success in the PISA main rating. Secondary ratings such 
as the very small portion of low achievers and the low disparity in student achieve-
ments were pointed out by few academic experts only. (Ruus 2005, Aarna 2005) 
Hence, the government stressed these aspects of the Finnish system, which fit well 
with the neoliberal ideology (more freedom to schools, individual development plans 
for students). This was done despite the fact that Finland itself had decided to return 
to a more centralised curriculum. This situation is called “mythmaking” in drawing 
lessons, meaning that the experiences of other nations are only occasionally seri-
ously examined; policy-makers see foreign examples parochially as promising solu-
tions to domestic problems. (Marmor, Freeman and Okma 2005, 334)
Another noteworthy aspect concerns the different approaches of various actors to 
the way how lessons should be transferred. Some top MER officials wanted to copy 
the Finnish curriculum fast and without adaptation. Academic pressure groups 
became worried about such attempts. “If we just take it, it will be disastrous to 
Estonian education, because we never learn to make a curriculum ourselves”, said one 
of the leading educational researchers. (Ruus 2005, 86) Analysts warned also that 
because of the different social context and educational practices, the application of the 
Finnish curriculum in Estonia would cause a total policy failure. (Ruus 2005, 87)
The controversy between policy-makers and experts has been one of the factors 
that hindered the quick implementation of the Finnish curriculum. Additionally, a 
new government coalition was formed as a result of the parliamentary elections in 
67
Brussels comes via Helsinki: The Role of Finland in Europeanisation of Estonian Education Policy
2005. The revision of the Estonian curriculum was restarted from the very founda-
tion although without remarkable progress. In this stalemate situation, policy-making 
activities were refocused on less controversial issues such as the provision of free 
school lunches and workbooks, the reform of the school evaluation policy and the 
organisation of extracurricular activities. Not surprisingly, Finnish experience guid-
ed these policy initiatives as well. For the left-oriented interest groups, the introduc-
tion of free school lunches and state subsidy for extracurricular activities were seen 
as tools to soften the impact of the liberal market economy; advocates of neoliberal 
thinking referred to these measures as predictors of Finland’s success in PISA. Thus, 
lesson-learning became more selective and bound to the ideological orientation of 
the actors.
In parallel to Finland, the European influence became more apparent in the 
national education policy. This can be found for example in the reform of the school 
evaluation system. The quality discourse and school evaluation issues were top pri-
orities for the EU. When the Ministry of Education and Research started active work 
towards the implementation of internal evaluation in schools, it explicitly referred to 
the European experience. (MER 2006) In parallel to implementing the European 
discourse in quality management, MER used the Finnish expertise in the field. 
Similarly to Finland, Estonia abolished school inspections, introduced compulsory 
self-evaluation and developed an integrated system of external and internal evalua-
tion. Finnish experts were invited to training seminars, and relevant Finnish manuals 
were translated into Estonian.
 The increasing role of the EU can also be seen in policies on equal access to 
education. The introduction of compulsory pre-primary education and the increasing 
flexibility of the school system can serve as evidence here. None of these issues has 
been reflected in the first Estonian national report on educational indicators (COM 
2005) although they were highlighted in the Commission progress report. (COM 
2006) However, just one or two years later, concrete actions were taken.
 The pre-primary education reform was prepared in 2006 and will be imple-
mented in 2007-2009. (MER 2006b) In terms of lesson-drawing, it represents a 
mixed case. Estonia has set a nearly universal enrolment rate (95%) in pre-primary 
education for 2010. This is in line with the EU benchmark, but significantly exceeds 
the relevant figure for Finland. (COM 2007, 28) On the other hand, according to the 
draft law, pre-primary schooling may occur not necessarily in kindergarten, but also 
in day-care centres or at home. This is the existing practice in Finland. Similarly to 
the case of the school-evaluation reform, Finnish experts served as consultants in 
drafting the pre-primary education reform.
The case of improving flexibility of the educational system by the integration of 
the vocational education training (VET) and general education represents a similar 
story. After long debates, the former system of VET institutions was reformed in 
2006, and a system comparable to the Scandinavian ones was introduced. (Eurydice 
2007) The change had two objectives: firstly, to allow vocational training for persons 
without basic education and secondly, to increase vocational school graduates’ com-
petitiveness while applying to the higher education. Both these objectives were 
highlighted in the Commission progress report as good practices to be found in 
Scandinavia. (COM 2006)
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These two cases confirm Radaelli’s thesis that for the implementation of an EU 
policy, a relevant attractive national practice must exist, which can be “inseminated”. 
(Radaelli 2000)
In 2007, Estonia enacted a new Development Plan for the Primary and Secondary 
Education, which reflects the growing importance of Brussels. Firstly, the language 
of the document uses keywords common in the EU progress reports on education and 
training. As T. Annus, one of the senior civil servants in MER, explained, via the EU 
documents, policy-makers have gained the confidence that they “can phrase the topic 
of the access to education in such a way, to look at things in this way” (Annus 2007, 
33). Secondly, explicit references to the EU documents are made in the Development 
plan when analysing the domestic situation in education. Inter alia, the need to 
increase investments into pre-primary education is described as a priority for the EU. 
(MER 2006b, 9)
Yet, regardless of this Europeanisation in language, a systemic adjustment to the 
EU education policy is lacking in the national Development plan. The master docu-
ment, “Education and training 2010”, is not mentioned amongst related strategies. 
Instead domestic activities in education policy are listed within the “National Action 
Plan on Economic Growth and Jobs”. (MER 2006, 44) Thus, Estonia located its 
education policy in the area of economy and labour market as it was typical for the 
pre-Lisbon tradition in the EU.
In sum, the first two years of Estonian membership in the EU are marked by 
contested and eclectic attempts of policy transfer. Some issues that fit well with the 
political orientation of the neoliberal government were imported both from Finland 
and Brussels. References to the EU documents were used to legitimise domestic 
reform ideas, whereas Finnish expertise was used in the implementation stage. The 
latter included the taking over of educational arrangements, the invitation of trainers 
and the translation of manuals.
The very latest developments suggest that Estonian education policy becomes 
more oriented towards the EU, leaving Finland in a secondary position. Interviews 
and policy documents support this argument. In earlier years, Estonian Ministers of 
Education referred to Finland in their speeches, but now they refer to the Lisbon 
strategy. “There was no Lisbon mentioned four-five years ago but today. I think the 
Lisbon strategy has become stronger and stronger.” (Annus 2007, 39)
In 2008, a joint Development plan for all education areas was finally enacted by 
the Ministry of Education and Research. (MER 2008) Compared to the Development 
plan of primary and secondary education implemented two years earlier, it has sig-
nificantly more references to the EU education policy, including naming the pro-
gramme “Education and training 2010”.
In addition to the issues and keywords, European statistical indicators are used 
to frame the domestic policy agenda. The problem of early school drop-outs can 
illustrate this emerging trend. This issue had already been raised in Estonian educa-
tion policy many years earlier and was repeatedly discussed. However, debates and 
previous policy reports focused on students’ drop-out from grades 6-8, whereas the 
EU measures the share of 18- to 24-year-olds with lower secondary education who 
have left the education system. Thus, there was a mismatch between the domestic 
and the European indicator. In the joint Development plan of 2008, this mismatch 
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has been abolished by implementing the EU indicator. “Because we are members of 
the EU we cannot act in a different way. We share common objectives that are not 
set without us. If there are some indicators that help us to define our position, then 
we shall use them.” (Annus 2007, 39) Thus, policy-learning has led to the emergence 
of administrative identity, based on statistical indicators as revealed in some previous 
studies. (Moreno and Palier 2005)
However, when Estonia looks more closely towards Brussels, Finland is losing 
its interest in European education policy objectives. Arguably, European benchmarks 
are regarded as too low and thus not relevant for Finland. (Naumanen and Rinne 
2008, 303) Because Estonia also performs quite well in several benchmarks, a simi-
lar demotivation mechanism can appear in the future. However, the question remains 
of whether Estonian policy-making has become as confident as its Finnish counter-
part to set the national agenda independently.
Summing up
This analysis was one of the many attempts to discuss the impact of Europeanisation 
on domestic policy change. The empirical base, a new member state, was non-typi-
cal, and so was the chosen policy field, education. One can argue that for both, there 
is not enough “history” yet to draw reliable conclusions. This can be partly true. 
However, a first generation of country studies is needed to build the “basic ingredient 
for improved policy learning.” (Marmor et al. 2005, 344)
I studied the impact of Finland on the Estonian education policy in the last 
decade involving pre-accession and post-accession periods. My assumption was that 
the EU membership affects the pattern of lesson-drawing. Another member state 
which serves as an arena for policy transfer can play a catalysing role in enhancing 
the Europeanisation of national policy. To test this assumption, I looked at motives 
and mechanisms used by political actors in different periods applying the theoretical 
framework by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and the latest contributions of several 
authors on policy-learning within the framework of the OMC. (Knill and Lemkuhl 
1999, Jepsen and Serrano Pascual 2005, Moreno and Palier 2005)
The analysis revealed a significant evolution in arguments of lesson-drawing. In 
the early pre-accession period, the dominant motive shared by all actors in the field 
was the willingness to gain the confidence that the chosen policy orientation fits with 
democratic principles. Later, when policy actors formulated their particular political 
visions, foreign experience was used mainly to legitimise domestic reform ideas. 
Due to the variance of political preferences, policy transfer became more selective 
and contested.
The post-accession period, when Estonia became part of the OMC process, is 
characterised by a progressive increase of the EU influence. In addition to using the 
EU for legitimising domestic policy change, a feeling of belonging becomes impor-
tant. To be European appears as a strong argument for using EU policy “language” 
and statistical indicators to frame national education policy. In parallel to the increase 
of a European identity amongst Estonian policy-makers, Finland loses its central role 
in policy-learning. The study suggests that Finland played a catalysing role in the 
Europeanisation of Estonian education policy only in a limited period. Shortly before 
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and after Estonia became a member of the EU, Finnish experience was used to 
legitimise Brussels’ vision and to implement relevant policy change in practice.
The low legitimacy of the EU as an obstacle to learning (Radaelli 2000) was not 
proved by the current analysis. Rather to the contrary, the EU activism helped 
legitimise domestic decisions, which were pending for a long time.
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ABSTRACT
Trust and integrity are the cornerstones of a democratic and open society. Good gov-
ernance and transparency should be studied by observing citizens’ influence, par-
ticularly when the citizen perspective is often neglected in empirical research on 
administrative ethics.
This article deals with trust and integrity violations in Finnish public administra-
tion from the citizens’ viewpoint. We survey how ordinary citizens judge (signifi-
cance valuated) trust and integrity violations in Finnish public administration. The 
following ethical issues are analysed:
 trust in public organizations and institutions
 serious violations of integrity, such as bribery, theft and fraud
 other forms of corruption such as old boy networks, nepotism, linkages in
 business life and bad and careless treatment of citizens.
The evidence is based on the empirical data from a large-scale citizen questionnaire 
implemented by the University of Vaasa in Spring 2008. Two of the 18 questions of 
our questionnaire form are reported upon here, including unstructured responses 
from open-ended questions. The original sample of the survey incorporates 5,000 
Finnish people. Compared to other national surveys, the sample of the study is 
regarded as relatively high.
Ethical governance is based on trust. Among citizens, trust is a sort of general 
confidence in politicians and public authorities. Ethical governance is also based on 
model examples given by politicians and public authorities. In the case of Finland, 
public organizations and institutions so far enjoy the confidence of ordinary citizens, 
and estimations of unethical actions were quite moderate. However, citizens estimate 
that old boy networks, nepotism and excessive linkages in business life as corruption 
forms are quite common in the Finnish society. We expect that if unethical actions, 
e.g. excessive linkages in business life, become more usual, this will sooner or later 
interact with trust.
·
·
·
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The article continues the methodological discussion of the relevance of survey-based 
research in administrative ethics. By collecting citizens’ opinions, attitudes and 
expectations about chosen ethical issues, we expect that the article will provide the 
grounds both to consider and develop ‘citizen-focused’ ethical governance.
The article is based on our conference paper at EGPA Conference 2008 in 
Rotterdam (Study Group: Ethics and Integrity of Governance).
Key words: administrative ethics, trust, integrity, corruption, citizens, survey-
based research. 
1. Introduction
Trust and unethical actions: previous discussion
Administrative ethics and integrity violations have been the subject of considerable 
scholarly study and research (e.g. Frederickson and Ghere 2005; Cooper 2006; 
Lawton and Doig 2006; Sampford et al. 2007; Menzel 2007, Huberts et al. 2008). 
Basically trust is a trait of deserving confidence. Trustworthiness is a moral value. 
Are there clear explanations in previous research how trust is related to unethical 
actions? What causes lost in trust, low trust or distrust? (see more, Christensen and 
Laegreid 2002, 2005; Kim, Helgesen and Ahn 2002; Bouckaert and Van de Walle 
2003; Heinzman and Marson 2005; Menzel 2005; Warren 2006; Chang and Chu 
2006; Van de Walle et al 2008; Six and Huberts 2008.)
People’s trust in public institutions is a complex and multidimensional issue. 
Warren (2006: 164) refers to Jeremy Bentham’s classical statement according to 
which every good political institution is a system of distrust, because politicians 
have authority and temptations to abuse it. That is why we can ask: Are politicians 
and public sector leaders trustworthy? One single factor to explain trust does not 
exist. Those who are involved in politics might think more of their own welfare than 
of the welfare of citizens. Secondly, a high level of trust in one institution tends to 
extend to other institutions. Thirdly, in general terms, corruption decreases institu-
tional trust.
As Six and Huberts (2008: 65-69) stress, trust is an attribute of the trustor, and 
trustworthiness is an attribute of the trustee. In our analysis, citizens as trustors 
evaluate trust in three types of Finnish institutions and organizations. From the trust-
ees’ viewpoint, citizens judge the level of integrity by giving their assessment of the 
frequency of unethical actions in the Finnish politico-administrative system. 
Trustworthiness is studied in relation to serious and other forms of corruption. The 
concept of trust covers both politicians and public authorities.
Integrity violations belong to the debate of political and administrative trust. 
Corruptive phenomena erode citizens’ trust in the administrative and political sys-
tems, and there are numerous debates about officials’ and politicians’ independence 
from external linkages. Indiscreet behaviour by those who govern may damage pub-
lic confidence (Isaksson 1997, 10; Fawcett and Wardman 2008, 123, 136).
Our previous contribution to integrity violations dealt with the control mecha-
nisms of corruption in Finland (Salminen et al. 2007). In that discussion it remained 
unanswered whether the country as the least corrupt nation in the world is perceived 
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to be as corruption-free as the international statistics (Transparency International) 
portray. In Table 1, a limited country ranking of corruption is presented. True or not, 
in a comparative setting, Finland is still in a good position. But when analyzing the 
views of citizens, this ranking list is partly beyond the questions we pose here. 
Table 1. 
Country rankings in Corruption Perception Indices: Finland among neighboring and 
Baltic countries.
Part of this is exactly what we are trying to do in this presentation. Trust in different 
types of institutions and organizations, and different forms of corruption are 
described. In the Finnish survey data, citizens express their views, opinions, attitudes 
and expectations towards trust and unethical actions. However, comparative settings 
of explaining trust in different countries (Kim, Helgesen and Ahn 2002) and common 
explanations of distrust in the public sector (Van de Walle et al 2008) are not includ-
ed in this analysis.
The focus of our presentation
Two core ethical issues are examined, namely trust and integrity violations. Although 
trust is clarified in Finland through academic research and governmental reports, 
there is a limited number of research reports which relate trust to unethical actions 
in parallel. The interconnection between trust and corruption is rather rarely studied 
as far as it concerns citizens’ views. As far as it concerns our focus, we share the 
opinion of Van de Walle (2008, 215-216), that the relationship between trust and 
integrity violations is complicated rather than easy. Do perceptions of trust determine 
the views on integrity violations or vice versa?
According to our considerations, a fresh approach to the integrity issue is how 
ordinary citizens view trust and corruptive behavior in Finnish public administration. 
In reflection of the hardening ethical climate of the Finnish society, politicians and 
leading public employees are not safe anymore from public debate and severe criti-
cism. A few ethical issues are taken under closer examination here as structured in 
Year and rank 
Country
ESTONIA
FINLAND
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
NORWAY
RUSSIA
SWEDEN
2002
Rank
29
1
52
36
12
71
5
2003
Rank
33
1
57
41
9
86
6
2004
Rank
31
1
57
44
8
90
6
2005
Rank
27
2
51
44
8
126
6
2006
Rank
24
1
49
46
6
121
6
2007
Rank
28
1
51
51
9
143
4
2008
Rank
27
5
52
58
14
147
1
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Figure 1. The subjects of the questions represent both sustaining and violating integ-
rity. Basically trust is a part of maintaining integrity. According to our questionnaire, 
other issues of integrity, such as good administration, accountability, responsibility 
and openness, are not included in this analysis. Trust was estimated through 19 gov-
ernmental and non-governmental Finnish institutions and organizations (for details, 
see Figure 2). On the contrary, as part of violating integrity, unethical actions are 
described through the seven forms of unethical actions, including one open-ended 
question named by citizens themselves (for details, see Figure 3).
Figure 1. 
Chosen issues for ethical analysis.
 More accurately, two questions are posed here. The first is how trustworthy Finnish 
citizens estimate the above-mentioned organizations and institutions to be. Issues of 
trust are examined through trust in public sector organizations, trust in social institu-
tions and trust in public and private corporations. The second question is how fre-
quently the above-mentioned eight unethical actions take place in the estimations of 
Finnish citizens. The detailed list of questions is presented in the Appendix. In addi-
tion to these two questions, we analyze three socio-demographic variables, namely 
gender, working history and level of education. We try to find differences in opinions 
between the different respondent groups. 
The national citizen survey
For gathering opinions, attitudes and expectations – as we did –, the survey tech-
nique is an accurate tool in administrative ethics when the purpose is to reach a wider 
population (see e.g. Bossaert and Demmke 2005; Salminen 2006; Demmke et al. 
2007; Moilanen and Salminen 2007; Van de Walle 2008). The evidence of this 
research is based on the empirical data from a national citizen survey implemented 
Gender, working history,
level of education
Trust in organizations
and institutions
- Seven public sector
organizations
- Five social institutions
- Seven public and
private corporations
Integrity violations of political
system
- Serious integrity violations such as 
bribes, theft and fraud
- Other forms of integrity violations
such as old boy networks, nepotism, 
linkages in business life and bad and 
careless treatment of citizens
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by the University of Vaasa.1 The questionnaire consists of three main themes: citi-
zens’ assessment of:
1) ethics of public services, such as guaranteeing public services, ethical values 
 of services and the future of public services
2) good administration, such as administrative principles, accountability and
 the realization of virtues
3) ethics of the political system, such as democracy, openness and transparency 
 and change of ethics in society.
The questionnaire form is twelve pages in length. Altogether, it covers 18 question 
groups and 128 statements and assessments of the ethical themes. Each of the three 
themes has one open-ended question. Three additional open-ended questions were 
included at the end of the form. Through these questions, a lot of personal stories 
were collected from the respondents. The written-down material is about 300 
pages.
The questionnaire, with separate introductory letters and postage-paid return 
envelopes, was sent in March and re-sent in April 2008. The survey was sent to 5,000 
Finnish citizens, aged 25-65. The sample was chosen to represent Finland in minia-
ture. The survey-sample was received from the Finnish public agency called the 
Population Register Centre. All the questions are multiple-choice. The multiple-
choice questions were executed in Likert’s scale to secure the statistical runs. The 
answers were recorded in the statistics program SPSS.
The careful selection of the respondents raises the validity of the results of our 
study. What also speaks for their validity is the relatively high response rate. 
Although incentives were not used, the response rate rose to 40.4 %. More than 2,000 
carefully completed questionnaire forms were returned.
2. Trust in organizations and institutions
The first issue in our article is trust, which can be regarded as one of the leading 
ethical values in the Nordic countries. If trust is lost in the public realm, much is lost. 
The whole political and administrative system will appear in a different light.
Trust is studied through different dimensions: trust between individuals, trust 
towards the activity of professionals, trust inside and within organizations, trust 
between organizations, trust in politicians, or trust inside the community. (Lawton 
and Doig 2006, 16-17.) When talking about trust, it is a question of citizens’ emo-
tions, beliefs, opinions and experiences shaping through many processes. Part of the 
opinions are already formulating as youngsters through the process of socialization. 
We agree with Christensen and Laegreid (2005, 487) that when a citizen strongly 
1  The survey is a part of the large research program “Citizens first? Ethical Government in Terms of 
Citizens” (http://www.uwasa.fi/eettinenhallinto/english/) in the University of Vaasa. The three-year program is 
funded by the Academy of Finland.
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trusts one organization, he/she is likely to also trust other public sector organi-
zations.
All distrust is not harmful. A certain amount of distrust is healthy and functional: 
it is needed to maintain the level of administrative accountability. The optimal level 
of trust depends on the development of political and administrative culture. The 
certain level of trust may be high in one but low in another country. (Van de Walle 
et al 2008, 52; see also Hofstede 1980.) There is no single or unambiguous explana-
tion why some organization seems to be trustworthy and another does not. It is the 
question of personal experience, the experience of the circle of acquaintances, 
images and the history and base of the trustor. (Van de Walle 2005, 224-225.)
Lewis and Gilman (2005, 21) state that public sector ethics is different from 
private sector ethics because the citizens’ trust keeps democracy effective – or at 
least alive. Strict ethical standards are included in public trust. The OECD report 
(2000) underlines that public service also means public trust. Citizens assume they 
will get impartial service, and when the service level ensures impartial and trustwor-
thy services, trust in public administration increases. Public trust is an essential fac-
tor when talking about the successes and losses of organizations. Trust is a question 
of an organizations’ reputation. Institutionalized trust is more important to the soci-
ety than personal, informal trust which can be connected to old boy networks, 
political patronage or even criminal mafia (Harisalo and Stenvall 2001; Harford 
2008).
Why research institutions and organizations? Citizens have much more connec-
tions with administrative institutions and organizations than with political, represen-
tative institutions and organizations. Experiences from administrative actions have a 
direct connection to thoughts about the political system on the whole. (Rothstein 
2005, 108-109)
Empirical findings
In Figure 2, the citizens’ estimation of the trustworthiness of 19 Finnish public insti-
tutions and organizations are presented in three different categories. To us, the results 
are not outstandingly surprising. Compared to previous surveys of other countries 
(Listhaug 1984: 114; Warren 2006: 165), the figure indicates that the police (police 
officers), the legal system (judges) and the education system (teachers, professors) 
and also the military (military officers) are highly ranked. The results of Harisalo and 
Stenvall (2001) are similar to our results: police and military at the top, and media 
and science in third and fourth place in Finland. In the World Values profile study 
(Borg et al. 2007), it turns out that from 1981 to 2005, public trust in the police and 
military has got even better. We share the opinion that as long as citizens trust in 
public institutions, the whole society works better.
Our survey indicates that citizens trust strongly in such public sector organiza-
tions and social institutions as the police, universities and polytechnics, elementary 
and comprehensive schools, the military and hospitals and health centres. Surprisingly 
among public corporations, The Finnish lottery monopoly also belongs to the 
top five.
In the personal (individual) stories of the questionnaire, the majority of criticism 
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concentrated on the social insurance institution, the health care system and labour 
force bureaus. Even so, all these institutions and organizations enjoy moderate public 
trust. The percentage shares of quite and very trustworthy are several times higher 
than the shares of not very or not at all trustworthy (Appendix). Because most of 
these institutions and organizations represent branches of the administration, the 
figures in fact give a broader conception of trust in the Finnish politico-administra-
tive system.
Trust in public and private corporations strongly depends on the individual orga-
nization. As private corporations, Fortum and Sonera did not enjoy trust, but Finnair 
and Itella did. Trade unions and the central organizations of employers did not enjoy 
as much trust as traditional public organizations and institutions. If the value “3” is 
considered as the turning point for “trust” (≥ 3) and “less trust” (≤ 3), the average of 
each group is clearly higher than 3, and only two private corporations remain under 
the mean value.
Figure 2. 
Trust in Finnish public organizations and institutions: the views of citizens.
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Moreover, one question of the six statements of democracy in our survey dealt with 
trust among the Finnish politicians. The following statement was set: Local politi-
cians are more reliable than politicians at the national level. More than 30 percent 
agreed with the statement and less than 30 percent disagreed. In that specific ques-
tion, the difference was not remarkable. The majority of respondents was more or 
less neutral. They did not agree or disagree.
When asking about the trust in institutions and organizations, we are basically 
interested in the trustworthiness of the whole political system. We should keep in 
mind that our survey was carried out at a time when exceptional unclarities occurred 
in the political life in Finland. For instance, the private lives of prime and foreign 
ministers were continually discussed in the media. The limits of their privacy were 
tested. Investigative journalism was left aside, and public debates became more or 
less sensational. The prime minister felt that his privacy was infringed upon, and the 
case is considered in court. The foreign minister lost his political confidence, and 
was forced to resign and leave the Government after a heavy public debate.
In our questionnaire forms, several comments were made about these issues. We 
suspect that those incidents might have had an influence on citizens’ attitudes in our 
survey. Due to the time period of the survey implementation, the impact of views of 
the citizens is more short- than long-term.
Gender, working history and education as background factors – do they matter?
Is it possible to explain the reactions of respondents by different variables? Some 
tentative findings are worth highlighting. As mentioned earlier, the data was pro-
cessed through three background variables: gender, working history and level of 
education. We have calculated the percentage shares of statements for each group. 
We report here the differences we consider to be worth mentioning because the result 
strikes us as remarkable or surprising.
First, if the gender of the respondents is considered, women express higher trust 
in the majority of asked institutions and organizations: health care, the military and 
the Finnish lottery monopoly were more trusted by men than women.
Secondly, if the working history of the respondents is considered, three main 
groups are identified: those whose working history is 1) in the public sector, 2) in the 
private sector, 3) both in the public and private sectors. Working history as a back-
ground variable gives a couple of significant differences between groups. Those who 
have worked in the private sector clearly expressed the highest trust in the military 
and the Finnish lottery monopoly in comparison with the other two groups. Generally, 
however, those working in the public sector trusted the organizations and institutions 
asked about the most. One reason may be that with a long working history in the 
public sector, you are familiar with how the system works and you feel sympathy to 
the whole sector, not only to your own branch.
Thirdly, the level of education brings out a couple of opposing views between 
respondents. It became evident that respondents with more education had signifi-
cantly more trust in courts than respondents with less education. On the contrary, 
respondents with less education felt more confidence in the majority of the Finnish 
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public and private corporations.2 The less educated also clearly trusted trade unions 
and central organizations of employers more than respondents with more 
education.
3. Integrity violations
Integrity violations can vary from corruption to unethical social behavior in the 
working environment. Integrity violations are divided to cover corruption, fraud and 
theft of organizational resources, conflicts of interest, the abuse and manipulation of 
information, discriminatory treatment and the waste of organizational resources 
(Kolthoff et al. 2007, 408-409; OECD 2007).
Connected to trust, another issue deals with particular integrity violations, as 
described in Figure 3 (see also Appendix). Two fundamental types of integrity viola-
tions are described here. Bribes, theft and fraud belong to the serious forms of cor-
ruption, and the rest of integrity violations are typical of maladministration, bad 
governance etc. The grouping is basically the same as used by Vartola and af Ursin 
(1987, 239) in their research report. We also wanted to avoid the strong normative 
stress. But even if the other integrity violations are not considered to be as grave as 
the serious forms of corruption (for example bribery), it does not mean that they are 
acceptable features of administrative and political system.
Different corruptive or integrity violations have taken place in Finnish public 
administration since 2000. Among public officials3 and individual public servants, 
cases of unethical behavior have dealt with bribery and fraud, misuse of public 
office, doubts of discrimination such as sexual harassment, complaints of misman-
agement and lack of control. The cases have occured at universities, local govern-
ment, third-sector organizations, state government and public sector companies. In 
most cases, public servants were suspected of integrity violations, but were not sen-
tenced for any crime. However, the discussion in newspapers and other media has 
been lively around the different corruption cases. As described earlier, Finland has 
fallen from the top to the sixth position in the newest Transparency International 
CPI-index.
In Figure 3, the main finding is that the judgement of citizens is not very harsh. 
In the eyes of citizens, the serious forms of corruption are found much more seldom 
than the other types of integrity violations. Besides, the differences between different 
types of integrity violations are relatively big.
2  Despite the background variable under study, the least drastic opinions (the lowest standard devia-
tions) were found in the universities and polytechnics and elementary and comprehensive schools and the most 
drastic opinions (highest standard deviations) were almost regularly found in the church and trade unions.
3  As a term, ‘public officials’ refers here to the whole of the ‘politico-administrative system’, which 
includes both national and local ‘politicians’ and ‘public authorities’.
83
Trust and Integrity Violations in Finnish Public Administration: The Views of Citizens
Figure 3. 
Integrity violations: the views of citizens.
Bribes
To an ordinary citizen, the term corruption is mainly connected to serious forms of 
wrongdoing, such as bribery. The OECD report (2007) specifies the main elements 
of bribery as: 1) offering, paying or promising, 2) financial or some other kind of 
advantage, 3) direct or indirect, promised or paid to official, family member, organi-
zation or company, 4) undue, 5) purpose to offend against a law, and 6) obtaining or 
retaining business.
In the 2007 ministerial report, Finnish public officials considered bribery to be 
the most unethical way of action. Making decisions without appropriate preparation 
and sitting on data/information, unnecessarily delaying issues, scheming in appoint-
ments of the office, and the unwillingness to regenerate were mentioned at the top of 
the list of the most unethical procedures. Bribery is in a league of its own; the other 
actions mentioned are to be categorized more in administrative corruption. Civil 
servants express that they relatively regularly or occasionally meet unethical behav-
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ior and corruption-related issues in their daily work. Forms of grand corruption, such 
as bribery, are rare. (Ministry of Finance 2007, 39-40, 56, 78)
How is the state of affairs in the eyes of citizens? We start by asking whether 
there is a bribery problem in Finnish public administration. According to our survey 
data, the closer figures of bribes are as follows: 47 % of respondents considered that 
taking or giving bribes occurs very or rather seldom and 16 % rather or very fre-
quently. The relatively high percentage of bribery occurring occasionally (37 %) is 
rather alarming. Besides, altogether 16 % estimate that bribery occurs rather or very 
frequently. When compared with the opposing alternatives, the focus of the respons-
es is still in the alternatives very or rather seldom.
Theft and fraud
How are theft and fraud separate from bribery? Theft, peculation, and fraud involve 
the taking or conversion of money or other property or items which are valuable. It 
concerns an individual who has access to them through position or employment, but 
is not entitled to them. In the cases of embezzlement and theft, the person entrusted 
takes the property. Fraud consists of the use of false or misleading information to 
bluff the property’s owner to relinquish the property voluntarily. In legal definitions, 
theft means taking property or cash, but in other definitions, it also covers other 
immaterial values such as the stealing of information. (Langseth 2007, 11)
The situation seems to be better than in the estimates about bribery. In the survey 
data, 59 % of the respondents judged that theft occurs very or rather seldom and only 
9 % rather or very frequently. In the case of fraud, the figures were 56 % and 12 % 
respectively. The majority of citizens estimate that theft and peculation occur either 
very little or quite little. It is a little surprising that bribery was estimated to be more 
common than theft or fraud. Fraud is estimated to be more common than theft and 
peculation. Still about one third of the citizens estimate that theft and fraud exist 
occasionally.
In the above-mentioned unethical cases, such as bribery, theft and fraud, the state 
of affairs is generally positive in Finnish public administration. But it does differ 
from one administrative branch to another. According to the annual Science 
Barometer in Finland, citizens’ trust in science and scientific institutions has 
remained comparatively high from year to year. The general picture is not totally 
clean anymore. For example, from 2000 to 2007, there have been a couple of cases 
of heavy integrity violation in the university sector. These cases were widely dis-
cussed in the Finnish media. In higher education institutions, the evidence was 
obtained of receiving bribes, tax fraud and misuse of public office. This has led to 
trials, and few of the accused were sentenced to prison and/or to paying remarkable 
financial compensation. Some other individual persons from the higher education 
sector were also accused; the cases were processed legally, were publicized and got 
a lot of publicity, but the claims were completely dropped in court. However, the 
individuals were stigmatized as ‘baddies’ in the eyes of society.
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Old boy networks and nepotism
The other group of unethical actions starts with old boy networks and nepotism. Old 
boy networks are structures which affect society, indirectly or directly, in decision-
making. Nepotism does not relate to the self-interests of an official directly, but to the 
interests of someone near him or her, such as a family member, a member of the 
political party, a tribe member, or a member of the same religious group. Favoritism 
is based on several things, such as race, religion, geographical factors, political 
affiliation or personal and organizational relationships (clubs, associations). Favoritism 
has another side, too: the discrimination of certain groups. (Langseth 2007, 13)
The question of old boy networks has been widely discussed in Finland. Our 
survey confirms the importance of the issue in public debate. According to the results 
of our survey, 8 % of the respondents estimated that old boy networks exist very or 
rather seldom and 60 % estimated rather or very frequently. The corresponding per-
centages from nepotism were 14 and 49 (see Appendix). It seems like citizens feel 
old boy networks to be the most influential form of corruption in Finland. Comments 
and stories in the open-ended questions support this conclusion. Ethically it is very 
serious that 60 % of Finnish citizens think that old boy networks affect the society 
either rather or very frequently. Correspondingly, the figures of nepotism are also 
rather critical. Compared with the figures of bribes, the emphasis on responses is 
opposite: responses are emphasized in the alternatives of rather and very frequently 
compared with the opposite alternatives.
In Finland the old boy networks seem to be a bigger problem than expected on 
the grounds of reports of an offence (Korruptiotilannekuva 2008, 2). In the old boy 
networks, the services are not paid with money. Therefore the interdependence in 
these networks is different due to strong personal and informal linkages. If old boy 
networks and nepotism are a real and serious problem, what explains this?
We have a couple of assumptions. Perhaps the Finnish elite are more and more 
accustomed to cooperating through old boy networks. But one might doubt whether 
the networks fit in the other administrative structures and practices at the central and 
local levels. Because of the political favoritism which is widely spread in nomina-
tions to public office, citizens’ attitudes towards nepotism and old boy networks are 
extremely negative.
Linkages in business life
Corruption commonly refers to acts that rest with public sector officials. The act can 
involve a transaction with a private sector actor, but the definition still concentrates 
on the public sector officials rather than the companies who pay the bribes. 
(O’Higgins 2006, 236) Public trust in public officials is among the important indica-
tors of good governance. An excessive amount of linkages makes the public sector 
function more unreliably even if the public officials did not act against public interest 
when dealing with business life. The existence of these linkages is often a sign to 
citizens that there must be some dishonest business going on and that the old boy 
networks are working again.
In the eyes of the citizens, 13 % of respondents estimated that the excessive link-
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ages occur rather or very seldom and 44 % estimated occurrence rather or very fre-
quently. This result is not ethically flattering to politicians and public authorities. The 
recent events in Finland with relation to the financing of election campaigns from 
external sources are undoubtedly increasing citizens’ suspicions concerning linkages 
in the business life.
Another important issue in the Finnish public discussion has been linkages in busi-
ness life as a form of financing state and local elections. In Finland, the external financ-
ing of elections is regulated by a special law. The purpose of the Act on the disclosure 
of election financing from 2000 was to increase the transparency of election financing 
in order to clarify the possible personal interests of the candidates. The Act proved to 
be open to interpretations and gave room to a sort of secret behavior. Those who 
financed the leading candidates of the elections tried to support them anonymously and 
through special corporate arrangements. After that the public mess was ready.
In the law, there are no sanctions for those who do not make a declaration of more 
than 1,700 euros external financing, but basically, legal actions were not morally 
approved of by the public. Particularly the spirit of the law was broken by those who 
accepted the financial support without openness. Later, the names of donors were 
revealed and the donated sums of money turned out to be rather remarkable. The 
political parties in Government had received most of the financial support. The ‘hid-
den’ interplay between politicians and businessmen resulted in political consequences. 
The legitimacy of the political system was endangered, and the leading political par-
ties gathered immediately in political negotiations concerning the election financing 
and the need of refining the rules of the game. Short-term measures of improving the 
ill-defined clauses in legislation were taken, and the Act was required to be renewed 
in the future.
Bad and careless treatment of citizens
As the last form of corruption, we will shortly discuss the bad and careless treatment 
of citizens. In the questionnaire form, the types of unethical treatment were not speci-
fied. With the term ‘unethical treatment’ we mean quite wide-ranging actions, includ-
ing maladministration and mismanagement. The term maladministration is very wide 
and includes things such as delaying issues, incorrect actions or failure to take any 
action, failure to follow the procedures, failure to give information, misleading or 
inaccurate statements, inadequate consultation, and broken promises. Mismanagement 
is a form of maladministration. (Caiden 1991, 111)
The corruption-related cases investigated by the Finnish Ombudsman usually deal 
with delayed issues, insulting the principle of equality, negligence, improper justifica-
tions of decisions, lack of publicity, lack of hearing of the parties involved, discrimina-
tion, undelivered public notices, insufficient advice, and partiality. The investigations 
are based on the citizens’ announcements. The names of complainants are not usually 
published, which increases the probability of denunciation. The amount of complaints 
has increased since 2003. The issues are categorized as maladministration or the like. 
(Salminen et al. 2007; Annual Reports of Ombudsman Office 2000-2006)
Statistically, citizens’ estimations of public officials’ bad and careless treatment of 
citizens are the following: Most of the citizens surveyed (48 %) feel that unethical 
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treatment occurs occasionally or once in a while. One-fourth of the respondents 
shared the opinion that unethical treatment takes place either rather or very fre-
quently (26 %) or very or rather seldom (25 %). Numerous comments were expressed 
by citizens through the open-ended question of the questionnaire. However, compar-
ing the estimates to the amount of complaints and the expressions in the open-ended 
questions, the estimates seem to be rather positive.
Concerning the unethical behavior of politicians, a few themes rose above the 
others. Citizens criticize that politicians tend to search for private gain instead of 
emphasizing the public interest. Sometimes they are greedy. The politicians are guilty 
of forgetting the concerns of citizens and prefer to concentrate on their own affairs and 
the party politics. Citizens also ask whether the politicians finally tell the truth. The 
promises made before elections are forgotten during the electoral period. If the private 
life of politicians is considered immoral, it is strongly condemned by citizens.
Background variables in focus
If a closer look is taken at the background variables of the respondents (gender, 
working history, and level of education), three more conclusions are evident. We 
calculated the percentage shares of statements for each groups. We are reporting only 
differences we find remarkable or surprising.
First, in general, women estimate the asked corruptive behaviours to be more 
common than men. Only linkages in business life and unethical treatment of citizens 
received more critical assessments by men than women. But as far as old boy net-
works are concerned, gender assessment makes no exception, even if women have 
so far remained the ‘outsiders’ of such networks, they do not express their mistrust 
higher than men. If both trust and unethical actions are considered, differences exist 
between the female and male views. Women trust more in public institutions and 
organizations but compared to men, they estimate corruptive behavior to be more 
common in society. This finding is opposite to what we expected.
Secondly, between the education levels of respondents, there are dramatic differ-
ences in the estimations of bribery, theft and fraud. The less educated were twice as 
negative as the more educated. The findings are in opposition to the question of old 
boy networks. Respondents with more education estimated the question more nega-
tively than those with less education. In the question of linkages, the attitudes were 
nearly similar.
Thirdly, if the working history of the respondents is considered, a statistical dif-
ference exists. Those who have worked in both sectors estimate that all forms of 
unethical actions exist more frequently than those who worked in the public or pri-
vate sector only.
4. Conclusions
Summarizing the previous discussion, it is obvious that in the Finnish case public 
administration works rationally enough in the ethical sense. But, how to solve the 
relationship between trust and unethical behaviour? Some answers are available.
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Our analysis of Finnish public administration was limited to these two research ques-
tions: 1) how trustworthy Finnish citizens estimate the public organizations, social 
institutions and public and private corporations to be; and 2) how frequently the dif-
ferent forms of corruptive actions take place in the citizens’ estimation.
While citizens express their opinions, attitudes and expectations of trust and 
unethical actions, one may ask, how much it really matters. What might be the con-
sequences of citizens’ views of the public trust and integrity of the Government? Do 
these figures give any evidence to develop ‘citizen-focused’ ethical governance?
We are convinced that the findings of such large-scale citizen surveys as ours 
should be taken into consideration by the Finnish political elite and the leading 
reform drivers in the Finnish government. Plenty of evidence is at hand, but before 
that, more specific statistical analysis is required of the attitudes of citizens towards 
government and the interdependence of trust, accountability and openness. The 
respondents of the survey had a strong motivation to answer and had particular inter-
est to influence political and administrative decision making. The citizens might 
often be heard but not listened to by those in power.
Ethical governance is based on trust. Among citizens, trust is a sort of general 
confidence in politicians and public authorities. Trust means both increasing trust-
worthiness and decreasing distrust. Trustworthiness was rather high among the insti-
tutions and organizations we describe in Figure 1. If organizations and institutions 
are no longer reliable, general trust is gradually decreasing. Ethical governance is 
based on model examples given by politicians and public authorities. If unethical 
cases in a society increase, citizens’ confidence towards public officials staggers.
The Finnish public organizations and institutions so far enjoy the confidence of 
ordinary citizens. According to our analysis, trustworthiness seems to be relatively 
high. Estimations of integrity violations were rather moderate. The overall situation 
is still very good, but the basically positive judgment of citizens varies from one 
form of integrity violations to another. Is trust threatened by unethical behaviour? 
The citizens estimate that old boy networks, nepotism and excessive linkages in 
business life as corruption forms exist quite frequently. According to the citizens’ 
considerations, the serious forms of corruption play a relatively minor role in the 
public realm (see Figure 3). At least temporarily, the political scandals explain the 
decreasing figures in trust in politicians and public servants. In spite of citizens’ 
attitudes and predispositions towards government and services, without necessarily 
any real personal experience, the respondents strongly appeal to reform, e.g. ethi-
cally dysfunctional old boy networks and nepotism.
If public officials’ excessive linkages in business life are becoming more usual in 
the society, we expect that it will sooner or later interact with trust: first at the level of 
politicians and then at the level of public sector organizations and institutions. 
Openness and transparency as ethical values are threatened. Where is the dividing line 
that makes linkages too excessive? Should it be defined through a fixed sum of money 
or through the amount of citizens’ trust in the politico-administrative system?
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Q 7. How do you consider the trust-
worthiness of the following Finnish 
institutions and organizations?
1. Courts (n=1980)
2. Hospitals and health centres 
(n=1991)
3. Public authorities of social services 
(n=1968)
4. Labour force bureaus/Job centres 
(n=1959)
5. KELA, Social Insurance Institution 
(n=1987)
6. Church (n=1962)
7. YLE, National broadcasting 
company (n=1972)
8. Military (n=1976)
9. Police (n=1992)
10. Elementary and comprehensive 
schools (n=1983)
11. Universities and polytechnics 
(n=1969)
12. Itella, Finnish post company 
(n=1988)
13. VR, Finnish national railways 
(n=1979)
14. Sonera, Telecommunication 
company (n=1965)
15. Fortum, Energy company 
(n=1942)
16. Veikkaus, Finnish lottery 
monopoly (n=1955)
17. Finnair, National airways 
(n=1971)
18. Trade unions (n=1975)
19. Central organizations of 
employers (n=1972)
not at all 
trustworthy 
(%)
3.3
1.6
3.8
4.4
4.1
5.6
4.8
1.6
1.7
0.5
0.5
4.2
2.4
10.8
14.1
2.6
2.9
6.0
7.0
not very 
trustworthy 
(%)
7.9
6.4
14.8
13.1
12.4
7.8
10.8
3.9
3.7
2.2
1.8
12.8
13.8
28.1
26.1
6.8
12.9
17.2
19.3
somewhat 
trustworthy 
(%)
19.0
22.8
36.6
35.2
26.9
24.3
29.7
19.1
13.4
17.7
15.9
28.0
36.0
38.0
35.3
26.1
33.3
35.0
41.5
quite 
trustworthy 
(%)
55.8
58.5
40.6
42.1
47.2
46.2
45.0
50.2
52.7
61.8
63.6
45.7
42.0
21.0
21.7
47.0
43.2
35.4
28.5
very 
trustworthy 
(%)
14.0
10.7
4.2
5.2
9.4
16.1
9.7
25.2
28.6
17.9
18.3
9.4
5.8
2.1
2.8
17.5
7.7
6.4
3.7
Total 
(%)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Appendix
The two selected questions of the citizen survey.
Research Project: Citizens First? Ethical Governance in Terms of Citizens 2008-2010.
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Q 12. Please estimate the ethical 
level of the political system. 
1. Taking or giving bribes (n=1980)
2. Theft (n=1974)
3. Fraud (n=1968)
4. Old boy networks (n=1979)
5. Nepotism (n=1974)
6. Bad and careless treatment of 
citizens (n=1973)
7. Excessive linkages in business 
life (n=1960)
occurs very
seldom 
(%)
18.0
18.8
16.8
1.4
2.1
3.1
2.2
occurs quite 
seldom 
(%)
29.3
40.3
38.6
6.8
11.8
22.4
11.3
occurs 
some 
(%)
37.2
31.8
32.7
31.8
37.3
47.8
41.8
occurs quite 
much 
(%)
12.5
8.0
9.9
40.2
35.7
20.4
32.3
occurs very 
much 
(%)
2.9
1.1
1.9
19.8
13.1
6.4
12.3
Total 
(%)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
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In an OECD report entitled Government of the Future (2000), the question “Why 
public management reform?” is answered in three ways. First, governments need to 
keep up with society in terms of responsiveness and better, faster and more services. 
Second, trust in government needs to be re-established. A third reason is that govern-
ment’s role is changing under new pressures including the loss of the government 
monopoly, greater competition, the opening-up of societies and international struc-
tures. However, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the starting 
positions, the challenges, the capacity to change, and the initial objectives were quite 
different from most of the Western European countries, except for, e.g., Portugal or 
Spain. (OECD 2005).
In a first part, this essay will cover spans of public-sector reform which may be 
narrow or broad. In a second part, trajectories of reform, which are not linear but 
progressing in a corrective way, will be discussed. In a third and final part, remaining 
issues of reform practice and study are discussed.
1. Spans of public sector reform
In Western Europe, there was a relatively common problem analysis. Two main 
problems coincided: First, there was a macro-economic problem of too big a propor-
tion of government in the gross domestic product (GDP), of significant deficits, and 
of a perceived lack of public-sector performance contributing to the GDP. Second, 
there was a drop of trust and legitimacy in public institutions, including politicians.
The macro-economic shifts (from ‘problem’ to ‘solution’) could be operationa-
lised as follows from the ‘economic’ point of view:
 The proportion of the public sector in the GDP decreases; there are countries
 with stable patterns of decrease, others have more fluctuating decreases.
 Government net lending is an indicator of the yearly deficit. Of course, the
 European Union’s Maastricht criterion of a maximum of 3% deficit had a
 significant impact on reform policies within the European Union. In general, 
 there was a downward trend. In some countries, this deficit turned into a 
 surplus; the recent (financial) crises are reversing this pattern again.
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 Government employment as a proportion of total employment should in 
 general be decreasing. However, some countries have stable or even increa-
 sing numbers of government employment.
 The division of the budget shows in general that direct consumption by gov-
 ernments is decreasing. This may prove that direct service delivery by the
 public sector is decreasing as well. It also shows that transfers are increasing. 
 These should guarantee outsourcing or privatising of service delivery as well.
From a societal point of view, there was a general feeling of decreasing satisfaction 
with government performance, and a related level of trust which was generally 
decreasing. To solve these problems in countries like the United Kingdom (Thatcher) 
and the United States (Reagan), politicians initially started to blame the civil service 
and distanced themselves from the public sector. The public sector was the cause of 
all problems, and in reducing it, the two problems would be solved. This strategy of 
bureau-bashing could not last for a very long time, because trust in civil servants is 
higher than in politicians. The politicians’ pushing for lower trust in civil servants 
resulted in lower trust levels for the politicians themselves. This negative project was 
not sustainable in the long run. Therefore, other strategies had to be developed.
In analysing these strategies, three main objectives occur:
 the need to adjust the proportion of government in the GDP and the related 
 need to reduce the deficits (savings) or to re-allocate resources;
 the need to solve the problem of a low level of performance (real and/or 
 perceived as such); and
 the need to redefine responsibilities between actors (legislative versus 
 executive; public sector versus market; politics versus administration; min-
 isters versus ministries versus autonomous bodies; central level versus 
 decentralised levels of government); this triggers the need to redefine mec-
 hanisms of accountability.
In solving these needs, ‘performance’ became a common conceptual denominator. 
The exercise of moving activities to the market place and of reducing budgets implies 
a certain mapping of inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes, their links, now and in 
the future. Taking measures to improve real and/or perceived levels of performance 
requires the implementation and use of instruments that describe and push towards 
performance. Adjusting systems of responsibility-sharing and mechanisms of 
accountability implies that performance will be used as a key operational term to 
guarantee substantial, valid and auditable performance agreements. And in observing 
trends which occur in realising a modernised public sector, performance (measure-
ment and management) appears to be a pivotal element.
In general, there are three hypothetical basic mechanisms which could be pre-
sumed in the dynamics of increasing performance:
 First, increasing pressure improves performance (pressure assumption);
 second, increasing specialisation improves performance (re-structuring
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 assumption); and
 third, increasing citizen involvement improves performance (citizen-as-
 customer assumption). (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008)
The general idea that government and public sector are not changing by themselves 
is reflected in the idea that pressure for performance should be organised to guarantee 
change and improvement. As a result, internal and external pressure is institutiona-
lised in the public sector. Increasing internal pressure implies that the whole range of 
internal management instruments is activated. Strategic plans and business plans, 
personnel evaluations, organisational relationships and financial mechanisms are 
adjusted to enhance pressure. Also, external pressure, through market-type mecha-
nisms, is present.
Next to pressure, the idea of specialisation for performance is involved to enhance 
improvement. Creating autonomous organisations with smaller fields of competen-
cies, up to single-purpose or task-homogeneous bodies, is in accordance with the 
managerial philosophy which states that specialisation pushes results. This is also 
applied to the policy cycle where policy design seems to happen in a better way in e.g. 
ministries, the implementation in another independent entity (market or public sector) 
and the evaluation in still another one. Of course, the whole problem of co-ordination 
and the choice of an optimal level of specialisation are crucial. Most countries wrestle 
with the agenda of adequate mechanisms of co-ordination.
A third crucial issue is the ‘customer’ role of citizens, including their active 
involvement in co-designing, co-deciding, co-implementing and co-evaluating public 
services. Participation for performance becomes a key element in reform policies to 
increase satisfaction and ultimately trust and legitimacy of public services.
In the CEE countries, the problem analysis was also similar to a large degree. How-
ever, the starting positions were quite different, and the objectives were heavily influ-
enced by the perspective of possibly becoming a member of the EU. Building democ-
racies, organizing transitions, and preparing pre-accession were shared objectives.
In some cases, systems change drastically. Political systems change, e.g. from 
dictatorships to democracies, and their elites are removed. Democratic checks and 
balances are established. State structures are reshuffled, e.g. toward more decentralisa-
tion. The economic system changes its nature, e.g. from state monopolies to market 
systems with private firms. Societal and social systems with NGOs, not-for-profit 
organizations, and citizen action groups are established and are designed to participate 
actively in a public debate and to become stakeholders of their society and their com-
munities. (Peters 1996) Within the public sphere, the decision-making processes are 
redesigned to select political and administrative personnel, to create a legal framework 
with authority and legitimacy, to have a new budget cycle, to get sustainable policies 
which support the system and to establish a public sector infrastructure which is effi-
cient, effective, reliable, transparent, and legitimate.
Within the CEE countries, it seems that changes have been drastic indeed, includ-
ing in public systems. Politics, policies and administrations were to change accord-
ingly. In focusing on the administration and the management of public systems, five 
scopes of reform are possible, from a very narrow and limited, to a very stretched and 
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broad span of reform. (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) These five positions could be 
linked to definitions of public sector reform. Choosing one of these five positions is 
not just an academic choice with theoretical implications. Choosing one of these 
models has tremendous practical implications for the content of a reform programme, 
for the choice of the reform projects, for the sequence and timing of the reform port-
folio. It also requires different tactical choices to be made. One of the issues is how 
many degrees of freedom there are to reform the public sector.
1. A first model has a span of reform which is limited to single organisations 
 within the public sector. In this sense, “Public management is a merger of the 
 normative orientation of traditional public administration and the instrumen-
 tal orientation of general management.” (Perry and Kraemer 1983, x) In
 practice, this means that private-sector management techniques are imported
 into the public sector. Private-sector-based methods and techniques of com-
 mand and control, internal control systems, personnel and financial manage-
 ment tools, etc. are transferred to the public sector. The focus here is on
 single organisations. The assumption is that if these entities function pro-
 perly, the public sector is much better off. Obviously, this requires a solid
 support system, since this should be applied to all organisations in the public
 sector, from local to central.
2. A second model has a broader span of reform which looks beyond single
 organisations to clusters of public sector organisations. “The critical area of
 public management is the management of organizational interdependence, 
 for example, in the delivery of services or in the management of the budge-
 tary process. Public management is concerned with the effective functioning
 of whole systems of organizations. ... What distinguishes public management 
 is the explicit acknowledgement of the responsibility for dealing with struc-
 tural problems at the level of the system as a whole.” (Metcalfe and Richards 
 1987, 73-75) This is about reforming networks or chains of organisations. 
 Here we reform organisations and their interfaces, interdependencies, inter-
 actions and coherent clustering. Value added is defined at the level of sets of 
 organisations, not just at the single level. Here we can ask the question of 
 where particular organisations should be, at a central or rather a decentral 
 level. The location of an organisation in a set becomes important. There is 
 the question of relationships, e.g. hierarchies of organisations, in order to
 have good service delivery and policy implementation. This requires a vision 
 on the architecture and the mapping of the public sector.
3. A third model goes beyond this architecture. “We conceive public adminis-
 tration as the key output linkage of the state towards civil society. However, 
 the interface between public administration and civil society is a two-way
 street, including public policy implementation as well as policy demands 
 from private actors towards policy-makers.” (Pierre 1995, ix) This span of 
 reform includes the interface of the public sector and civil society. This inter-
 face needs to be reformed too, which in some cases requires civil society to
 be (re)built. This requires the recognition of civil society as a partner in 
 reform. Therefore platforms for exchange, transparent discussions and con-
 tradictory debates are necessary to reform the public sector in a sustainable,
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 legitimate, and transparent way. Stakeholders become part of the reform
 process. Outsourcing, co-production, and public-private partnerships (PPPs)
 become key tools in the whole production of services. Policy cycles consist 
 of co-design, co-decision, co-implementation and co-evaluation. (Pollitt, 
 Bouckaert and Löffler 2006)
4. A fourth model goes beyond the infrastructural level and includes the supra-
 structure of reform. “We talk about the managerial state because we want to
 locate managerialism as a cultural formation and a distinctive set of ideo-
 logies and practices which forms one of the underpinnings of an emergent
 political settlement.” (Clarke and Newman 1997, ix) This reform scope
 includes the realm of ideas and ideologies, culture and values. Reforming the
 public sector includes not just its infrastructure (organisations and their inter-
 actions within the public sector and its civil society) but also its suprastruc-
 ture. Although this does not mean that identities of communities or nations
 need to change, it does mean that practices are based on belief systems with
 norms and values, cultures and ideas. (Bouckaert 2007) Removing a tradition 
 of corruption, supporting a culture of public entrepreneurship with responsi-
 bility and accountability, pushing the value of citizen trust and customer
 satisfaction are part of this fourth span of reform. A crucial debate here is the
 old discussion of whether infrastructure determines its suprastructure or, the
 other way round, ideas change practice. This is a crucial element in a sustai-
 nable reform programme. It requires projects on civic education, transpa-
 rency and communication, customer, citizen and civil servant surveys on
 perceptions, expectations, beliefs and convictions, satisfaction and trust.
5. The fifth model goes beyond the fourth one and includes all elements of the
 system. “Public administration may be interpreted as a social system existing
 and functioning in accordance with its own order but, on the other hand, it 
 also depends on environmental conditions in a complex and changing soci-
 ety. ... In the light of the modern society’s functional differentiation, state and
 market are notable for their own characteristic strategies to control the supply 
 of goods. The type, scope, and distribution of private goods are decided on
 by harmonising the individual preferences within the market mechanisms;
 decisions on the production of public goods, on the other hand, result from a
 collective, i.e. politico-administrative, development of objectives.” (König
 1996, 4, 59) This requires a reform strategy which includes the major stee-
 ringmechanisms in society, depending on the state structure itself. Market 
 mechanisms are obvious within the private sector. Budget mechanisms are
 clear within the public sector. In a mixed economy, you also may have con-
 sensual allocation of resources amongst not-for-profit organisations. Public
 sector reform affects the proportions and regulates the allocation mecha-
 nisms of public, private and not-for-profit. It also affects the allocation
 mechanisms within the public sector using hierarchies (budgetary top-down
 distribution with e.g. envelopes), markets (market type mechanisms such as
 vouchers or competitive tendering) or networks (consensual distribution).
Just as in many other countries, CEE countries have chosen mixed strategies of 
public-sector reform, and these choices have changed over time. However, it seems 
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that the span of reform has been rather broader than narrow. It also seems that tactics 
could have been more visible than strategy because of electoral cycles.
This brings us to the question of the trajectories to move ahead. Are reforms 
linear or dialectic or cyclical? Are they continuous or discontinued? Are reforms 
cumulative or not? Have models been made explicit or not?
2. Trajectories of reform
It is clear that these adjustments in the public sector have been based on an action-
reaction pattern where the solution of a problem turns into a problem itself which 
needs to be solved, as in figure 1. A solution becomes dysfunctional because it is not 
really, or really not, answering the question, or because the solution is becoming so 
extreme that it has lost its answering capability, or because the implementation was 
so deteriorated and deteriorating. Sometimes the ‘cure’ was worse than the disease. 
Many OECD countries, even the most rational and ‘pure’ NPM countries, such as 
e.g. New Zeeland, had a series of reforms which could be framed into a sequence of 
a (problem)-(solution)=(problem)-(solution) etc. chain. (Boston et al. 1996; Chapman 
and Duncan 2007; Commonwealth Secretariat 2003; Norman 2003; Scott 2001; 
Schick 1996) This zig-zag action-reaction chain was not designed beforehand but 
became a pattern of change in many countries. In some cases, there was an ideo-
logical exaggeration of a solution which then was ideologically corrected in the next 
government.
This trajectory is described in figure 1. An initial situation is perceived as a prob-
lem. Since the 1980s, reactions of countries have been to maintain, modernise, mar-
ketise or minimise their public sectors. (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) This resulted in 
a range of acceptable ‘solutions’ for the perceived problems. However, as described 
above, these solutions became too extreme, or unacceptable because of some dys-
functions. Dysfunctional pressure and specialisation caused loss of control. In gen-
eral the set of solutions that has been developed to solve the second generation of 
problems can be based on mechanisms (and their related instruments) of hierarchy, 
markets and networks. Specifically, Market-Type Mechanisms (MTM) and Network-
Type Mechanisms (NTM) were supposed to be useful because of their higher level 
of compatibility with organisational autonomy. (Christensen and Laegreid 2006; 
Halligan 2006)
Problems were perceived of guaranteeing performance, taking and allocating 
responsibility, substantiating accountability, keeping or even enhancing transparen-
cy, making functional control and keeping a sufficient policy capacity. As a ‘solu-
tion’, agencies were created, autonomy was granted, specialisation was increased, 
single-policy capacity was developed, and performance measurement systems 
(PMS) were installed for guiding, control and evaluation. This would solve the initial 
problem.
However, these reforms resulted in dysfunctional levels of autonomy. Autonomy 
became an objective in itself, and central government lost control over centrifugal 
families of organisations. Because of the contracting mechanisms with these agen-
cies, there was a focus on measurable outputs which also influenced a bonus system. 
This resulted in a suboptimal focus on agency outputs rather than on policy out-
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comes. It was unclear if and how certain outputs were contributing to certain out-
comes. Ultimately, outputs became an objective in themselves. There also were 
considerable transaction costs between the components of the policy cycle and 
between agencies. Autonomy resulted in disconnecting the normal chain of design, 
implementation and evaluation. Even worse, the nature of the connection was altered 
from a hierarchical link to a market type mechanism. Policy advice and design was 
supplied to departments or agencies. There was a quasi-market interface between 
supply and demand of policy advice or any other interaction between entities in the 
public sector. In separating supply and demand, there was a disconnected policy 
capacity which was too specialised and which lacked critical mass. The linkage 
between stages of the policy cycle, but also within the implementation stages were 
disrupted for the sake of autonomy and responsibility. A logical policy chain became 
a sequence of supplies and demands. Dysfunctions as a consequence of performance-
based control systems started to result in ‘gaming’. The guiding principle was not the 
reality of administrative or societal value added but its derivative of better numbers 
on particular indicators.
This problem triggered new ‘solutions’ which were based on re-establishing the 
co-ordination between departments and agencies, or between different agencies, by 
using renewed Hierarchy-type-mechanisms (HTM) as well as new Market-type-
mechanisms (MTM) and Network-type-mechanisms (NTM). Also efforts to look 
beyond single organisations and to take a policy field perspective (in focusing on 
outcome drivers for outputs, cross organisational boarder ‘landscape reviews’ or 
joined-up government or straight forward evaluations) were put in place, increasing 
policy capacity at a higher (meso) level. Audits became the (re)new(ed) solution. 
Internal audits became a separate part of the internal control system. External audits 
were expanded and further developed, auditing all aspects of ‘performance’, includ-
ing the quality of indicators and data. A key question was whether these ‘solutions’ 
would generate new problems.
They did. It seems that HTM was not always very functional, especially in cases 
of pure recentralisation. Also MTM sometimes resulted in shifting from a public to 
a private monopoly, without competition, or market regulation and modernisation. 
NTM, in many cases, became a soft and symbolic mechanism. Obviously, there are 
good examples of renewed versions of hierarchies (holding structures, consolidated 
budgets, etc.) or regulated markets (telecom, postal services, electricity) or networks 
which did function (‘open methods of co-ordination’ in the EU). However, it also 
seemed that when a problem occurred, the solution was to have more of the same. A 
perceived problem of indicators, objectives or audits resulted in more indicators, 
more objectives and more audits. One could sometimes consider a mushrooming of 
indicators and objectives, and an audit tsunami. Especially internal audits have 
exploded. Above all, performance as a principle to organise a control system replac-
es trust, internal trust, as a basic principle. Distrust within the public sector became 
the standard: between the central and the local governments, between the ministries 
and the agencies, between the line departments and the horizontal departments, 
between politics and administration. The assumption that agents and professionals 
within the public sector are in line with general interest became an obsolete principle 
and needed to be replaced with a major principle of economic neo-institutionalists, 
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i.e. principals should not trust agents. Therefore, if trust was good, it was not good 
enough anymore. Distrust, control and audits should replace it.
This extreme solution, turning into a problem, needed a new solution. In some 
countries, there was a tendency to consider the ‘less is more’ principle. In the 
Netherlands, indicators need to be ‘useful’ and the ‘provide or explain’ principle says 
that one should provide indicators unless one can explain why these are not provided. 
Rebuilding trust within the public sector, not just citizens trusting their government and 
administration, becomes a ‘solution’. Also, the focus on performance needs to take a 
governance approach into account, beyond the public sector in its strict sense, resulting 
in performance governance as a model. (6 et al. 2002) Obviously, this again may result 
in new problems, and an ex-ante evaluation of these new solutions is required.
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Figure 1: Refined Problem-Solution Chain regarding public sector reform
These zig-zag action-reaction trajectories are an empirical description which seems 
to apply to many OECD countries, even if some have followed this sequence in a 
more explicit way than others. To the extent that some countries have followed, or 
even imitated, ‘advanced’ solutions, which were advanced because they provided 
solutions to a previous problem and therefore were further ahead in the sequence, 
they probably did not provide the right ‘solutions’ to their own (sequence of) ‘prob-
lems’. A famous case is Mongolia, which imported the New Zealand financial 
model, which was financed by an Asian Development Bank loan. It makes certain 
observers proclaim that we need not imitate New Zealand, especially not developing 
countries (Schick 1998).
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Many of the shared problem definitions were also generated by sclerotic traditional 
and Weberian bureaucracies. For many continental European countries, the state of 
law (Rechtsstaat, Etat de Droit) and its related Weberian bureaucracies were the 
starting position. Indeed, there was a need to have a more developed incentive for 
performance responsibility and accountability, for citizens as a customer orientation, 
for open and transparent decision-making, perhaps even for participation. Upgrading 
a European Weberian model with elements of performance and participation could 
result in a Neo-Weberian model. (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Pollitt et al. 2009) 
Anglo-Saxon countries have followed a trajectory of upgrading public management 
models by applying principles of New Public Management.
CEE countries inherited bureaucracies which were dominated by a single party. 
Even more important than defining the ultimate model which is necessary for a par-
ticular country, it is important to try to define, or to anticipate the zig-zag trajectory 
of action and reaction to reach the desired model. Obviously, especially for countries 
that wanted to, and ultimately did, join the EU, there was a clear ‘to do’list and a 
series of ‘acquis’ to realise. There was economic and political pressure to prove prog-
ress, to speed up change, perhaps to take short cuts or to jump to ‘final’ positions. 
Reforming the public sector sometimes was indispensable and impossible at the 
same time, and therefore highly problematic. Importing NPM techniques that needed 
to improve Weberian bureaucracies when these were not present and simultaneously 
building classical checks and balances was a tough reality. Reforming in such a case 
sometimes was organising dysfunctions. This leads us to the last section.
3. Further issues to explore
Applying a standard model of analysis to a range of countries makes sense. The 
ultimate purpose is to compare. The purpose of comparing is to detect patterns or 
clusters, and to learn from these patterns or clusters of countries. However, differ-
ences remain crucial.
Many questions remain for the practice of change, but also for empirical 
research. Most of this research happened ex post and followed a classical pattern of 
describing, modelling and, in some cases, explaining reform. In some cases it was 
possible to even predict the consequences of certain reform initiatives because the 
solutions did not match the problems, or because the contingencies or conditions for 
an effective solution were not present, or the culture of competition was not part of 
the culture of the country.
It is clear that public sector reform is a never-ending story. Therefore initial ques-
tions remain relevant, such as, e.g., Are short cuts possible? How do we make irre-
versible reform? How well, and under what conditions do models travel? How 
generic and how contingent are models? What can we learn from others? Is it useful 
to replicate research models in a different context? Should we start with finance, 
personnel or organisational reforms within organisations? etc.
It is important for CEE countries to continue to compare and to learn from one 
another. It is necessary to develop trajectories and to detect problems, possible solu-
tions for these problems and possible new problems because of these solutions.
Geert Bouckaert
103
REFERENCES
6, P., D. Leat, K. Seltzer and G. Stoker. 2002. Towards Holistic Goverance. The New
 Reform Agenda. Hampshire: Palgrave.
Boston, Jonathan, John Martin, June Pallot and Pat Walsh. 1996. Public Management,
 The New Zealand Model. Auckland: Oxford University Press.
Bouckaert, Geert. 2007. “Cultural Characteristics from Public Management Reforms 
 Worldwide.” In Kuno Schedler and Isabella Pröller (eds). Cultural Aspects 
 of Public Management Reforms. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 29-64.
Bouckaert, Geert and John Halligan. 2008. Managing Performance, International 
 Comparisons. London: Routledge.
Chapman, Jeff and Duncan Grant. 2007. “Is there now a New ‘New Zealand 
 Model’?” Public Management Review 9 (1), 1-25.
Christensen, T. and P. Laegreid (eds). 2006. Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with
 Agencies in the Modern State. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Clarke J. and J. Newman. 1997. The Managerial State. London: Sage.
Commonwealth Secretariat. 2003. A Profile of the Public Service of New Zealand: 
 Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service
 Management. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
Halligan, J. 2006. “The Reassertion of the Centre in a First Generation NPM
 System.” In T. Christensen and P. Laegreid (eds). Autonomy and Regulation: 
 Coping with Agencies in the Modern State. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
 162-180.
König, Klaus. 1996. On the Critique of New Public Management. Speyer: Speyerer 
 Forschungsberichte, nr. 155.
Metcalfe, Les and Sue Richards. 1987. “Evolving Public Management Cultures.” In
 Jan Kooiman and K. Eliassen (eds). Managing Public Organizations. 
 London: Sage, 65-86.
Norman, Richard. 2003. Obedient Servants? Management Freedoms and 
 Accountabilities in the New Zealand Public Sector. Wellington: Victoria
 University Press.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2005. Modernising 
 Government: The Way Forward. Paris: OECD.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2000. Government of 
 the Future. Paris: OECD.
Perry J. and K. Kraemer (eds). 1983. Public Management: Public and Private
 Perspectives. California: Mayfield.
Peters, B.G. 1996. The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models. Lawrence: 
 University Press of Kansas.
Pierre, Jon. 1995. Bureaucracy in the Modern State: An Introduction to Comparative
 Public Administration. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Pollitt Christopher and Geert Bouckaert. 2004. Public Management Reform: A 
 Comparative Analysis. 2nd expanded edn. Oxford: Oxford University
 Press.
Public Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe
104
Pollitt Christopher, Geert Bouckaert and Elke Löffler. 2007. Making Quality
 Sustainable: Co-design, co-decide, co-produce, co-evaluate. Report by the 
 Scientific Rapporteurs of the 4th Quality Conference, Ministry of Finance, 
 Finland.
Pollitt Christopher, Geert Bouckaert, Tiina Randma-Liiv and Wolfgang Drechsler 
 (eds). 2009. A Distinctive European Model? The Neo-Weberian State. 
 Bratislava: NISPA.
Schick, Allen. 1998. “Why most Developing Countries Should not Try New Zealand
 Reforms.” World Bank Research Observer 13 (1), 123-131.
Schick, Allen. 1996. The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector 
 in a Time of Change. Wellington: State Services Commission.
Scott Graham. 2001. Public Sector Management in New Zealand, Lessons and
 Challenges. Canberra: Centre for Law and Economics, ANU.
Geert Bouckaert








